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Abstract 
 
 This thesis explores whether the doctrine of indefeasibility of title and its three associated 
principles – the mirror principle, the curtain principle, and the insurance principle – are mythical 
constructs, and not legal facts as they are portrayed in the dominant legal discourse and in 
traditional legal research sources.  It is commonly understood that indefeasibility of title is the 
hallmark of land titles systems of registration, especially those based on the Torrens model, and 
Saskatchewan is a jurisdiction which operates such a system. When one examines the genesis of 
land titles systems and indefeasibility of title, Saskatchewan’s land titles statutes and recent court 
decisions, one discovers that there is a dichotomy between indefeasibility of title in practice and 
how it is portrayed in theory.  Given that land titles systems of registration are statutory 
creations, it is more appropriate to utilize the language in the legislation and therefore to avoid 
reliance upon these constructs. 
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 1 
THE EMPEROR’S NEW CLOTHES: 
THE MYTH OF INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE IN SASKATCHEWAN 
- AN INTRODUCTION 
It might be appropriate to begin this thesis with the iconic phrase, “once upon a time.” 
Reminiscent of the Andersen fairy tale “The Emperor’s New Clothes,”1 the thesis exposes that 
the doctrine of “indefeasibility of title” is little more than a myth in Saskatchewan.  Nonetheless, 
the doctrine and its three associated principles: the mirror, curtain and insurance principle, are 
supported as legal fact in dominant legal discourse, including judgments of the court: 
….the torrens system of land registration encompasses the indefeasibility of title 
and that the certificate of title is intended to be a complete and accurate reflection 
of the result of all preceding transactions affecting the land. The plaintiff submits 
that a person searching a certificate of title is entitled to rely upon such search 
without looking elsewhere.
 2
 
 
Contrary to this assertion, they have never existed as such.  
Such an argument may be considered blasphemous, because "indefeasibility” has grown 
to be “the received and almost universally accepted manner of describing a ‘title’ under the 
religion [of the Torrens System].”3 This is not surprising because this growth occurred during a 
time when provincial and territorial government officials acknowledged that Canadian land titles 
statutes were: 
opaque, and sometimes downright misleading. They … [had] to be tortured by 
courts into new forms to meet current conditions. They … [hid] the light of title 
registration under bushels of substantive law and administrative detail. They 
require[d] rationalization and modernization in the light of nearly a century and a 
half of experience of title registration.
4
 
In the 1990s the government of Saskatchewan addressed these concerns,
5
 and in 2000 
significantly revamped the land titles system and its legislation,
6
 making it clearer and better 
                                                 
1
 Hans Christian Andersen, “The Emperor’s New Clothes” in Maria Tatar (ed), The Annotated Hans Christian 
Andersen, (New York: WW Norton & Company, Inc, 2008) at 3. 
2
 GW Harris Drywall Ltd v Saskatchewan (Regina Land Registration District) (1982), Sask R 149; [1982] SJ no 10 
(SKQB) at para 15. 
3
 Thomas W Mapp, Torrens’ Elusive Title: Basic Legal Principles of an Efficient Torrens’ System (Edmonton: The 
University of Alberta Printing Department, The University of Alberta, 1978) at para 4.23. 
4
 Joint Land Titles Committee, Renovating the Foundation: Proposals for a Model Land Recording and Registration 
Act for the Provinces and Territories of Canada (Edmonton: Alberta Law Reform Institute, 1990) at 4-5. 
5
 Chapter 3 below at 87-92. 
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organized.  As a result, it is now easier to see the problems and limitations inherent in the claim 
that indefeasibility of title is centrally important to the system’s operation. This explains why 
Saskatchewan is an appropriate focus of analysis. 
If one remains taken aback by the hypothesis, it is important to realize that the reliance 
upon these terms grew during the pre-computer and internet era, at a time when legal research 
sources were all paper-based.  Researching and accessing journal articles and case reporters from 
other jurisdictions was not always possible, because it depended upon the collection in the 
research library.  Also, one had to examine a series of paper volumes to ascertain 
interconnections between statutory provisions, and to determine whether any had been amended. 
There was no other way to research statutes. Accessing more than 100-year-old newspaper 
articles and almost 200-year-old and out-of-print books was not possible.  In this environment, 
questioning the efficacy of “indefeasibility of title” would be a major research project involving 
travel to three continents and years of study.  There is no evidence that any researcher ever 
secured funding for such a project.   
Fortunately, online research databases now make such research possible.  Among other 
things, in the twenty-first century one can find sources which used to be difficult to access, 
including: a more than 180 year old treatise containing a draft “Code” (statute) now out of print;7 
an article on real property reform written by Jeremy Bentham;
8
 excerpts from speeches of Robert 
Torrens;
9
 more than fifty-year-old foreign journal articles which debate the central features of 
                                                                                                                                                             
6
 The Land Titles Act, 2000, SS 2000, c L-5.1, as discussed in Chapter 3 below beginning at 92. 
7
 James Humphreys, Observations on the Actual State of the English Laws of Real Property; with The Outlines of a 
Code (London, John Murray, 1826) as digitalized by Google Books and found online at 
<http://books.google.ca/books?id=C5kDAAAAQAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=%22Observations+on+the+Actual
+State+of+the+English+Laws+of+Real+Property%22&source=bl&ots+Go_jaklbcG&sig=efh3r9UXOFNBkqshXN
Tz9J3-_4U&hl=en&ei=jELPTJ-
eMsKonAfj55jpDw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=l&ved=0CBUQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false
> discussed in Chapter 1 below at 6-9. 
8
 Jeremy Bentham, On Mr. Humphreys’ Observations on the English Law of Real Property: with the Outline of a 
Code, &c. London, 1827 [Bentham 1827] reprinted in The Making of the Modern World. Gale 2009. Gale, Cengage 
Learning. University of Saskatchewan Library. 13 November 2009 online: 
<http://galenet.galegroup.com.cyber.usask.ca/serviet/MOME?af=RN&ae=U104702744&srchtp=a&ste=14>  
discussed in Chapter 1 below at 6-9. 
9
 Rosalind F Croucher, “Inspired Law Reform or Quick Fix? Or, ‘Well, Mr Torrens, what do you reckon now?’ A 
Reflection on Voluntary Transactions and Forgeries in the Torrens System” (2009) 30 Adel L Rev 291 at 304 
(HeinOnline). 
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land titles systems;
10
 the ten current Canadian land titles statutes
11
 (none of which have adopted 
“indefeasibility of title”12 and only one of which refers to an “indefeasible title”13); the Canadian 
journal articles which have employed the term “indefeasibility of title” or “indefeasible;”14 and a 
correlated list of the number of times courts in each province have used the terms “indefeasibility 
of title,” “mirror principle,” “curtain principle,” and “insurance principle.”15 
Accessing such research sources, in addition to consulting more traditional research 
sources ranging from Blackstone to Greg Taylor’s new book, The Law of the Land,16  facilitates 
a more critical analysis of indefeasibility of title and a greater understanding of the context in 
which it developed than was possible before using the internet and online legal research 
databases became customary.  This explains why such an argument as the one made in this thesis 
may seem novel. 
When one juxtaposes the information contained in the historical and modern sources, and 
further when one compares the contents of repealed and current land titles legislation in 
Saskatchewan, one begins to question if indefeasibility truly is a hallmark of land titles systems 
of registration, or if it ever has been.  From the synthesis created out of these research results, 
                                                 
10
 See eg: WN Harrison, “Indefeasibility of Torrens Title” (1954) 2 U Queensland LJ 206 (HeinOnline) discussed in 
Chapter 3 below at 68; RG Patton, “The Torrens System of Land Title Registration” (1935) 19 Minn L Rev 519 
(HeinOnline) referred to in Chapter 4 below; Charles E. Stevenson, “Brevia Addenda: Influence of Bentham and 
Humphreys on the New York Property Legislation of 1828” (1957) 1 Am J Legal Hist 155 (HeinOnline) referred to 
in Chapter 1 below. 
11
 Land Titles Act, RSA 2000, c L-4 (Alberta, available on CanLII); The Land Titles Act, 2000, supra note 6 
(Saskatchewan, available on CanLII); Land Titles Act, RSO 1990, c L.5 (Ontario, available on CanLII); Land Titles 
Act, RSY 2002, c 130 (Yukon, available on CanLII); Land Title Act, RSNWT 1988, c 8 (Supp) (North West 
Territories, available on CanLII); Land Titles Act, RSNWT (Nu) 1988, c 8 (Supp) (Nunavut, available on CanLII); 
Land Titles Act, SNB 1981, c L-1.1 (New Brunswick, available on CanLII); Land Titles Act, RSBC 1996, c 250 
(British Columbia, available on CanLII); The Real Property Act, CCSM c R30 (Manitoba, available on CanLII); and 
Land Registration Act, SNS 2001, c 6 (Nova Scotia, available on CanLII). 
12
 Although their statutes do not contain “indefeasibility of title,” Alberta, Saskatchewan, the Yukon, the North-West 
Territories, and Nunavut do employ the expression “absolute and indefeasible estate of inheritance in fee simple of 
and in the lands” in the short form mortgage covenant which is found in a schedule or appendix attached to its 
statute, or contained in a regulation.  See: The Land Titles Act, RSA 2000, c L-4 at Schedule 2, Column 2; The Land 
Titles Regulations, 2001, SR 2001, c L-5.1, Reg 1, Appendix 2, Column 2; The Land Titles Act, RSY 2002, c 130, 
Schedule 2, Column 2; The Land Titles Act, RSNWT 1988, c 8 (Supp), Schedule B, Column 2; NSNWT-NU 1988, 
c 8 (Supp), Schedule B, Column 2.   
13
 The expression “indefeasible title” is contained in the Land Titles Act, RSBC, supra note 11 at ss 23, 25, 29, 33, 
34 and 37. 
14
 See Chapter 2 below at 55-60. 
15
 See Chapter 2 below at 62-67. 
16
 Greg Taylor, The Law of the Land The Advent of the Torrens System in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2008). 
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Chapter 1 provides the context in which land titles systems developed, and of its most important 
features. “Indefeasibility of title” was not of central importance in more than the first one-
hundred years in which common law jurisdictions operated land titles systems of registration, 
even those based on the Torrens model.
17
  The terms “mirror principle,” “curtain principle,” and 
“insurance principle” were not created until the early 1950s.18  From this it can be concluded that 
the genesis of the doctrine of indefeasibility of title in Saskatchewan is very different from how it 
is usually portrayed.   
From this a need was identified to survey traditional research sources regarding 
indefeasibility of title, to determine if they provide any indication that there is more to 
indefeasibility of title than how it is commonly portrayed. Chapter 2 serves this function, and 
outlines the common understanding of indefeasibility of title, and the mirror, curtain, and 
insurance principles. 
The next two chapters refute the common understanding, particularly as it appears in 
Saskatchewan. The land titles system of registration is based upon a statute, and judicial 
interpretation has only been necessary when legislative provisions are ambiguous, or when the 
issue involves a matter which the legislation has failed to address.  Chapter 3 examines the 
contents of Saskatchewan’s land titles legislation of 1906,19 197820 and 200121 and determines 
that indefeasibility of title and the three principles have never been central tenets of the 
province’s land titles system.  Chapter 4 examines four relatively recent cases where 
indefeasibility of title has been, or should have been, considered.  Contrary to the dominant 
assertion, three of these cases illustrate that courts do not always treat indefeasibility of title as a 
legal fact, thereby supporting the argument that it is more myth than reality. 
Taken together, these four chapters support the hypothesis that indefeasibility of title has 
never existed in Saskatchewan.  One might think that this is a theoretical issue of limited 
importance.  However, the lack of understanding of this subject potentially can affect many 
people who live in the ten Canadian jurisdictions which operate land titles systems of 
                                                 
17
 Chapter 1 below. 
18
 Theodore BF Ruoff, An Englishman Looks at the Torrens System (Sydney: The Law Book Co of Australasia Pty 
Ltd, 1957). 
19
 The Land Titles Act, SS 1906, c 24. 
20
 The Land Titles Act, RSS 1978, c L-5 (repealed by SS 2000, c L-5.1). 
21
 The Land Titles Act, 2000, supra note 6. 
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registration.
22
  Consider that in 2006 in Regina, Saskatchewan, two-thirds of all dwellings were 
single-detached homes,
23
 and sixty-eight percent of all dwellings were owner-occupied.
24
 Home 
owners are the people who potentially will be adversely affected if lawyers do not understand the 
nuances inherent in land titles legislation and conveyancing practices.  The issue of the myth of 
indefeasibility is not just theoretical; it possesses practical consequences. It is important that its 
limitations be exposed, and the public be protected from the misunderstanding which may result 
from our collective reliance on these terms.  
 
                                                 
22
 These are the Yukon, British Columbia, Alberta, the North West Territories, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Nunavut, 
Ontario, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. 
23
 Sask Trends Monitor, Focusing on People … a social and demographic profile of the Regina community 2008 
Edition June 2009 at section 5.1, located online at <http://www.regina.ca/residents/residents-regina-
facts/information-facts/Focusing_on_People_2008final[1].pdf>. 
24
 Ibid at Table 5.1. 
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CHAPTER 1 
PINNACLE OR POSTSCRIPT:  
THE GENESIS OF INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE 
By the early nineteenth century English real property law, especially conveyancing, was 
like a pot of water which had been heated to a temperature just below boiling.  Discussions of 
revolution or reform were commonplace, and noted utilitarian theorist Jeremy Bentham even 
participated in the debate.
1
  Consequently it is not surprising that in the mid 1820s – more than 
forty years before a patent was granted to the inventors of the typewriter
2
 - established English 
lawyer and “conveyancer,”3 James Humphreys, authored a book on this subject.   
He called it Observations on the Actual State of the English Laws of Real Property; with 
The Outlines of a Code, and it was in excess of 350 pages.
4
  It included an explanation of the 
changes he identified as necessary to overhaul this area of law, and a model Code.  It was a 
remarkable feat; Humphreys had to handwrite this treatise before it could be reproduced with 
typographical plates on a printing press.  He was a solicitor, and this task reduced the amount of 
time available for him to focus on billable work.  Because of this, Bentham noted that 
Humphreys had made “a sacrifice of pecuniary interest on the altar of public good.”5   
As demonstrated through this project, Humphreys was dedicated to improving the state of 
conveyancing and the English law of real property, and he thought a Code would function as the 
pinnacle in possible improvements. Through this treatise, Humphreys sought to expose the 
                                                 
1
 Jeremy Bentham, On Mr. Humphreys’ Observations on the English Law of Real Property: with the Outline of a 
Code, &c. London, 1827 [Bentham 1827] reprinted in The Making of the Modern World. Gale 2009. Gale, Cengage 
Learning. University of Saskatchewan Library. 13 November 2009 online: 
<http://galenet.galegroup.com.cyber.usask.ca/serviet/MOME?af=RN&ae=U104702744&srchtp=a&ste=14> . 
2
 In 1867, US citizen Christopher Latham Sholes invented the typewriter.  In 1868, the US government granted a 
patent for his invention to him, Carolos Glidden and Samuel Soule.  See online: 
<http://www.ideafinder.com/history/inventions/typewriter.htm>. 
3
 Bentham 1827, supra note 1 at 3. 
4
 James Humphreys, Observations on the Actual State of the English Laws of Real Property; with The Outlines of a 
Code (London, John Murray, 1826) as digitized by Google Books and found online at 
<http://books.google.ca/books?id=C5kDAAAAQAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=%22Observations+on+the+Actual
+State+of+the+English+Laws+of+Real+Property%22&source=bl&ots+Go_jaklbcG&sig=efh3r9UXOFNBkqshXN
Tz9J3-_4U&hl=en&ei=jELPTJ-
eMsKonAfj55jpDw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=l&ved=0CBUQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false
>. 
5
 Bentham 1827, supra note 1 at 3. 
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defects in real property law,
6
 to demonstrate emphatically that these laws were “utterly incapable 
of correction.”7  He also wanted to prove that a code in this area was possible, that all elements 
of the problem could be addressed through legislation, with “practicable” results.8  The common 
law had failed, and he advocated that legislation must replace it.   
This was revolutionary.  When Humphreys was writing, legislative codes were not 
popular with the English who associated “code” with the French Civil Code, bringing to mind 
the relatively recent issues with France and Napoleon.
9
  In such an environment many legal 
scholars were not receptive to legislative reforms,
10
 preferring to rely upon judicial 
interpretation. Yet Humphreys still chose to draft a code to transform real property law. 
His book “was acclaimed as a masterpiece”11 and, given the importance attached to this 
issue, generated a great deal of debate.  At the time there were conflicting opinions regarding 
reforms to real property law and conveyancing.  Some commentators agreed with Humphreys 
and believed that the entire system needed to be changed.  For example, Bentham wrote that 
“this mass of abuse could not be cleared away by any other hand than that of parliament.”12  
Another person wrote under a pseudonym and adopted a more moderate position than had 
Bentham.  However, he still evidenced support for Humphreys’ concepts.13   
Jonathan Henry Christie exemplified a more traditional and conservative reaction to 
Humphreys’ work. 14  He wrote that a code would not work because the drafters could not 
                                                 
6
 Humphreys, supra note 3 at 3. 
7
 Ibid at 179. 
8
 Ibid at 179; Charles E. Stevenson, “Brevia Addenda: Influence of Bentham and Humphreys on the New York 
Property Legislation of 1828” (1957) 1 Am J Legal Hist 155 at 161 [Charles Stevenson] (HeinOnline). 
9
 Humphreys, supra note 3 at 2. 
10
 JH Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (2
nd
 ed) (London: Butterworths, 1979) at 189.  The utilitarian 
legal scholars Jeremy Bentham and James Austin are two exceptions. See:  Jeremy Bentham, The theory of 
legislation, edited and with an introduction by C.K. Ogden (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1931) and John 
Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (London: Murray, 1832).  
11
 Charles Stevenson, supra note 8 at 161. 
12
 Bentham 1827, supra note 1 at 6. 
13
 A Correspondent, “Examination of the Code of Laws of Real Property, proposed by Mr. Humphreys” (1827) 5 
Prop Law 325 (HeinOnline). 
14
 Jonathan Henry Christie, Letter to the Right Hon. Robert Peel, One of His Majesty’s Principal Secretaries of 
State, on the Proposed Changes in The Laws of Real Property, and on Modern Conveyancing (London: John 
Murray, 1827), as digitized by Google Books and found online at 
<http://books.google.ca/books?id=UYG_PH2j7XoC&pg=PA478&lpg=PA478&dq=%22Code+of+Laws+of+Real+
Property%22&source=bl&ots=PKArRubCwJ&sig=-tOgS1rhVqSxG-YGIYQRwOOU3nc&hl=en&ei=1-
  8 
possibly foresee all issues.  Therefore more reliance would have to be placed on litigation if a 
code was adopted.
15
  He also asserted that only incremental changes would work, especially 
since lawyers exhibited a tendency to revert to the legal systems and practices which they knew 
and used.
16
  To him, the complete transformation of the system of real property law, through the 
adoption of a code, was unlikely to be effective. 
But Humphreys and Bentham believed otherwise.  Their commitment to revolution 
through the pinnacle of legislation was shared later by Robert Richard Torrens of South 
Australia.  In Australia that belief resulted in the development of a land titles system of 
registration which was adopted in many other jurisdictions including Saskatchewan.  More than 
one hundred and fifty years after the first land titles system was adopted, these statutes are no 
longer treated as the “pinnacles” of the evolutionary process of conveyancing practices.  Instead, 
the principle or doctrine of indefeasibility of title is.   
Contrary to popular belief, “indefeasibility of title” was only a postscript in real property 
law and conveyancing practices until approximately sixty years ago.  This is evidenced through 
examination of conveyancing practices documented by Blackstone in the late eighteenth century, 
the reform movement which resulted in the adoption of a deed registry system, and in the 
development of the first land titles system of registration in South Australia.  The term also is 
noticeably absent from the debate in Canada which resulted in the adoption of land titles systems 
of registration in Ontario, Manitoba, and the in the North-West Territories.
17
  
If South Australia legislation is not the genesis of this term, what is?  In the late 1950s 
noted British land titles expert Theodore Ruoff credits Canada and the decision of Turta v 
Canadian Pacific Railway
18
 with the creation and popularization of this expression.
19
  A closer 
                                                                                                                                                             
TOTJm0EoGlnQf6_7ET&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=28&ved=0CBkQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=%
22Code%20of%20Real%20Property%22&f=false>. 
15
 Ibid at 6-8. 
16
 Ibid at 8-9. 
17
 Greg Taylor, The Law of the Land: The Advent of the Torrens system in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2008). 
18
 Canadian Pacific Railway Company v Turta (1954), SCR 427; [1954] 3 DLR 1; [1954] SCJ no 31 (SCC) 
(available on CanLII) [Turta SCC citing to QL]. 
19
 Theodore BF Ruoff, An Englishman Looks at the Torrens system (Sydney: The Law Book Co of Australasia Pty 
Ltd, 1957) at 8 and 9 n 14. 
  9 
examination of the trial and appeal judgments
20
 leads to an inference that Ruoff overstates the 
importance which the Supreme Court attached to the term.  The trial court in Turta actually 
advocates that ownership disputes should be resolved on the basis of the wording contained in 
the legislation, and not on phrases which are not codified in the statute.
21
  Such an approach, 
notes the Court, leads to confusion.  Neither the Court of Appeal nor the Supreme Court of 
Canada contradicted this position.  Consequently, it was not the Canadian courts but Ruoff – the 
man who also coined the expressions mirror principle, curtain principle, and insurance 
principle
22
 – who promulgated a term which began as a postscript to the real property and 
conveyancing reform movement, and which is now treated as if it is the pinnacle of land titles 
systems of registration.
23
   
1. CONVEYANCING DURING BLACKSTONE’S ERA 
Since the Conquest in 1066, the English law has recognized that all land is owned by the 
Crown, with individuals merely being granted an estate or interest therein.  In such a system the 
original Crown grant is viewed as the foundation of all titles.
24
  By the nineteenth century, the 
root of land ownership was causing difficulties in conveyancing, because land was beginning to 
be valued as a commodity possessing economic value.
25
  However, conveyancing was a 
complicated matter, in part because there remained sixteen different types of deeds to effect a 
transfer of an estate or an interest, none of which were reduced to standardized forms.
26
   
In Blackstone’s Commentaries27 the chapter, “Of Alienation by Deed,” illustrates how 
complexity in the system of deeds adversely impacted conveyancing practices.
28
 This chapter 
begins with a recitation of the requirements of a deed which is “a solemn form of contract that is 
                                                 
20
 Turta v Canadian Pacific Railway Company (1952), 5 WWR (NS) 529; [1952] AJ no 21 (QL) (Alta SCTD) 
[Turta Trial citing to QL). 
21
 Ibid at para 147. 
22
 Ruoff, supra note 19. 
23
 Chapter 2 below. 
24
 R Stein, “The ‘Principles, Aims and Hopes’ of Title by Registration” (1983-1985) 9 Adel L Rev 267 at 267 
(HeinOnline). 
25
 Austin, supra note 10. 
26
 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol 2, (Philadelphia: Robert Bell, 1771 [-1772. New 
York: Oceana Publications, 1967]), Chapter 20. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Ibid. 
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entered into between the seller and the buyer.”29  According to Blackstone, the law requires that 
eight conditions must be met before a deed is valid.  First, the deed must comply with the Statute 
of Frauds and be in writing.
30
  Second, it “must be founded upon good and sufficient 
consideration”31 or it is invalid.  Third, a degree of formality is required in the written form; 
specifically the deed must be written upon paper or parchment, and not on any other surface such 
as a stone or a tree bark.
32
  Fourth, the names of the parties, premises, the nature of the estate or 
interest being alienated, any reservations annexed to the grant, any conditions, any warranties 
such as a warranty of the estate being granted, covenants, and conclusion must be sufficient and 
specific so as to bind the parties to the transaction.
33
  Fifth, each of the parties must actually read 
the deed, or if a party cannot read, it must be read to him.
34
  Sixth, it must be signed and sealed 
by each party, to verify that each understands its contents and intends to be bound by them.
35
  
Seventh, a deed must be “delivered by the party himself or his certain attorney”.36  This helps to 
prevent fraud, as it precludes another individual from preparing and bringing forward a 
fraudulent document at a later time.  Finally, for a deed to be valid, it must be attested, or signed 
by each party in the presence of a witness.
37
  Blackstone states, if any of these conditions are not 
met, the deed is invalid, and, as a result, no interest or estate in the land would be transferred.  
Next Blackstone reviewed how deeds were used in the different types of transactions in 
which an interest or estate in land was alienated in England.  He noted there were six different 
types of “original conveyances:” feoffment or livery of seisin; gift; grant; lease; exchange; and 
partition.  He also listed five types of derivative conveyances: release; confirmation; surrender; 
assignment; and defeasance which includes mortgages.
38
  Each of these was defined and briefly 
described in the chapter.  After these conveyances, Blackstone turned to alienation by equitable 
                                                 
29
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30
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31
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 Ibid at 297. 
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means and discussed the use and the trust, and identified five types of conveyances that 
developed in consequence of the Statute of Uses.
39
  These included the covenant to stand seised 
to uses; the bargain and sale of lands; the lease and release; deeds to declare the uses of other 
conveyances; and deeds of revocation of uses.
40
 Acquiring an estate in land was far from 
straightforward during this era. 
When land was the subject of a conveyance, the landholder and the person interested in 
acquiring an estate or interest in land would each hire their own lawyers to review the owner’s 
chain of title – all such deeds – dating back to the original Crown grant.41  These lawyers would 
review all such deeds and other instruments in the landholder’s possession pertaining to the 
land’s alienation over the centuries.  The instruments and deeds were voluminous.42  Land 
descriptions in these documents were lengthy, with more words devoted to the types of interests 
held in the land which generate revenue than to the actual size or boundaries of the parcel.  For 
example in one deed of lease dating from the eighteenth century, the land was described as: 
the capital messuage, called Dale Hall in the parish of Dale in the said country of 
Norfolk, wherein the said Abraham Barker and Cecilia his wife now dwell, and 
all those their lands in the said parish of Dale called or known by the name of 
Wilson’s farm, containing by estimation five hundred and forty acres, be the same 
more or less, together with all and singular houses, dove houses, barns, buildings, 
stables, yards, gardens, orchards, lands, tenements, meadows, pastures, feedings, 
commons, woods, underwoods, ways, waters, watercourses, fishings, privileges, 
profits, easements, commodities, advantages, emoluments, hereditaments, and 
appurtenances whatsoever to the said capital messuage and farm belonging or 
appertaining, or with the same used or enjoyed, or accepted, reputed, taken, or 
known, as part, parcel, or member thereof; and the reversion and reversions, 
remainder and remainders, yearly and other rents, issues, and profits thereof, and 
of every part and parcel thereof:  To have and to hold the said capital messuage, 
lands, tenements, hereditaments, and all and singular other the premises herein 
before-mentioned or intended to be bargained and sold, and every part and parcel 
thereof, with their and every of their rights, members, and appurtenances …43 
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As well, deeds usually were written in one paragraph, without subparagraphs or other 
breaks, so there were no headings to guide the reader.  Sentences could run on for fifty lines.
44
  
The lawyer also had to check for defects in the document, “such as invalid attestations, 
inoperative documents executed by corporate officers where the document is ultra vires the 
powers of the company or without the scope of authority of the officer”45 and to determine if the 
conveyancing instrument contravened any statute.
46
  In short, reviewing such documents was a 
very difficult and cumbersome task for the lawyer, and an expensive one for the client. 
Unfortunately the lawyers’ review of the chain of title did not end with the documents.  
These lawyers also had to try to ascertain if anyone had an interest in the land which was not 
documented in writing, such as a claim based on equity.  Other times people had good claims, 
but they were statute barred.
47
  As well, the landholder may have misplaced a deed.
48
  The 
lawyers for the parties had to carefully check all such matters, because the chain of title was only 
as good as its weakest link.
49
  As most chains had a weak link, titles were very uncertain. 
It took months to search the chain of title and even after the transaction was completed, a 
stranger could come forward and claim to have a better title to the parcel than the person who 
had just purchased the property.  When this happened, the buyer lost the land and could not 
recover the money he had paid to the seller.
50
  Sometimes the estate or interest was valid; at other 
times it was fraudulent.  Unfortunately, the system was not designed to allow a person to assess 
the truth and validity of the competing claims. Given this lacuna, the common law conveyancing 
system facilitated fraud and forgery.
51
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Similarly the storage of the documents offered ample opportunity for fraud, as they were 
retained in the private possession of the seller.  It was relatively easy for a landholder to change a 
few details on a lengthy and difficult-to-read deed that remained in his possession; no one else 
could say the deed never contained that term, because no one else had the opportunity to view it.  
From the reign of Henry VIII there had been a public registry for enrolling sale deeds at one of 
the Courts of Westminster, but landholders avoided using it.  Instead of using deeds of sale, they 
used a combination of a lease and release.
52
  These types of deeds were not caught by the 
enrollment rule and thereby the details of what were de facto sale transactions of real property 
remained private and were not subject to public scrutiny.  Acquiring land – and being certain you 
were obtaining and keeping what you believed was the subject of the agreement – was subject to 
risk.   
This lessened the attractiveness of acquiring land, and also made lenders reluctant to use 
land as collateral when loaning funds to landholders.  This was problematic during the industrial 
revolution, when acquiring private property was viewed by many people, including leading 
utilitarian legal scholars such as Jeremy Bentham
53
 and John Austin,
54
 as an important means of 
increasing the level of public good in society and maximizing the potential of wealth. Changes to 
real property law needed to be made to facilitate these goals. 
2. NINETEENTH CENTURY REFORMS 
As noted in the introduction, by the early nineteenth century some lawyers such as James 
Humphreys began to address real property law and conveyancing practices that were impeding 
economic progress, and suggesting reforms.  Government took notice.  In February 1828 Lord 
Brougham delivered a six-hour speech to Parliament on the need for legal reforms, including 
laws pertaining to real property.  His speech was followed in the subsequent decades by several 
commissions,
55
 and starting in the 1840s the government made minor changes to conveyancing 
practices to modernize the law in this area.   
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2.1 The Deed Registry System 
After October 1, 1845, a conveyance of a freehold estate could be effected by a grant 
without any accompanying ceremony of livery of seisin.
56
  In 1862, England formally adopted a 
deed registry system.
57
  As part of this development, the law was amended to limit chain-of-title 
searches to sixty years.
58
  Sale deeds were “simplified”59 and deeds were entered on a register 
according to the name of the party then owning the land or holding the interest.
60
  However, its 
usage was not compulsory until 1897.
61
   
Deed registry systems continue to operate today, in jurisdictions such as Ontario and 
Prince Edward Island.
62
  They incorporate real property law as it developed over centuries, and 
the chain of title remains very important because the title is only as good as its weakest link.
63
  
To this end, the registry operates like a notice board which conveys priority if the document is 
properly prepared and executed.  Whenever a legal interest in land is alienated, the details of the 
transaction (but not the description of the parcel of land
64
) are “enrolled” or recorded on the 
registry. Because one must know the names of the parties to transactions before one can search 
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the chain of title, it “works best in a jurisdiction with infrequent land transfers and where title 
searches are uncomplicated and short.”65   
In the deed registry system, the government operates the system and also stores the deeds 
which have been enrolled.
66
  No one at the registry office formally reviews the deeds for 
accuracy so the deeds as entered may contain inaccurate information which serves to invalidate 
the entire instrument.
67
  For example, if land is not correctly described on a mortgage, no charge 
will attach to the land.  The deed also is invalidated if the attestation clause is not completed 
correctly.  A deed may be forged, or its contents may be the subject of fraud and altered so that it 
no longer reflects the actual details pertaining to the ownership of the land.  If a person fails to 
register an interest, it will be ineffective against third parties.  The onus is on the potential 
purchaser to search for deeds and to review them for accuracy.  Provided the deed is valid, 
priority is obtained through the timing of registration.
68
  If the deed is not valid, the 
proprietorship of the land will be compromised. 
For these reasons, deed registry systems are unable to provide any warranty  regarding 
land ownership. Such systems:  
can be physically cumbersome and time-consuming because a great number of 
index books may have to be consulted and reconsulted. In addition, where a past 
transfer of title does not appear in the grantee index, the title searcher may have to 
guess how ownership may have passed to an owner in order to reach further back 
in time where additional transactions may be recorded. If a particular transaction 
does not appear in the grantee index, the searcher is limited to the process of trial 
and error and may or may not be able to discover how ownership passed to a 
particular owner.
69
 
 
A nineteenth century commentator expressed the issues inherent in a deed registry system 
more bluntly: 
Under our present method of registration of deeds, any piece of conveyancing 
no matter how absurd or ridiculous it may be, can be registered, and it may 
remain on the register for years before its absurdity and utter failure to carry out 
the intention of the parties is discovered. No doubt the person who concocted the 
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“conveyance” … was fully persuaded that it was all right and in proper legal 
form, and those who employed him were equally confident that their wishes had 
been carried out. Notwithstanding all its defects, the deed could be registered, and 
the title might pass through the hands of several equally accomplished 
conveyancers, before the defect might be exposed, and in the meantime, the 
possibility of remedying the defect be increased a hundred fold.
70
 
 
Even so, the deed registry system is an improvement over the common law because there 
was a central office where a conveyancer could go and, by identifying the parties, learn about 
transactions which focused on the specific parcel of land.  This reduced the potential for missing 
transactions.  Title searches were shortened too; a potential purchaser no longer has to search the 
chain of title back to the original Crown grant.   
Yet the reforms provided in this system could not address its greatest deficiency. Because 
the root of the title is predicated upon the efficacy of previous deeds and instruments back to a 
legislated date, problems are “grandfathered in” for the current owner.  The nature of the system 
facilitates uncertainty in land ownership.  Given this inherent uncertainty, in the nineteenth 
century some people continued to lobby for more revolutionary changes to conveyancing. 
2.2 Land Titles Systems: an Overview 
2.2.1 South Australia 
One place where the debate regarding land systems continued was South Australia.  It 
was not a penal colony, but “had been developed on the principle of land purchase, and buying 
and selling land was its raison d’être.”71 Many of its settlers (including, perhaps, Torrens’ father 
who was “a well-known political economist and one of the … [Colony’s] founding fathers”72) 
were British citizens “dissatisfied with the English religious establishment and, more broadly, 
with inherited irrationalities and solutions dictated from above.”73  Yet even in the early years of 
South Australia: 
[l]and speculation was rife; and land titles were in serious disarray. [Professor 
Douglas] Pike estimated that it was probable that the documents for three-quarters 
of the titles had been lost. There had been a number of fires in public offices; land 
                                                 
70
 Geo S Holmested, “To the Editor of the Canadian Law Times” (1884) 4 Can L Times 20 at 22 (HeinOnline) 
[Holmested 1884]. 
71
 Croucher, supra note 50 at 303. 
72
 Ibid at 302. 
73
 Taylor, supra note 17 at 20. 
  17 
sales raced ahead of surveying, and many titles were in the hands of people who 
were not resident in South Australia.
74
 
 
In such an environment, “dissent and suggestions for reform had a ready hearing.”75  Real 
property reform was of major importance to the colonists, and its first bill for a land titles system 
was drafted in 1836.
76
 It failed to be accepted, but the issue did not resolve itself.   
Robert Richard Torrens, a customs officer at the Port of Adelaide and then the Registrar 
of Deeds,
77
 was the person who, without any “legal training whatsoever”78 was able to move the 
debate forward and achieve legislative results in the 1850s and in the 1860s.
79
  He became 
interested in the issue after a friend had purchased land in the colony of India.  His friend: 
was an officer in the Indian army, who had built a mansion and plantations, and 
who, after a flaw was discovered in the title, lost not only the land but ‘upwards of 
20 000 pounds expended on it in buildings and improvements and was entirely 
beggared by law expenses.’80 
 
Torrens found this situation untenable, and once opined that “the existing law of real property … 
[is] ‘complex and cumbrous in its nature, ruinously expensive in its working, uncertain and 
perplexing in its issues, and specially unsuited to the requirements of this community.’”81 He was 
determined to reform the laws of real property in his jurisdiction,
82
  to prevent any of South 
Australian’s citizens from being harmed as had his friend in India.    
As Torrens was not trained in law or a practicing lawyer, real property rules and 
conveyancing procedures were not axiomatic to him.  Additionally, he did not care for lawyers.
83
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With the involvement of Dr. Ulrich Hubbe,
84
an individual familiar with the system of land title 
by registration operating in Germany and Austria since the thirteenth century,
85
 Torrens 
developed a system that applied the principles attached to ships’ ownership pursuant to the 
Shipping Acts
86
 and their corresponding titles, to land.  
With ships, a certificate was issued to record ownership of the title or the shares held by 
different persons.  For example, if a ship was owned by three different individuals, a separate 
title was issued for each one.  When the owner sold his interest in a ship, the old title was 
cancelled and a new one evidencing the new owner was created in its place.  This new title was 
the root and there was no need to review the documents on which it is based.  Each owner was 
provided with a duplicate, as proof of ownership.  There was no “chain of title” to search, and 
the title was the only evidence of ownership.
87
    The titles were contained in a register book 
which is administered privately, not by the government.  Such a system facilitated certainty of 
ownership and therefore commercial transactions.   
Torrens believed that land should be treated like ships and that titles should be issued 
with respect of land. Each new title would be treated as the root, negating reliance upon the 
efficacy of the chain of title searches necessary in common law and deed registry systems.  His 
approach would also minimize lawyers’ roles in conveyancing.  Torrens was a member of South 
Australia’s first Parliament “after it became self-governing”88 and he used his position to 
continue advocating these reforms.
89
 When he presented a draft Real Property Bill to Parliament 
on 4 June 1857, Torrens told the members of the legislature that its objective was: 
‘to give confidence and security to purchasers and mortgagees through the 
certainty that nothing affecting the title can have existence beyond the 
transactions of which they have notice in the memoranda endorsed on the grant.’90 
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The Real Property Act came into force in 1858.
91
  It provided that each time the 
ownership of land changed, the parties would submit the documents to a government-run titles 
registry.  Government would cancel the existing title, and issue a new one.  Every time an 
interest in land was created, those documents should also be submitted to the government-run 
registry, which would note the essential provisions of the interest on the owner’s title.  Except in 
the cases of fraud and error, the Certificate of Title was to be conclusive.
92
   
This scheme was well suited to a colony that had only been settled for a short time
93
 but 
where land speculation was rampant.
94
  The chains of title were relatively short and the 
introduction of a rational system simplified the process of conversion to a land titles system 
where certainty of title was to be guaranteed by government.    
 “Indefeasibility of title” was not part of the scheme which the legislature adopted. The 
legislation did not contain the expressions “indefeasibility of title” or “indefeasible title.” Nor did 
it mention a state warranty of title. Instead, the legislature employed the following language: 
‘33.   Every certificate of title or entry in the register book shall be conclusive, 
and vest the estate and interests in the land therein mentioned in such manner and 
to such effect as shall be expressed in such certificate or entry valid to all intents, 
save and except as is hereinafter provided in the case of fraud or error.’95 
 
This is the closest the legislation ever came to enacting true indefeasibility; in it, the only 
exceptions occurred in cases of fraud or error.  Even then, a dichotomy existed between the 
concept of “indefeasibility of title” as it has come to be known,96 and the contents of the 
legislation. 
 More exceptions were introduced within six months of the Act becoming law. In 
December 1858 the South Australian government assented to the Real Property Law Amendment 
Act.
97
  Seventy sections of the original Act were repealed, including section 33.
98
  It was replaced 
by section 20, which stated: 
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’20.   Notwithstanding any error or omission in the observance of any formality 
herein prescribed to be observed in bringing land under the operation of this Act, 
and excepting in the case of frauds, and so far as regards any wrong description of 
any land, or of its boundaries, or the omission or misdescription of any right-of-
way or other easement, created in, or existing upon, any land under the operation 
of this Act, every certificate of title or entry in the register-book, signed by the 
Registrar-General, shall absolutely vest the estate or interest in the land therein 
mentioned, in the manner and to the effect expressed in such certificate of title or 
entry, and the registered proprietor of such estate or interest in the said land, shall 
be secure from eviction or disturbance or adverse claim, in respect of any estate, 
right, or interest in the said land, which is not declared in such certificate of title, 
or entry on the register-book, or in the instrument referred to in such entry.’99 
 
Within six months of becoming law, the warranty of title provided in the original Torrens 
legislation had been reduced.  In addition to fraud and error, there was no longer a warranty that 
the title would be correct vis-à-vis the land’s boundaries, a wrong description of the land, or the 
omission or misdescription of any easement or right of way. With such exceptions, title always 
remains defeasible in the Torrens system.
100
 
When compared to the common law and to the deed registry systems, the Torrens system 
was still remarkable in the degree of certainty of ownership which it facilitated. Because of the 
increased certainty of title and the increased simplicity in conveyancing practices, the system 
spread to the other Australian states and New Zealand.
101
 When the “Torrens” bill was 
introduced to the New Zealand Parliament in 1870, a member commented that one of the leading 
principles of the legislation: 
‘is, that it establishes a public record of all transactions affecting registered land 
… so that everyone dealing with the land may know exactly what he is dealing 
with; and not only that, but by which the rights of incumbrancers, and other 
persons holding derivative interests in land – trustees, mortgagees, and others – 
may have a guarantee for the security of their incumbrances.’102 
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By the time New Zealand and the other Australian states adopted land titles systems of 
registration, section 20 was already in force.  This meant they relied upon the amendments to the 
original legislation, and title was never completely “indefeasible” in any of them either.   
Even so, after the complexity and resulting lack of certainty of ownership inherent in the 
common law and deed registry systems, the South Australia model appeared to be a panacea 
capable of providing universal protection to all land owners and interest holders.  In such an 
environment persons elected to government in these colonies could see the benefits of such a 
system while debating its adoption.  This type of debate also occurred in Canada.  
  2.2.2 Canada 
Land titles legislation was passed first in the Colonies of Vancouver Island in 1861 and 
British Columbia in 1870,
103
 but it is debatable whether they used South Australia as a model.
104
  
Additionally real property reform was raised as an issue in Upper Canada as early as the mid 
1860s.  An early reformer, Oliver Mowat, was a lawyer who served as Upper Canada’s 
Chancellor between 1864 and 1872, and then served as its Premier until 1896.
105
  In 1865 he 
wrote an open letter to then Attorney-General of Upper Canada, John A. Macdonald, regarding 
the Quieting Titles Bill which was being considered by the legislature.
106
  Mowat commented on 
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issues arising from the descent of land in a registry system,
107
 but also made more general 
statements regarding issues with a deed registry system and the need for reform, stating:   
“’Our Registry law has, beyond all controversy, been of immense advantage to 
the country; and yet in regard to any of the questions I have spoken of, it cannot 
be said to afford any protection whatever; we need something to supplement its 
provisions before our titles can have the reliability which it is very desirable they 
should possess.  The Registry law in fact provides for but one source of danger to 
a purchaser, namely, unknown conveyances affecting the property.  It affords 
little or no aid in ascertaining the validity of conveyances, the proper construction 
of deeds and will, or any events affecting title, otherwise than by written 
instruments; or in supplying the future proof of such events. These things may be 
of greater moment to an intending purchaser than the possibility of there being 
some deeds affecting the property of which, but for the registry law, he would not 
have known. 
It is a further serious inconvenience, connected with our existing system, that if 
a purchase is effected, or a loan granted after an investigation which satisfies the 
solicitor employed that the title is good, the whole investigation has to be gone 
over again before every fresh transaction in reference to the property; and a title 
that was satisfactory to one lawyer may not be satisfactory to another; … the 
ablest and most cautious lawyers may occasionally make a slip or overlook a 
defect … Sometimes, therefore, one solicitor finds it his duty to reject a title 
which another solicitor has examined and passed; and this is the case not only in 
Canada but in England also, where conveyancing is a distinct branch of 
professional practice, and has received a degree of  careful attention which it is 
not possible or general practitioners in Canada to give to it.’”108 
 
It is not apparent if Mowat was cognizant of the Torrens system or was referring to it per se, but 
clearly he believed Upper Canada, soon to be the province of Ontario, should adopt a different 
type of system. Others had a similar idea. 
In 1883 some Toronto residents formed the Canadian Land Law Amendment Association 
(the “Association”) with a purpose of lobbying for the adoption of a Torrens-type system of land 
titles registration for Ontario, the North-West Territories and Manitoba.
109
  At the time, all of 
these jurisdictions were subject to English common law rules and implemented deed registry 
systems based on English legislation.
110
  Many of the Association’s members were bankers, and 
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they favoured the Torrens system’s goals of promoting certainty of ownership (which in turn 
facilitated the use of land as collateral for loans) and of simplifying conveyancing practices.
111
   
The Association’s members compared the deed registry system which was operating in 
Ontario with the land titles systems operating in Australia and British Columbia.  One of its 
members, J Herbert Mason, once wrote: 
“It will be a grave mistake, if not a lasting disgrace, if, now that an 
unquestionably better method is known, an antiquated and condemned system, 
with all its uncertainties, and cumbrous and costly machinery, be inflicted upon 
the virgin soil of the hope of our Dominion, the Great Northwest.  Whoever shall 
emancipate land from this relic of feudalism; give legislative effect to the Torrens 
system of transfer by registration; simplify and make uniformly operative the law 
of descent; abolish general liens and all charges created by operation of law, 
without registration; and make land as safely and easily dealt with as registered 
stock or bonds, - will not only be entitled to the thanks of the present generation 
of his countrymen, but merit the gratitude of millions yet unborn-.”112  
 
With statements such as this, the Association’s members generated a great deal of debate.113   
Much of the debate involved George Holmested, a lawyer and court official involved in 
the Association.
114
  He wrote letters to the editor of the Canadian Law Times, who then penned 
rebuttals.
115
  In one such letter, Holmested compared the Torrens system of land titles to shares 
and bonds. The editor questioned if such a system could really work and Holmested responded 
affirmatively and passionately.
116
 He was committed. He and the Association’s other members 
continued with their efforts and ultimately the Association was successful; in 1886 the Canadian 
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government adopted the Torrens system for use in the North West Territories, Manitoba, and part 
of Ontario.
117
   
 Although the Torrens system was adopted in these jurisdictions, and a land titles system 
was operating in British Columbia, there were differences between them.  For example, 
originally Manitoba only operated one Land Titles Office for the entire province, while the 
concurrently operating deed registry system had several offices throughout the province.
118
  This 
meant few people were prepared to use the Torrens system.  British Columbia had a unique 
approach to bringing land within the ambit of the legislative scheme.  It included elements of 
deed registry systems and instituted a system of “possessory title” which was open to 
challenge.
119
  The system adopted in the North-West Territories was the closest to the scheme 
operating in South Australia and New Zealand.
120
  Like the scheme on which it was based, The 
Territories Real Property Act
121
 failed to include the expression “indefeasibility of title.” 
 Within Canada the system in Ontario was the most different from the South Australian 
model.
122
  Ontario’s approach was based upon the English model, with the Ontario Act 
incorporating many of the provisions contained in the Land Transfer Act:
123
  
[The English Act] was adapted to the country where titles to land were growths of 
centuries and where custom and precedent exercised an extremely powerful, if not 
entirely dominating, influence. It is naturally to be expected that in such a case the 
framers of such an Act would not attempt to deal with land titles in the bold and 
thoroughgoing fashion adopted in the new colony of Australia, where a large part 
of the land had not passed from the Crown at all and where none of the titles had 
any history behind them compared to what is to be found in the case of any piece 
of land in England. The circumstances of the Province of Manitoba and of the 
Northwest [sic] Territories in 1885, and of the new provinces in 1906, 
corresponded much more closely with the state of affairs in Australia than with 
that of England and indeed in Ontario, and it is not surprising therefore to find a 
difference between the Acts in the prairie provinces and that of Ontario 
corresponding to that which is found between the Australian Acts and the English 
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Acts of 1875 and 1897. The Ontario Act provides for three varieties of title, 
possessory, qualified and absolute.  The absolute title corresponds to the title 
certified to under the ordinary certificate of title of land in fee simple under the 
Torrens systems in Australia and the prairie provinces of Canada.
124
  
 
The Ontario government did interact with the Canadian Land Law Mortgage Amendment 
Association, and it considered the Torrens system prior to its adoption of land titles registration 
legislation. For example, when the Ontario government adopted the original legislation, it 
included an assurance fund which was not part of the English legislation.
125
  Yet the consensus 
remained that it was based on the English system,
126
 which varies from the Torrens system of 
land titles registration, 
in one fundamental way, which is that the Register may be rectified more readily 
… [as it] does not carry with it a definitive indefeasibility once registration is 
secured without fraud. If under general law rules it is wrong to accept the 
statement of interests recorded on the Register, it may be rectified to reflect the 
true legal title, leaving the deprived proprietor to the remedies provided by the 
assurance fund.
127
 
 
From this, it can be seen that in Ontario, the notion of “indefeasibility of title” was not even 
treated as a postscript in its original system.   
 2.3 The Pinnacle of the Reform Movements 
By the early twentieth century the Torrens model proved to be the most popular in the 
British colonies.
128
  The choice was attributable to the model’s twin goals of fostering increased 
certainty of title, and simplifying and reducing the costs and time associated with conveyancing 
in common law jurisdictions,
129
 which in turn facilitated settlement.  These goals were 
accomplished through the creation of a register for many – but not all – interests in land.   
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In keeping with its goals, land titles registration systems always reflected four 
characteristics: 
1. The land is initially placed on the register as a unit of property. 
2. Transactions are registered with reference to the land itself, and merely as 
instruments executed by the owner. 
3. Registration of transactions is essential to their validity. 
4. Registration, initial or subsequent transactions, acts in some degree as a 
warranty of title in the person registered as owner, and as a bar to adverse 
claims.
130
 
 
It is these characteristics, especially when contrasted with historical common law conveyancing 
practices and rules, which cause individuals to view land titles systems of registration as the 
pinnacle of real property law and conveyancing.  These characteristics – not indefeasibility of 
title – traditionally were considered the culmination of the real property law and conveyancing 
reform movement in the nineteenth century.  
3. THE GENESIS OF INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE 
In advocating for a land titles system, Torrens hoped that all interests could be entered on 
the registry for each piece of land to which they applied,
131
 making each title indefeasible. In 
spite of his aspirations, the first time “indefeasibility of title” was used to describe the impact of 
land titles registration on conveyancing practices and substantive real property law appears to 
have been in 1859, after South Australia’s legislation had been adopted.  Then Torrens used the 
term in a pamphlet when describing the Real Property Act.  He wrote: 
‘as a first principle, the South Australian Real Property Act creates ‘independent 
titles;’ retrospective investigation is cut off; each proprietor of the fee holds direct 
from the Crown subject to such mortgages, charges, leasehold or other lesser 
estates as may exist or be created affecting the land. 
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Indefeasibility of title. 
   Indefeasibility of title created by registration follows of necessity as a corollary 
to the principle of ‘independent title,’ and out of this again arises the necessity of 
providing a fund from which rightful heirs and others may be compensated for the 
value of land which they are debarred from reclaiming against persons who have 
acquired title by registration as purchasers, mortgagees, or otherwise through the 
operation of the law.’132 
 
Shortly after, the word “indefeasible” was used in one early Australian statute,133 and the 
English first included it in The Land Registration Act of 1862.
134
 However, it was never widely 
adopted. By the early 1950s, still only one Australian statute had incorporated the word 
“indefeasible.”135  “Indefeasibility of title” is never mentioned in any of the others.  Similarly, 
indefeasibility’s three associated principles – the mirror, curtain and insurance principles – do 
not appear to have been codified in any early Australian or English statutes.
136
  From this, it can 
be inferred that the drafters of the early and subsequent legislation never intended that the 
concept of “indefeasibility of title” and its three principles would come to dominant legal 
discourse or be treated as the apex of land titles systems.   
 Yet they have.  If they were not codified in the legislation, where did these terms 
originate?  As evidenced from Torrens’ 1859 quote and the fact that it was not codified in the 
legislation, the term “indefeasibility of title” has always existed on the fringes of legal discourse. 
“Indefeasibility of title” did not begin to gain popularity in traditional legal research sources137 
until an Englishman who was later to be named Chief Registrar of its land titles system, 
Theodore BF Ruoff, used the expression.  He claimed this term originated in Canada with the 
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Supreme Court’s decision in Canadian Pacific Railway v Turta.138  However, when his treatment 
of this term is juxtaposed with the language and analysis employed in the trial and appeal courts 
in Turta, it is apparent that Ruoff deserves the credit.  He coined the expressions mirror 
principle, curtain principle and insurance principle, as well as the popularization of 
“indefeasibility of title.”   
 3.1 The Englishman and His Role in the Genesis of Indefeasibility of Title 
Theodore Burton Fox Ruoff began working in London’s Land Registry Office in the 
1930s and for many years thought the English land titles registry system was the only one 
operating in the Commonwealth.  In the late 1940s when he held the position of Assistant 
Registrar, Ruoff became interested in the Torrens system. He was amazed to discover that a 
different system had been developed in South Australia and that it predated England’s.139  Ruoff 
was intrigued.  Given his interest, he applied for and became the recipient of a travel fellowship 
in 1951.  He used these funds to travel to South Australia, to enable him to learn and write about 
this different system.
140
  Based on the research he undertook on this trip, he authored several 
articles and then went on to co-author several real property texts, became the Chief Land 
Registrar of England and Wales,
141
 and was awarded the title “Companion of the British Empire” 
(“CBE”).142   
Ruoff was greatly impressed with what he learned about the Torrens system
143
 and, as 
has been observed in one paper, he wrote with “brevity and deceptive simplicity”144 and 
possessed “an easy facility for explanation and description.”145  He was like a newly converted 
zealot coming out from the wilderness – wanting to proselytize everyone he met, to make them 
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as excited about the Torrens system as he was.  Like any new convert, he only understood the big 
picture.  He had not yet grasped some of the more subtle nuances and contradictions inherent in 
Torrens’ scheme.  Yet his easy facility with language made the Torrens system appear to be a 
panacea in the wilderness of real property law.   
As early as 1952 he published articles in Australia and New Zealand about the Torrens 
system.
146
  In some of his early papers, he used the phrases “mirror principle”, “curtain 
principle”, and “insurance principle”147 and now he is credited with authorship of them.148  He 
also used the phrases “indefeasible title” and “indefeasibility of title” when describing his 
interpretation of the Torrens system’s149 central features.   
He did not restrict his research and writing to issues pertaining solely to the southern 
hemisphere.  In 1955 he submitted a paper entitled “Systems of Land Tenure and Transfer in the 
Commonwealth and Empire – their Advantages and Disadvantages” to the first Commonwealth 
and Empire Law Conference.
150
  In his paper, Ruoff briefly mentioned “indefeasibility” and 
credited this expression to Canada.
151
  When doing so he remarked,  
[i]n many jurisdictions they use the word ‘indefeasibility’ when describing the 
conclusive state of a title, meaning thereby that the estate of the registered 
proprietor is paramount and prevails against all comers.
152
   
 
Ruoff seems to have caught someone’s attention, because within two years of this 
Conference he was asked to prepare a book of essays to commemorate the 100
th
 anniversary of 
the first adoption of the Torrens system.  He accepted.  In this book, Ruoff began by re-printing 
the portions of his earlier essay from the Conference.
153
 Then he re-printed his essays which 
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focused on the mirror principle,
154
 the curtain principle,
155
 the insurance principle,
156
 and land 
titles practices in New Zealand.
157
  He inserted some new chapters too.  He commented on 
inadequacies in the Torrens system vis-à-vis the modern era,
158
 and its associated method of 
surveying and describing land.
159
  He devoted lengthy chapters to Canadian Pacific Railway Co 
Ltd and Imperial Oil Limited v Turta
160
 and to claims against the English insurance fund.
161
  
It took 103 pages to cover all of these topics.  Compared to Hogg’s treatise which is 399 
pages,
162
 Ruoff’s book is very short.  However, Ruoff, with his ability to write simply and 
clearly, came to be viewed as the expert on the Torrens system, and his book changed the way 
certainty of ownership within the Torrens system was described.  Most instrumental to this was 
his creation of the expressions mirror principle, curtain principle, and insurance principle. 
Ruoff spent most of his book elaborating on the three principles and on problems within 
the Torrens system.  In reality, he hardly mentioned “indefeasibility of title:” using the phrase 
only three times
163
 and failing to provide any lengthy explanation of it.  However, he interwove 
the phrase “indefeasible title,”164 and the words “indefeasible”165 and “indefeasibility”166 
frequently when writing about the three pillars.   
The mirror and the curtain are visual references which nearly everyone in the common 
law can relate to.  Each of us looks in a mirror, and each of us has window coverings in our 
homes.  These items are part of our daily existence.  When they are used as analogies for the 
complicated substantive provisions contained in land titles legislation, they possess great power.  
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Given that two of these two pillars create such sharp visual images, and that the third one is 
readily grasped because most of us are familiar with insurance, people have remembered and 
adopted “indefeasibility of title.” This is seen through a brief review of each principle.   
3.1.1 The Mirror Principle 
In the introductory chapter, Ruoff describes this principle as “the proposition that the 
register of title is a mirror which reflects accurately and completely and beyond all argument the 
current facts that are material to a man’s title.”167  He reiterates this characterization in the 
chapter which focuses on the mirror principle; then Ruoff begins by identifying that “the register 
book reflects all facts material to an owner’s title to land.”168  Later in this chapter he qualifies 
this oversimplification by admitting that that “although the register is deemed to be both correct 
and complete in fact it is never perfect in either respect.”169  Yet a few pages later, and still in the 
same chapter, once again Ruoff asserts that “the register is not only paramount but also a mirror 
of all material information about an owner’s estate.”170  The intent of this message is that the title 
is a mirror, and that one can rely on it completely. 
This is misleading, because only enumerated legal interests can be registered against a 
title.  Statutory exceptions are not registered on titles.
171
 Additionally, equitable interests cannot 
be registered
172
 except through the notice provided with a caveat.
173
 However, registering a 
caveat to notify the world of an equitable interest in the land is not mandatory.  This means that a 
title may never accurately reflect its true and complete state.   
3.1.2 The Curtain Principle 
Ruoff also postulates that one of the central pillars of the Torrens system is “the curtain 
principle.”174  He asserts that the curtain principle most effectively ensures “simplicity in the 
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general operation of the Torrens system.”175 To make this point, he overstates the judicial 
conclusions drawn in two cases,
176
 writing: 
‘[t]he register was not to present a picture of legal ownership trammeled by all 
sorts of equitable rights in others, which those who dealt with the registered 
proprietor must take into account.’ Furthermore, [according to Lord Watson in 
Gibbs v Messer,] ‘the main object of the Act …. is to save persons dealing with 
registered proprietors from the trouble and expense of going behind the register, 
in order to investigate the history of their author’s title, and to satisfy themselves 
of its validity.’ Here the curtain principle simplifies the duties of a disponee or his 
legal adviser by shutting out forbidden things from his view.
177
 
 
Lord Watson’s passage is taken out of context because, immediately following the 
passage Ruoff quotes, Lord Watson qualifies this remark:  
That end is accomplished by providing that every one who purchases, in bona fide 
and for value, from a registered proprietor, and enters his deed of transfer or 
mortgage on the register, shall thereby acquire an indefeasible right, 
notwithstanding the infirmity of his author’s title.178  
Lord Watson never intended the indefeasible right – or the curtain principle – to apply to 
everyone.  Only a bona fide purchaser for value was to be entitled to such protection.  Yet Ruoff 
asserts that indefeasibility applies to all types of “disponee[s]”.  By associating a “curtain 
principle” with this, Ruoff creates a false sense of the protection provided in the legislation.   
Later in his book, Ruoff appears to acknowledge his failure to qualify his earlier use of 
Lord Watson’s statement.  When he does so, he restricts the application of the curtain principle 
to purchasers, claiming:  
[t]he curtain principle is one which provides that the register is the sole source of 
information for proposing purchasers, who need not and, indeed, must not 
concern themselves with trusts and equities which lie behind the curtain.”179   
 
The curtain is not a complete barrier to potential purchasers either; sometimes one needs to look 
at the documents behind a title, such as the survey plan, to determine if the information on the 
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title is accurate.  This qualification tends to be forgotten, and the use of the curtain as first 
described by Ruoff contributes to an indiscriminate use of the phrase “indefeasibility of title.”180 
   3.1.3 The Insurance Principle 
Unlike the Torrens system, England and Ireland had always employed the term 
“insurance fund” in their land registry statutes181 and their systems operated like insurance 
businesses.
182
  This was the term and the scheme with which Ruoff was most familiar; by the 
time he visited Australia, he had been working in London’s Land Registry Office for 
approximately fifteen years. As a result, he chose to label the “insurance principle”183 as a central 
feature of the Torrens system, even though many of the Torrens systems employed the phrase 
“assurance fund” in their statutes. Ruoff justified substituting insurance for assurance, as follows: 
Although all the Australian Torrens Acts refer to ‘assurance’, the term 
‘insurance’ is a happier one because it refers to a possible, rather than to a certain 
risk, and I believe that many of the dangers that are commonly contemplated exist 
only in timid minds.
184
 
 
But these two words are not synonyms.  “Assurance” means “a positive declaration that a 
thing is true [, and as] … a solemn promise or guarantee.”185  The Canadian Oxford Dictionary 
does provide that “assurance” may be used interchangeably with “insurance”, but notes that this 
occurs especially in Britain, and most often in the context of life insurance.
186
  In Canada, 
“insurance” means something else.  It is: 
the act or an instance of insuring property, life, etc.[;] … a sum paid for this; a 
premium.[;] … a sum paid out as compensation for theft, damage, loss, etc.[;] …. 
[and] a measure taken to provide for a possible contingency.”187   
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With this substitution, Ruoff appears to fail to grasp the distinction between this “principle” and 
the purpose of the assurance fund codified in many early Torrens statutes, and how it was 
implemented in the land titles regimes.
188
   
The dictionary definition of “assurance” most closely reflects Torrens’ intent in 
introducing such a fund in land titles conveyancing.  The Torrens system was established as a 
counterpoint to the system of real property conveyancing which relied upon convoluted and 
lengthy deeds,
189
 with the corresponding need to search the chain of title every time a parcel of 
land was transferred.
190
  It was not universally accepted or adopted. Rather, some landholders 
were concerned that the land titles registration system would deprive them of the proprietary 
interests and estates in land. As a result: 
The Torrens system was introduced against a background of narrow 
professional hostility. Its author faced charges that the System would lend itself to 
manipulation by unscrupulous persons; that innocent owners could be deprived of 
their rights by land being brought under the Act surreptitiously.  Torrens sought to 
counter his critics with provisions for intense advertising [when land was brought 
under the Act].
191
 
 
As an additional assurance to such critics, Torrens adopted an “assurance fund” which 
was to be financed from fees payable every time land was brought within the Act, and each time 
thereafter when the title to it was transferred.
192
  Torrens wanted to reassure his critics so that 
they would be encouraged to use the land titles system.  His “administrative philosophy”193 was 
based on “the principle that the Assurance Fund had been created for the specific purpose of 
facilitating the free flow of conversions to the new form of title.”194  The purpose of the 
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assurance fund truly was to assure land owners and interest holders that they would not suffer 
losses because of the new system, not to insure real property in conveyancing transactions.  
Ruoff ignores this fact when he discusses this principle. Instead he states that the 
insurance principle was established to compensate persons who had suffered a loss, as:  
it warrants that if the mirror of title gives a specious or an incomplete reflection 
by reason of which someone incurs a loss that cannot otherwise be made good, 
the State will recompense him. When this happens there is a conversion of a legal 
right into cash, for the person deprived is to be put in the same situation, so far as 
money can do it, as if the wrongful act complained of had not been done.
195
 
 
A few pages later, Ruoff describes the “insurance principle” even more broadly, implying that it 
could be accessed in all circumstances:  
[T]he insurance principle, properly understood and fully carried out, involves far 
more than an owner’s title, that is known to be reasonably sound, is guaranteed by 
the State. In the widest sense it means not only that registration will be carried on 
literally as an insurance undertaking but also that it is the privilege of the 
Registrar …, on bringing land under the Act, to cure the title of known defects so 
far as he possibly can. It implies that the whole business of registration ought to 
be conducted with such an economy of public manpower, public time and public 
money that the saving which is achieved far outweighs any payment of 
compensation for errors or omissions which may become necessary from time to 
time. I should like to write the last sentence in the boldest lettering known to the 
printer.
196
 
 
Contrary to his assertions, in the Torrens system registration was never “carried on 
literally as an insurance undertaking.” In most Torrens jurisdictions, the party which benefitted 
from the other’s loss was expected to provide the indemnity.  Hogg notes that in nineteen out of 
twenty-two commonwealth jurisdictions operating land titles registration systems: 
provision is made by the statutes for the payment of indemnity by the State in 
certain cases of owners being deprived of property through the statutory warranty 
of title operating in favour of others. In many of the statutes these enactments are 
grouped with enactments relating to the raising and keeping of an indemnity fund, 
and to the conclusiveness of the register, whilst in some cases the same enactment 
relates both to State indemnity and indemnity from private individuals.
197
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Saskatchewan was part of the majority.  In the case of fraud, a claimant could only 
recover from the assurance fund if the “real” defendant was impecunious or had absconded from 
the province.
198
  Additionally, Saskatchewan’s assurance fund was not available to a land owner 
if the land owner breached any trust,
199
 if the same land was included in two or more Crown 
grants,
200
 or: 
[i]n any case in which loss, damage or deprivation has been occasioned by any 
land being included in the same certificate of title with other land through 
misdescription of the boundaries or parcels of any land; unless it is proved that the 
person liable for compensation and damages is dead or has absconded from the 
province or has been adjudged insolvent or the sheriff has certified that he is not 
able to realize the full amount and costs awarded in any action for such 
compensation.
201
 
 
 Because of provisions such as these, not everyone suffering a loss in every circumstance 
could assert a claim against the fund.  Given that Torrens legislation obligates government to 
compensate persons suffering loss in specific, if limited, circumstances, one would expect that a 
government would do so, and that it would indemnify the aggrieved party.  This would occur if 
an “insurance principle” was a central tenet of these schemes.  As an insurer, government would 
take all necessary action to ensure the claim was legitimate and fell within the statute’s 
parameters before paying the aggrieved party.  If it was an insurance fund, government would 
then pay the party who had suffered the loss.  Statistical evidence from various Torrens 
jurisdictions suggests otherwise.  
When New South Wales stopped collecting money for its Assurance Fund in 1941, more 
than 750,000 pounds “had been paid into the Fund, while payments out had not exceeded … 
21,000 [pounds].”202  Only one claim was for more than 10,000 pounds.  In approximately 
eighty-five years, less than three percent of the funds collected were paid to claimants.  The 
balance was transferred to the government’s general revenues.  Government continued to 
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promise it would fund claims from its general revenues,
203
 but, given these statistics, the 
likelihood of it doing so in any substantial amount was very small. 
Western Canada provides other examples.  In the almost twenty years in which the 
Dominion Government operated the land titles system in the North-West Territories, only one 
claim was ever paid out from the assurance fund.  It amounted to $259.60 plus costs.
204
  Yet 
more than $200,000 was levied and collected in that period.  Consequently, when Saskatchewan 
and Alberta became provinces and the assurance fund was shared proportionately between them, 
they each received $125,621.12 and $85,350.70
205
 respectively. By 1956, in Alberta the “sum of 
$3,815,645.75 … [had] been paid in and only $72,280.33 … [had] been paid out.”206  Whenever 
the amount of the fund exceeded a specified amount, the excess was transferred to government’s 
general revenues.  These are just some of the examples of government’s tight-fistedness 
regarding the assurance fund.
207
 
One reason these funds remained “indecently solvent”208 related to the review of 
instruments undertaken in land titles offices.  Land Titles staff examined every instrument 
submitted for registration and if the instrument was not substantially correct in form and in 
substance, the Registrar rejected it.
209
  As well, at least one Torrens system had a written policy 
that staff should act to avoid errors and claims being made against the assurance fund.
210
  For all 
of these reasons, very few substantive registration errors ever occurred.   
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When the Torrens assurance fund is treated as insurance, it seems to be accepted that 
mistakes will occur, and that such mistakes will be compensated by government each time such a 
loss occurs.  Ruoff’s early description of the “insurance principle” promulgates such an 
interpretation.  He knew differently,
211
 but he never corrected this impression. 
He had an opportunity to do so at the 1955 Conference.  Instead, Ruoff reiterated that “if, 
through human frailty, a flaw appears [on the title], anyone who thereby suffers loss must be put 
in the same position, so far as money can do it, as if the [mirror’s] reflection were a true one.”212    
In most of this text – even following his admission that a claim could be difficult or impossible 
because of legislative changes
213
 – he consistently maintained that the “insurance principle” was 
one of the main features of a Torrens system.  He confirmed:  
[t]he existence of a fund is, of course, an essential and characteristic feature of the 
Torrens system. Under that system the register is like a mirror which reflects 
fully, accurately and authoritatively all facts material to the owner’s title. If 
through human frailty, whether it be the mistake of a Registrar, on the one hand, 
or the fraud of a criminal on the other, there is a flaw in the mirror, in 
consequence of which an innocent person who has relied upon the reflection 
being a true one suffers loss, he must be put into the same position, so far as 
money can do it, as if the reflection were indeed true. Thus the Torrens system is 
nothing more nor less than a system of insurance of title to land by the 
government – the term ‘insurance’ is a happier one than ‘assurance’ because it 
refers to a possible risk rather than a certain one. Unfortunately, however, the 
business of registration is seldom conducted as a true insurance business.
214
 
 
With such convincing and easily understandable language, Ruoff transformed “indefeasibility of 
title” from a postscript in legal discourse, to the focal point of land titles systems of registration. 
It also helped that he modestly credited the acceptance of this expression to Canada and the 
decision of Turta v Canadian Pacific Railway. 
3.2 Canada’s Role in the Genesis of Indefeasibility of Title 
 In 1952 – the same year as Ruoff first published articles pertaining to the three principles 
– Justice Egbert of the Supreme Court of Alberta wrote a lengthy judgment regarding competing 
ownership claims to petroleum in a quarter-section of farm land located near Leduc, the location 
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where an oil well was first drilled in Canada.
215
 Justice Egbert did employ the expression 
“indefeasibility of title” in his judgment, but he concluded that the matter should be determined 
upon the wording contained in the legislation, commenting as follows: 
     Keeping in mind the purpose and intent of the Act …, I fail to see how it is 
possible for a court to import into these protective clauses words which are not 
there, and to attach to them another condition or exception which the legislature 
did not see fit to mention.
216
 
 
This approach, and not indefeasibility of title as Ruoff claimed, was the basis upon which the 
court reached its decision. The facts help to explain this. 
In 1903 the Crown had granted a large tract of land including mines and minerals to the 
Canadian Pacific Railway (“CPR”), and had instructed the Land Titles Office to issue a 
Certificate of Title.  When CPR sold one quarter-section included in this Certificate of Title to an 
individual in 1908, the transfer specified that CPR had reserved the coal and petroleum.  
However, when Land Titles registered this transfer, it omitted the petroleum reservation from the 
purchaser’s new title.   
Land Titles discovered the error in 1943.  Without notifying CPR or the current land 
owner,
217
 Mr Turta, Land Titles staff amended the chain of cancelled titles and Turta’s title to 
reflect CPR as the owner of petroleum.  After these “corrections” were completed, Land Titles 
staff did not inform any of the interested parties regarding what they had done to the title.
218
   
After discovering what had occurred,
219
 Turta commenced an action for a declaration that 
he was “entitled to be registered as owner of all the petroleum in, upon and under the quarter 
section, and that the substitutions and alterations made to various documents to show the 
contrary were wrongful.”220  Turta relied upon the wording of the statute, ie, that registration was 
everything, and that if a legal interest was not endorsed on the title, it was to be treated as if it did 
not exist.  As the title had registered in his name without showing that petroleum was reserved to 
CPR, he and his successors held all rights to the petroleum.  He also argued that the registrar of 
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land titles could not “amend” the titles, as their actions prejudiced his rights which he had 
obtained for value.   
Given that Turta had purchased the land from a subsequent owner, and because title had 
been registered in his name, one would expect a Court to determine that Turta owned the 
petroleum.  He was an innocent purchaser for value. As a corollary, one would expect CPR to 
make a claim against the assurance fund, on the basis that Land Titles staff had erred when they 
failed to mark the reservation of petroleum on the 1908 title.  Unfortunately for CPR, in 1949 
and 1950 the Alberta government had amended its legislation so that: (1) an aggrieved party had 
six years from the date the error was made to commence such a claim; and (2) restricted the 
maximum claim to $5,000.
221
  Given that the error was made in 1903, CPR was statute-barred 
from commencing an action against the assurance fund.
222
  Also, it did not make commercial 
sense to institute a claim for $5,000 when the loss suffered was 1,000 times more than the 
statutory limit: by the mid 1950s the petroleum in the quarter section had been valued at 
approximately $5,000,000.
223
 At trial, all that was known was that Turta’s land was “almost 
surrounded by producing wells.”224   
For the Alberta government, these amendments were logical from a policy perspective.  
Since its inception, approximately $3,800,000 had been collected on behalf of the assurance 
fund.
225
 If CPR had been allowed to assert a claim and succeeded, the Alberta government would 
have had to take more than $1,200,000 from general revenues.  Additionally, CPR was not the 
only party which suffered a loss because of errors regarding minerals.
226
  Amending the 
legislation resulted in the government remaining solvent, but it caused problems for CPR. 
Faced with this reality, CPR had to try to assert that it owned the petroleum. One of the 
defences it raised to Turta’s claim was that Turta had not acted “’upon the faith of the register’” 
vis-à-vis the petroleum.  Succinctly, he was illiterate, he purchased the land for farming, and he 
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had no knowledge of or interest in the petroleum.
227
  Therefore in CPR’s view, he had not 
transacted on the faith of the register and was not entitled to retain ownership of the petroleum. 
 Until then, judicial analysis focused on the reliance placed on the register by a bona fide 
purchaser for value.
228
 CPR relied on this approach, but it was patently unfair to someone who 
was illiterate.  The court needed to find a means to “level the playing field” between persons 
such as Turta and those who could read, write, and comprehend English.  This was 
accomplished by focusing on the statute. In the course of analyzing statutory provisions, Justice 
Egbert demonstrated a preference for the adjective “indefeasible.” It seems to have encapsulated, 
for him, the essence of the cardinal features of the land titles system, and was a word which 
could succinctly describe the state of Turta’s title.   
 Among other cases, Justice Egbert analyzed decisions from the four appellate courts in 
Australia, New Zealand, England and Canada that had originally employed the word 
“indefeasible.” He also identified three such courts which had penned “indefeasibility of title” in 
their judgments.
229
  Of the four which referred to “indefeasible title,” one originated in British 
Columbia, and was quoting the terminology codified in its statute.
230
  One of the other cases 
mentioned both “indefeasibility of title” and “indefeasible title.”231  This means there were only 
five appellate cases in roughly 100 years which employed indefeasible or indefeasibility that 
Justice Egbert identified as apposite to the issue before him.
232
  Each deserves brief mention.    
As identified by Justice Egbert, the first prominent use of the adjective “indefeasible” 
occurred in Gibbs v Messer.
 233
  It involved a case of identify theft and ultimately the House of 
Lords determined that Mrs Messer, the original owner who had lost her property through forgery, 
was entitled to have the title to her land free and clear of the McIntyres’ mortgage which the 
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fraudster had registered against the title.
234
  In this judgment, Lord Watson uses the phrase 
“indefeasible right”235 when describing Mrs Messer’s interest in the title to land.  Her right could 
not be challenged, but someone else could potentially replace her as the owner on the title.  This 
means that, as the former registered land owner, Mrs Messer’s right was not automatically 
enforceable.  Only a bona fide purchaser for value receives a conclusive title once her ownership 
is entered on the register, ie, once a new Certificate of Title is issued in the owner’s name.  As 
the former registered owner, Mrs Messer had to bring a court action to recover her land.  
Ultimately she was successful and recovered her land free of the McIntyres’ mortgage.  This 
right was not automatic; instead, she had to take steps and incur the resulting expenses to recover 
her property.  Contrary to how it often is portrayed today,
236
 “indefeasible” did not apply equally 
to all parties who owned, or held an interest in, the land. 
 Mere Roihi v Assets Co 237is the next appellate court identified by Justice Egbert which 
employed this term.
 
At page 725 of its judgment, the New Zealand Court wrote:   
’It is the indefeasibility of title of a purchaser for value from the registered 
proprietor, which indefeasibility exists in the interests of the purchaser and not of 
the vendor, which is the essential element in the Act.’238   
 
This decision was reversed upon appeal.
239
   
 Justice Egbert identifies that the New South Wales Court of Appeal used the term too, in 
Hamilton v Iredale.
240
 The transfer which had been submitted and registered described the wrong 
parcel of land.
241
 One of the judges,  
Walker, J. gave a lengthy illustration of the difference between a case of 
"misdescription" and "no title" which has been quoted many times and which I do 
not intend to repeat here. He then goes on to say, referring to the case of "no title" 
as opposed to "misdescription." 
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‘If, however, I acted bona fide [the situation of the plaintiff here] 
believing, however mistakenly, that I had a title to the land applied for, 
then the case does not fall under any of the exceptions to the efficacy of 
the certificate, and ss. 40 and 42 give one an absolute title, which no 
Court can take away or review. ... having regard to the obvious policy 
and intention of the Act, I think the object of the Court should be to 
support and strengthen, not weaken, the indefeasibility of certificates of 
title.’242 
 
 In 1906 “indefeasible” was once again employed by the New Zealand Court of Appeal, in 
Fez v Knowles.
243
  The passage containing this adjective was quoted often in Canada:
244
   
‘The object of the Act was to contain within its four corners a complete system 
which any intelligent man could understand, and which could be carried into 
effect in practice without the intervention of persons skilled in law. * * * The 
cardinal principle of the statute is that the register is everything and that, except in 
cases of actual fraud on the part of the person dealing with the registered 
proprietor, such person, upon registration of the title under which he takes from 
the registered proprietor, has an indefeasible title against all the world.  Nothing 
can be registered the registration of which is not expressly authorized by the 
statute. Everything which can be registered gives, in the absence of fraud, an 
indefeasible title to the estate or interest, or in the cases in which registration of a 
right is authorized, as in the case of easements or incorporeal rights, to the right 
registered.’245 
 
Although in this instance the New Zealand Court of Appeal states that the “register is 
everything” and refers to an “indefeasible title”, it also mentions a restriction on the application 
of this principle.  Instead of making a general pronouncement, it limits the principle to interests 
which can be registered.  If an interest is not capable of sustaining registration, it is not capable 
of supporting an indefeasible title. According to this explanation of the phrase “indefeasible 
title”, it is not absolute or all-encompassing. 
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The final appellate court decision considered by Justice Egbert was Reeves v Konschur,
246
 
a 1909 decision of the Saskatchewan’s Court of Appeal. The Court wrote:  
‘Indefeasibility of title, however, is secured by the Act, only to those who obtain 
title relying upon the register’”247 and as ”‘therefore … The Land Titles Act is 
only intended to confer indefeasible title on those who deal with the registered 
owner, and deal with him on the faith of his registered title.’”248   
 
Once again, the expressions are used in the context of someone dealing with the owner, while the 
Court’s focus remains on the registered title. 
Justice Egbert used these cases and the term “indefeasibility of title” to centre his analysis 
on the legislative provisions contained in the Act.  In the judgment, he used the adjective 
“indefeasible” and the expression “indefeasibility of title” thirty times. Of these, only sixteen 
were quotations from earlier judgments;
249
 he penned the rest.  By doing so, the Court found the 
rationale to grant Turta the relief requested in the face of competing authority.  
Again, Justice Egbert appeared troubled by the distinction which had arisen between the 
test which had developed regarding reliance on the register, and the protections afforded in the 
statute.  In keeping with this, he observed:  
the whole situation should be reviewed by a court of appellate jurisdiction, and a 
definitive, authoritative finding made on the specific point as to whether the 
protective sections of the Act are available only to a purchaser or mortgagee who 
has acted bona fide, has given valuable consideration and has, in addition, acted 
‘in reliance upon’ or ‘on the faith of’ the register. I would point out that there is 
not within the four corners of The Land Titles Act a single word as to ‘reliance 
upon the register’ or ‘acting upon the faith of the register’ – the protection is 
afforded to ‘any purchaser or mortgagee, bona fide and for valuable 
consideration’, subject only to the specific exceptions set forth in the Act and to 
nothing else.
 250
 
 
The Court also opined:    
     Keeping in mind the purpose and intent of the Act …, I fail to see how it is 
possible for a court to import into these protective clauses words which are not 
there, and to attach to them another condition or exception which the legislature 
did not see fit to mention.  If these words are to be read into these sections, it 
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means that protection is afforded to the intelligent and educated purchaser who 
has some comprehension of the meaning of his vendor’s title, but it is denied to 
the ignorant and illiterate who have no such comprehension and who cannot, 
therefore, be said to have dealt ‘on the faith of the register’, and I cannot believe 
that any such result was intended by the legislature.
251
 
 
Following this case, the use of “indefeasibility of title” became more popular in Canada. Yet this 
new reliance was not found in the appellant judgments in Turta. 
The majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judgment.
252
  
“Indefeasible” and “indefeasibility of title” were written thirteen times in the appeal court’s 
judgments: eight were contained in quotations and five were found in passages of the 
judgments.
253
 None of them are apposite. 
 In a fifty-page, six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the decision 
of the majority of the Appeal Court and made a declaration that Turta owned the petroleum. In 
its judgments, the Court used the word “indefeasible” only nine times.254  Interestingly, the 
dissenting judgments employed “indefeasible” more often than did the majority.   
When writing his dissent, Justice Locke quoted from Gibbs v Messer, and referred to an 
“indefeasible right.”255  Justice Locke also relied upon the Fels v Knowles quotation which 
employs “indefeasible title” twice.  He actually penned “indefeasible nature of the title” once in 
the text of his judgment. When describing the state of a title in a Torrens jurisdiction, Chief 
Justice Rinfret used “indefeasible” twice – both contained in a quote – in his dissenting 
judgment.
 256
  To summarize, the dissenting judgments employed “indefeasible” six times. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Estey used “indefeasible” three times.  First he quoted a 
portion of the passage from Fels v Knowles, and the passage from Gibbs v Messer.  Then Justice 
Estey relied upon the New Zealand quotation as the basis for the following statement: 
The foregoing preamble and quotations, as well as others to similar effect, 
emphasize that the Torrens system is intended ‘to give certainty to the title’ as it 
appears in the land titles office. That one who is named as owner in an 
                                                 
251
 Ibid at para 147. 
252
 Turta v Canadian Pacific Railway Company, [1953] 4 DLR 87; 8 WWR (NS) 609; [1953] AJ no 47 (AB CA); 
Chief Justice Ford dissenting [Turta Appeal citing to QL]. 
253
 Ibid. 
254
Turta SCC, supra note 18. 
255
 Ibid at 462. 
256
 Ibid at 433 and 436. 
  46 
uncancelled certificate of title possesses [to quote the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal] an ‘indefeasible title against all the world’, subject to fraud and certain 
specified exceptions, while one who contemplates the acquisition of land may 
ascertain the particulars of its title at the appropriate land titles office …257 
 
This is hardly a conclusive endorsement of indefeasibility of title as it is commonly employed in 
the dominant legal discourse today.  
Justice Rand wrote a concurring judgment.  Like the trial judge, he focused analysis on 
the legislation, and not on any tests which were not codified in the statute.  He described the 
essence of the registration system as the effect of registration, observing: 
     The mechanics of registration can be shortly stated. When a transfer is 
presented at the registry office it is immediately stamped and an entry made in a 
daybook of the day, hour and minute of its receipt, thereafter taken to be the time 
of registration. A memorandum is then endorsed on the certificate describing the 
interest conveyed by the transfer and to that extent cancelling the certificate. By 
that entry the transmission of title is effected. At the same time a like 
memorandum, under the seal and signature of the registrar, is made on the 
duplicate which is held by the owner and which must be presented to the registrar 
before a transfer can be registered. The new certificate and duplicate are then 
prepared and signed by the registrar, the former constituting a folio in the register 
and the latter being delivered to the transferee or new owner.
258
 
 
Justice Rand chose not to employ “indefeasible” or “indefeasibility of title” in this statement, or 
in a subsequent remark: 
     The general and primary conception underlying the statute, as it is of all 
legislation establishing what is known as the Torrens system of land titles, is that 
the existing certificate, bearing the name of a real person, is conclusive evidence 
of his title in favour of any person dealing with him in good faith and for valuable 
consideration.
259
 
 
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada were cognizant that the contents of the legislation 
such as the phrase “conclusive evidence”260 were determinative and only used “indefeasibility of 
title” as an interpretation tool to describe the statutory regime.  This is the approach they 
                                                 
257
 Ibid at 443-444. 
258
 Ibid at 451-452. 
259
 Ibid at 452. 
260
 Chapter 3 below. 
  47 
advocated. Yet a term popularized by an Englishman has become dominant in describing the 
central tenets of the Torrens system, with little or any reference to statutory provisions.
261
   
CONCLUSION 
 Throughout the reforms which lead to the development of land titles systems in South 
Australia and England, “indefeasibility of title” was not the focal point in the legal discourse.  
Torrens liked the expression, but it was not adopted in South Australia’s legislation which, even 
from the outset, included restrictions and limitations on the protections afforded to a registered 
owner.  In certain instances, title has always been defeasible. 
 Instead of being an integral part of the Torrens system from the beginning, the expression 
did not begin to become popular until approximately one hundred years after the system began in 
1858.  Theodore Ruoff – a man familiar with the English land titles system – is the person who 
promulgated the expression and who developed the expressions mirror principle, curtain 
principle and insurance principle.  He credits Canada and Turta with the genesis and 
popularization of “indefeasibility of title” but the judgments show little evidence of this 
connection. 
There are similar issues with the principles, or pillars, as Ruoff describes them. Yet 
Ruoff’s imagery was, and still is, compelling.  He wrote clearly, and his analogies were easy to 
understand.  He made a difficult and complex area of law appear straightforward.  As a result, 
“indefeasibility of title” – which began as a postscript – is now treated as the apex of land titles 
systems of registration.  With this rise, and to our detriment, we appear to have forgotten the 
following: 
the steps necessary to secure such benefits must be those contemplated by the Act 
and not something else. 
The principle involved is not new.  A privilege of any kind created by statute 
must be enforced in the way the statute provides. 
      It cannot be made available in any other way.
262
 
 
Had we continued to follow this approach, indefeasibility of title would have remained a 
postscript, and a myth would not have attained the status of legal fact in dominant legal 
discourse.
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CHAPTER 2 
EXPLORATION OF A MYTH:  
INDEFEASIBILITY IN CANADIAN LITERATURE TODAY 
 
The principle of indefeasibility provides that when title to land is transferred, 
the new owner takes that title free and clear of all encumbrances except those 
registered against the title at the time of transfer.  Registration is everything. It is 
conclusive proof of ownership and it is conclusive proof of any interests, 
exceptions and/or reservations that may affect ownership.
1
 
 
This quote encapsulates the dominant understanding of indefeasibility of title in 
Saskatchewan today: legally trained individuals tend to believe that “indefeasibility of title” is a 
legal fact, one which is the central feature of the province’s land titles systems of registration.2  
In reality, the doctrine of “indefeasibility of title” and the associated mirror, curtain, and 
insurance principles
3
 are recent constructs,
4
 and research indicates that these expressions have 
only come to dominate real property law discourse in approximately the past thirty years. Yet 
most lawyers and judges treat these terms as if they have always been synonymous with our land 
titles system.  Many traditional legal research sources buttress this belief, causing these terms to 
be treated as all encompassing legal facts.   
However, other evidence supports a conclusion that these expressions are not central 
features of the land titles system but are instead no more than a myth.
5
  Because lawyers rely 
                                                 
1
 Ryan-Froslie J in Jen-Sim Cattle Co Ltd v Agricultural Credit Corporation of Saskatchewan, 2006 SKQB 173 
(available on CanLII) at para 18 [Jen-Sim Cattle]. 
2
 To test this assertion, I spoke to three Regina, Saskatchewan lawyers who practice residential real estate about 
indefeasibility of title, what it means to them, and whether it exists. The least experienced lawyer said that he 
learned in Property Law that the term means that the title as issued correctly represents the state of the title, and you 
do not have to look behind it to verify its contents. Lawyer 1, telephone conversation (15 December 2011). 
     The second one believes it exists, and defines it through comparison to the conveyancing system in the United 
States, and clarifies the difference by referring to the need for title insurance there. Lawyer 2, telephone 
conversation (21 December 2011). 
 
    The most experienced lawyer who self-identifies as “a bit of a property nerd” believes it is a central feature of the 
land titles system but refutes the all encompassing definition.  He acknowledges that not all lawyers, and especially 
younger ones, do not appreciate all the nuances associated with this term.  He said he has only become aware of 
them because he has practiced long enough to encounter many land titles issues, “things that make … [him] shake 
his head.”  Lawyer 3, telephone conversation (5 January 2012). 
3
 Theodore BF Ruoff, An Englishman Looks at the Torrens System, (Sydney: The Law Book Co of Australasia Pty 
Ltd, 1957), as discussed in Chapter 1 above at 28-38. 
4
 The development of the use of these terms is discussed in Chapter 1 above, ibid. 
5
 Chapter 1 above, Chapter 3 below and Chapter 4 below. 
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upon “indefeasibility of title” to frame land ownership disputes, there exists a less than adequate 
understanding of the true parameters of land titles law in this province. 
To make the argument and in order to comprehend the myth of indefeasibility of title in 
Saskatchewan, it is helpful to gain a sense of lawyers’ collective understanding of this concept 
and Ruoff’s three pillars,6 or principles, as they are employed currently in Canadian common law 
jurisdictions.  Lawyers often approach an unfamiliar legal area by consulting secondary sources, 
and then moving to case law and statutes.  First a lawyer learns about the general meaning of a 
legal expression, and then examines how the expression is used in statutory provisions and court 
judgments.  This way, the lawyer has the necessary context in which to apply the law as 
expressed in the dominant legal lexicon to the facts.   
This chapter is organized from this perspective: the discussion proceeds as if an 
inexperienced lawyer is trying to formulate an opinion regarding a dispute over the ownership of 
land, one in which involves consideration of the term “indefeasibility of title” as it is used at 
common law.
7
  As such, the discussion begins with a brief presentation of how “indefeasibility 
of title” is defined on the internet and in two dictionaries.  Then “indefeasibility of title” and the 
mirror, curtain and insurance principles are considered from the perspective of two recently 
published introductory property law textbooks and one casebook. Then journal articles are 
considered as a final general source of legal information. 
From this, the analysis turns to an overview of case law and more practice-orientated 
sources often used by practicing lawyers when considering legal issues and preparing arguments 
for court. There is a brief review of how recent Canadian courts have interpreted the terms 
“indefeasibility of title”, “mirror principle,” “curtain principle” and “insurance principle.” After 
this the discussion shifts to the treatment of these terms in Saskatchewan’s most recently 
published land titles manual of procedure and in Torrens’ Elusive Title,8 the seminal text on land 
titles systems such as the one operating in Saskatchewan. From these sources, the meaning of 
“indefeasibility of title” within Canada’s dominant legal lexicon as understood by most lawyers 
and applied by the courts in Saskatchewan becomes clear.   
                                                 
6
 Chapter 1 above at 28-38. 
7
 The treatment of this term in Saskatchewan land titles statutes is beyond the scope of this chapter, and forms the 
subject of Chapter 3 below. 
8
 Thomas W Mapp, Torrens’ Elusive Title: Basic Legal Principles of an Efficient Torrens’ System, (Edmonton: The 
University of Alberta Printing Department, The University of Alberta: 1978). 
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1. INDEFEASIBILITY: THE INTERNET AND DICTIONARIES 
Given the prominence attached to “indefeasibility of title” in most land titles registration 
jurisdictions, a lawyer might expect to find this term defined on the internet or in a dictionary.  
Yet the results from an internet search of “indefeasibility of title” on www.google.ca do not 
identify any credible sources on the first page of results,
9
 illustrating the paucity of a decent 
online definition of this term.  For example, the first result refers to the definition found in 
Wikipedia, which reads, “Torrens title is a system of land title where a register of land holdings 
maintained by the state guarantees an indefeasible title to those included in the register …”10  
This definition is more tautological than helpful.  The next result identifies an entry in the Free 
Legal Dictionary which only provides a definition of “indefeasible” as an adjective which means 
something that “cannot be altered or voided, usually in reference to an interest in real 
property.”11 “Indefeasibility of title” is not defined.   
Similarly the Canadian Oxford Dictionary only defines “indefeasible” as an adjective 
meaning “of a claim, rights, etc. … that cannot be lost.”12  “Indefeasibility” simply refers to the 
noun associated with this entry.
13
   
More surprising given its legal focus and the fact that some American jurisdictions 
operate land titles systems of registration based on the Torrens System,
14
 Black’s Legal 
Dictionary only defines “indefeasible.”  Reading Black’s, the fictitious lawyer learns that 
“indefeasible” is an adjective affecting a “claim or right”, one meaning “not vulnerable to being 
defeated, revoked, or lost.”15  From these sources, our lawyer learns that “indefeasibility” is a 
noun formed from the adjective “indefeasible.”  As a noun predicated upon this adjective, 
“indefeasibility” must mean something such as a right or claim – or in this case, a title to land – 
that in itself is “not vulnerable to being defeated, revoked, or lost.”16  Given Black’s failure to 
                                                 
9
 www.google.ca 22/09/2011, sub verbo “indefeasibility of title definition.” 
10
 <en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indefeasibility_of_title>. 
11
 <http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/indefeasible>. 
12
 Canadian Oxford Dictionary, 2
nd
 ed, sub verbo “indefeasible.” 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 RG Patton, “The Torrens System of Land Title Registration” (1935) 19 Minn L Rev 519 (HeinOnline). 
15Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed sub verbo “indefeasible.” 
16
 Ibid. 
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define the term “indefeasibility of title,” it is not surprising that it does not define mirror 
principle, curtain principle and the insurance principle either.  
From this the fictitious lawyer will have to infer a definition of the noun “indefeasibility 
of title” by adapting the definition of the adjective “indefeasible.”  Because the definition of 
“indefeasible” is stated so emphatically, a lawyer gains the impression that “indefeasibility of 
title” must be absolute and unchallengeable.17  Although this impression is not absolute,18 it has 
certainly become dominant.  In these circumstances it would be unrealistic to expect this lawyer 
would reach a different conclusion, especially considering the contents of introductory property 
law textbooks and casebooks. 
2.  INDEFEASIBILITY:  INTRODUCTORY TEXTBOOKS AND CASEBOOKS 
Compared to internet sources and dictionaries, the fictitious lawyer should expect to find 
greater clarity in an introductory legal textbook or a casebook. Three such recently published 
Canadian books refer to “indefeasibility of title” and the associated mirror principle, curtain 
principle and insurance principle.  Each provides a much better definition than that provided in 
the dictionaries, but each one also supports the notion of the myth over the actual statutory 
provisions in effect in Saskatchewan.   
For example, the second edition of A Property Law Reader: Cases, Questions, and 
Commentary
19
 labels “three central features of title systems”20 as follows:   
                                                 
17
 This approach has been adopted by many persons involved in real estate conveyancing, such as Vancouver real 
estate agent, Luigi Frascati.  At <http://ezinearticles.com/?Title-
Indefeasibility&id=1711688wwparam=1316716888> Frascati describes “indefeasibility of title as follows:  
“Indefeasibility, therefore, is a legal principle providing that the Register of Titles is conclusive evidence that the 
person named on title as holding the interest in the land is, in fact, rightfully entitled to that interest and, 
furthermore, that his holding is not subject to any condition or encumbrances other than those shown on the title 
Register. It follows, therefore, that a purchaser can rely completely on what is shown in the Register of titles, since 
‘what you see is what you get’. This means, moreover, that a Purchaser’s title can be valid even if there are defects 
in the Seller’s registered deed.”   
18
 Since the term “indefeasibility of title” and the three pillars were first coined in the 1950s (see Chapter 1 above 
starting at 28), there have been academics and land titles officials in each generation who have identified that the 
scope of protection according to a landowner in a land titles registration jurisdiction is more limited than what is 
suggested by the notion of “indefeasibility of title.”  Some of these include Canadians Roger Carter and Thomas W 
Mapp, and Australians John Baalman, WN Harrison, and Robert Stein.  See:  Roger Carter, “Some Reflections on 
The Land Titles Act of Saskatchewan” (1965), 30 Sask B Rev 315 at 315 (HeinOnline); Mapp, supra note 8; John 
Baalman, The Torrens System in New South Wales (Sydney: The Law Book Co of Australasia Pty Ltd, 1951); WN 
Harrison, “Indefeasibility of Torrens Title” (1954) 2 U Queensland LJ 206 (HeinOnline); R Stein, “The ‘Principles, 
Aims and Hopes’ of Title by Registration” (1983-1985) 9 Adel L Rev 267 (HeinOnline).   
19
 Bruce H Ziff, Jeremy de Beer et al, A Property Law Reader: Cases, Questions, and Commentary (2
nd
 ed) 
(Toronto: Thomson Canada, 2008) [Ziff and deBeer]. 
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1) the principle of indefeasibility. Once in place, purchasers need not conduct an 
historic search of title; they can rely on the ‘top title.’ So it is said that a 
curtain is drawn on past dealings. 
2) the register is supposed to serve as a mirror (or a photograph) of all interests 
relating to a given plot of land. 
3) insurance (or net) principle … [is] the third pillar of land titles registration.21 
 
This paragraph relies on the construct of indefeasibility and the three principles. They are 
portrayed as legal facts and acceptance of the myth begins. 
In the fifth edition of Principles of Property Law,
22
 the author begins by quoting from the 
Manitoba Court of Appeal that “’[i]ndefeasibility is the heart of a Torrens system.’23  Almost 
immediately thereafter, the author acknowledges: 
the concept is qualified in major ways. A title is indefeasible when it cannot be 
vitiated by some antecedent act that might undermine the validity of current rights.  
In theory, therefore, state registration provides a safe harbour from any defects in 
title for the party declared by the register to be the owner of Blackacre. The idea of 
indefeasibility involves the lowering of a curtain on past transactions.
24
 
 
This author acknowledges that “indefeasibility of title” exists in theory, but this important 
qualification is overshadowed by his reference to the curtain.  Once the curtain has been lowered, 
there is no requirement to examine “past transactions.”  The curtain is a visual reference and as 
such is the most accessible portion of this quotation.  Thus, one remembers it more easily than 
the acknowledgement that indefeasibility is a theoretical construct. 
Another introductory property law textbook, Understanding Property: A Guide to 
Canada’s Property Law,25 takes a different approach.  Its authors begin by noting that “[l]and 
titles registration is not a complete code in that it does not affect interparty dealings relating to 
unpatented land, nor does it affect unregistered interests in registered lands.”26  This text does not 
                                                                                                                                                             
20
 Ibid at 980.  
21
 Ibid at 980. 
22
 Bruce Ziff, Principles of Property Law (5
th
 ed) (Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada Limited, 2010) [Ziff]. 
23
 Re Cartlidge and Granville Savings and Mortgage Corporation (1987) 34 DLR (4
th
) 161 (MBCA) at 172 (per 
Philip JA) quoted in Ziff ibid at 474. 
24
 Ibid at 474. 
25
 Marjorie Lynne Benson, Marie-Ann Bowden and Dwight Newman, Understanding Property: A Guide to 
Canada’s Property Law (2nd ed) (Toronto: Thomson Canada Limited, 2008) [Benson]. 
26
 Ibid at 156.  
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discuss the mirror principle, curtain principle and insurance principle until it first highlights the 
fact that the system does not apply to all transactions and to all parcels of land.  This means it is a 
much more accurate portrayal of a land titles system of registration. 
However, the authors do employ the terms indefeasibility of title, mirror principle, 
curtain principle and insurance principle.  They begin with the “mirror principle,” describing it 
as: 
Torrens system statutes provide that only those interests endorsed on the 
certificate of title, or otherwise specifically provided for in legislation, bind 
subsequent interest holders. Moreover, until it is registered, any transaction 
relating to the real properly [sic] does not create an interest in the land enforceable 
against a third party transferee, whether or not he is aware of the unregistered 
interest. It is unnecessary to look beyond the information presented on a 
certificate of title to learn the property description and holder with certainty. As to 
interests that might burden that title, it is necessary to look at the statutes, as well 
as the details of the interests on the back of the certificate of title.
27
 
 
The authors next turn to the “curtain principle,” writing: 
With the issuance of a certificate of title comes a state guarantee that the holder of 
that title is the holder of the estate named in the certificate, and that those 
investigating title need look no further than interests registered thereon or those 
implied by statute. A metaphoric curtain or wall shields subsequent interest 
holders from interests that may have existed prior to the date of issuance of the 
certificate of title.
28
 
 
They are even more succinct when discussing the “insurance principle,” using only one 
sentence to describe it as “[s]hould a mistake occur in the certificate of title, the state provides 
compensation from a fund known as the assurance fund.”29  Contrary to this assertion, 
compensation has only ever been paid in very limited circumstances.
30
   
After this, the authors summarize the key features of land titles systems of registration: 
When taken together, the mirror principle, the curtain principle, and the insurance 
principle constitute the underlying doctrine of indefeasibility of title. An 
indefeasible title holder will retain the land and the party whose interest was 
defeated will only receive damages.
31
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In so doing, they fail to consider the actual provisions in the statute which suggest a more limited 
degree of protection.  Like the other recent textbook and casebook, this textbook unknowingly 
perpetuates a concept which has a very limited, if any, statutory basis.   
After reading these recently published introductory property text and casebooks, it is 
reasonable to believe that indefeasibility of title and the three principles are the central features 
of land titles systems of registration. However the knowledge base is still incomplete. For 
example, the second text describes a number of exceptions to indefeasibility, but does not 
mention equitable interests or reservations in the original Crown grant,
32
 neither of which need to 
be noted on a title in a land titles system of registration as owners are expected to understand the 
legal exceptions codified in the legislation.
33
   These textbooks and the casebook may be 
misleading as none clearly indicate that the land titles system of registration always is based on a 
statute:
34
  no specific statutory provisions are included when the terms are described.   
In general, very little attention is given to the “statutory exceptions” mentioned by 
Professors Benson and Bowden, or to how the concept of indefeasibility is “qualified,” as noted 
by Professor Ziff.  These are introductory texts, written to introduce legal concepts and rules in 
property law.  A more nuanced discussion of issues such as, for example, the debate on 
immediate or deferred indefeasibility of title,
35
 the status of mineral titles within Canadian land 
titles jurisdictions,
36
 or fraud in the context of land titles,
37
 is beyond their scope.  There are 
many exceptions to indefeasibility, and they often contradict the “hallmarks” of land titles 
systems.
38
   
                                                 
32
 Ibid at 156-161. 
33
 Ball v Gutschenritter [1925], 1 DLR 901, SCR 68 (Duff J), as quoted in Prudential Trust Co Ltd v The Registrar, 
Land Titles Office, Humboldt Land Registration District (1956), 2 DLR (2d) 29; [1956] SJ no 40 (QL) (SK CA) at 
para 112 (citing to QL). 
34
 The historical development of Saskatchewan’s land titles system of registration, including an examination of the 
debate surrounding the development of a code for conveyancing in real property law, are discussed further in the 
Introduction above at 3 n 11; Chapter 1 above at 6-28; and Chapter 3 below. 
35
 The issue of immediate or deferred indefeasibility is the subject of many common law journal articles, such as:  
Pamela O’Connor, “Deferred and Immediate Indefeasibility: Bijural Ambiguity in Registered Land Title Systems” 
(2009) 13 Edinburgh L Rev 194 [hereafter referred to as “O’Connor 2009”] (HeinOnline). 
36
 See eg:  Olney v Great-West Life Assurance Company, 2011 SKQB 186 (available on CanLII). 
37
 See eg: CIBC Mortgages Inc v Saskatchewan (Registrar of Titles), 2005 SKQB 470 (available on CanLII) which 
is discussed more fully in Chapter 4 below at 106-118. 
38
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Before the magnitude of the exceptions can be comprehended, the central concepts need 
to be understood.  The textbooks and casebook perform this introductory function.  If other 
sources analyzed the exceptions and qualifications, a balanced view of indefeasibility of title and 
the three pillars would be facilitated. Unfortunately, other sources take a similar approach, only 
devoting brief mention to the exceptions and thereby creating a misunderstanding of this 
concept. 
3. INDEFEASIBILITY:  JOURNAL ARTICLES 
The term “indefeasibility of title” has been employed in Canadian journal articles.  It was 
first discussed in Marcia Neave’s “Indefeasibility of Title in the Canadian Context,”39 a 1976 
article which has been cited in numerous Canadian journal articles and in court decisions.
 40
 
Professor Marcia Neave, then a senior lecturer in law at the University of Melbourne,
41
 visited 
Canada in 1976 and published her article in the University of Toronto Law Journal.  In this 
article Professor Neave discusses the “doctrine” and its three pillars as they had been used in her 
country since the 1950s.
42
 Given that Canadians outside of Alberta
43
 rarely used these 
expressions before this article was published, Professor Neave can be credited with importing 
them into the Canadian legal lexicon.   
In her article Professor Neave describes systems of title registration as: 
The state establishes title by setting up a register and guaranteeing that a person 
named as the proprietor in the register has a perfect title subject only to registered 
encumbrances and to enumerated statutory exceptions. The philosophy of a 
system of title registration is often described as depending on three principles. 
The first is the ‘mirror principle’ under which the register is a perfect mirror of 
the state of title. The second is the ‘curtain principle’ under which the purchaser 
need not investigate the history of past dealings with the land, or search behind 
the title as depicted on the register. The third is the ‘insurance principle’ under 
which the state guarantees the accuracy of the register and compensates any 
person who suffers loss as the result of an inaccuracy. Together these concepts 
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 Marcia Neave, “Indefeasibility of Title in the Canadian Context” (1976) 26 U Toronto LJ 173 (HeinOnline). 
40
 See eg: Durrani v Augier, 2000 CanLII 22410 (ON SC) at para 42. 
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 Neave, supra note 39 at n *. 
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 See Chapter 1 above at 28-38. 
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form ‘the principle of indefeasibility’ frequently referred to by commentators, 
though the phrase is not used in the legislation itself.
44
 
 
In her experience, the “principle of indefeasibility” and the mirror, curtain and insurance 
principles were the central features of systems of land titles registration.  The first two 
“principles” create easily remembered visual images for the reader. The associated concepts can 
be readily grasped from Neave’s careful descriptions.  Consequently, these terms are useful tools 
for summarizing the fundamental principles in a somewhat complex and contradictory land titles 
registration system.  
The term “indefeasibility of title” next appeared in a journal article in 1985.  In that year, 
Roger Carter, a law professor at the University of Saskatchewan, used this expression in the title 
of a case comment.
 45  
He focuses on whether the principle of indefeasibility of title applied to a 
volunteer or whether the principle was restricted to a situation involving a bona fide purchaser 
for value. Professor Carter refers to the relevant statutory provisions and case law without 
including any separate definition of the term in his title.  As well, he never mentions the mirror 
principle, curtain principle or insurance principle.
46
   
“Indefeasibility of title” was next employed in a case comment47 regarding Hermanson v 
Saskatchewan (Registrar, Regina Land Registration District).
48
  In the case the court considered 
the competing claims of an innocent joint owner of a home whose signature was forged on a 
transfer, and those of the good faith purchaser for value.
49
  In the case comment the author 
introduces the concept of indefeasibility of title as follows:  
     One of the cardinal principles of the Torrens system is that of indefeasibility of 
title. Simply stated, it means that the person named as owner on a certificate of 
title to land has good title to that land against all the world, subject to competing 
claims or encumbrances endorsed on that certificate, and subject to a limited 
number of statutory exceptions.
50
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The author does not mention the three pillars, but his short description of “indefeasibility of title” 
promulgates the mythical conception of the term. 
In 1991, Professor Bruce Ziff from the University of Alberta discusses this term in a case 
comment involving the status accorded to private easements as overriding interests in Alberta.
51
  
In the first paragraph, Professor Ziff describes the “driving mission” of the Torrens System: 
….there should be no invisible clouds on title. In theory, a purchaser of land 
should be confident that the title issued by the Registrar of the Land Titles office is 
indefeasible, at least to the extent that it cannot be undermined by the later 
discovery of some hidden and prior unregistered interest.
52
 
 
Once again, the three pillars or principles are not mentioned. 
A 1992 article about indefeasibility of title and adverse possession in Alberta
53
 provides a 
rather simplistic conception of the basic components of a land titles system of registration.  As 
seen from the following quote, this student believes that all interests are registered against a 
Certificate of Title, and, except for claims based on adverse possession which is recognized in 
Alberta’s statute, that no further analysis is required: 
adverse possession is contrary to several basic components of a Torrens system.  
Adverse possession weakens the basic declaration of indefeasibility set out in 
section 64 of … [Alberta’s] Land Titles Act.  By allowing adverse possession, the 
owner no longer holds land absolutely free from encumbrances, liens, estates and 
interests not endorsed on the certificate of title. Not only can the adverse 
possessor encumber the owner’s title but he can make it defeasible as well.  
Similarly, a Torrens system envisages all interests in land clearly shown on the 
certificate of title. …. Further, adverse possession works around the evidentiary 
effect of a certificate of title. Section 66 [of the Alberta statute] states that a 
certificate of title is conclusive proof in all courts that the person indicated on the 
certificate is entitled to the land. This is clearly not the case where the owner’s 
title has been extinguished but the adverse possessor has not as yet had the 
certificate of title changed. Another basic Torrens principle … is that the owner is 
not subject to ejectment.  What is the effect of adverse possession, if not 
ejectment? Adverse possession therefore strikes at the root of the Torrens 
system.
54
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As these articles indicate, by the early 1990s the use of “indefeasibility of title” to describe the 
central feature of land titles systems of registration was commonly accepted.  The Australian 
expressions had become part of Canada’s dominant legal lexicon. 
The issues associated with “indefeasibility of title” now seem to be out of vogue with 
academics.  In the past ten years, only one article dealing with systems of title registration has 
been published in an English Canadian peer-reviewed journal.
55
  This article is written by Brian 
Bucknall, a lawyer in Ontario: a jurisdiction which operates both a title registration system and a 
deed registration system.  Bucknall “confines his practice to expert advice on real estate 
transactions and confines his clientele to lawyers and law firms”56 and as a result may be 
considered an expert in this area. When describing land titles systems of registration, he briefly 
mentions what is meant by “indefeasibility of title,” stating: 
The basic principle of Torrens registration and Land Titles registration is that 
the legal event associated with a change in title to real estate takes place on the 
public register, not in the course of dealings between the parties. Neither ‘grant’ 
nor ‘livery’ are of any assistance – documents indicating a change in title must 
appear on the public register. As with the Registry Act, no unregistered 
instrument can, other than within certain statutory exceptions, have any relevance 
to title. 
The register of title maintained under the Land Titles Act is intended to be, in a 
phrase used repeatedly in texts and judgments, a ‘mirror’ and a ‘curtain.’ The 
register mirrors all current interests in title (all non-current interests being struck 
out) and draws a curtain across the title history prior to the current registered 
interests.
57
 
 
Bucknall recognizes that there are statutory exceptions to “indefeasibility” but then asserts that 
the mirror and the curtain are central features of land titles systems.  Stating that “the register 
mirrors all current interests in title” creates an inference that no other interests are possible, or 
                                                 
55
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exist.  No other analysis of these expressions is provided.  Consequently it appears as if 
“indefeasibility of title” operates in most situations.   
International research indicates that there is a great deal of reinforcement for the very 
encompassing view of “indefeasibility of title.”  As evidenced by the number of journal articles 
from Australia,
58
 the notion of “indefeasibility of title” continues to be debated and analyzed in 
the country where Commonwealth land titles systems originated.
59
  There “indefeasibility of 
title” is treated as a legal fact.  However the same level of debate does not occur in Canada, and 
so Canadians’ understanding of the concept is not very well developed, and the nuances inherent 
in land titles systems are not presented in detail.  This means the myth can continue to be 
promulgated through the simplicity and visual imagery inherent in the definition of 
“indefeasibility” and the mirror and curtain. 
4. INDEFEASIBILITY: PRACTICE MANUALS AND SEMINAL TEXTS 
Lawyers also read practical sources such as practice manuals and recent seminal texts 
when learning a new substantive area of law and formulating legal opinions.  As a result such 
sources need to be considered in this discussion of indefeasibility of title.   
In the past sixty years three Saskatchewan land titles manuals have been published, all 
authored by a “Master of Titles,” the statutory official charged with overseeing the operation of 
the land titles system of registration under The Land Titles Act.  The first manual dates from 
                                                 
58
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1962 and does not refer to “indefeasibility of title” or any of the three principles.60  The next 
published in 1966 does not mention these terms either.
61
  The final manual, published in 1988, 
does.  Under the heading “Indefeasibility,” the author states that the “salient characteristic of a 
Land Titles System is that the certificate of title is conclusive evidence of ownership.”62  The 
author goes on to indicate that “conclusive evidence of ownership” is affected through section 
213 of The Land Titles Act.
63
   
Only then does the author use the noun “indefeasibility.” She writes: 
The essence of the principle of indefeasibility is that a person is entitled to rely on 
whatever the certificate of title says. Its accuracy must, therefore, be beyond 
question both as to what is on the face of the certificate and as to memoranda on 
the back. It is important also that it be not only accurate but free from 
ambiguity.
64
 
 
She also uses the term “exceptions to indefeasibility” when describing the limitations to 
conclusiveness of ownership in a Torrens-based system of land titles registration.
65
  However, 
like the dictionaries, the author of this manual does not refer to the mirror principle, curtain 
principle, or insurance principle in the section titled “Indefeasibility.”  A discerning reader may 
wonder about the absence of these expressions while finding support for the notion that 
“indefeasibility of title” is a principle of law.  
 To double-check the findings, a seminal text may also be consulted.  In 1978, Professor 
Thomas W Mapp of the University of Alberta authored Torrens’ Elusive Title: Basic Legal 
Principles of an Efficient Torrens’ System for the Alberta Institute for Law Research and 
Reform.
66
  This text on a Torrens land titles system is applicable to Saskatchewan, since the 
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statutory schemes in both provinces share the same genesis, The Territories Real Property Act,
67
 
and remained largely the same for many years. 
Professor Mapp’s text examines the basic legal principles of Torrens’ based systems of 
land titles in much greater detail than any of the other sources.  Because of this, he notes some of 
the inherent contradictions in associating “indefeasibility of title” with such systems.  He 
observes, for example: 
It is essential that we recognize that because of the possibility of error, 
potential defeasibility follows inevitably from the Torrens system strategy of legal 
ownership conferred by state decree. However, characterizing ownership under 
the system as inherently defeasible is heresy; it is contrary to the received and 
almost universally accepted manner of describing a ‘title’ under the religion.68 
 
He credits the “historic environment” for the misunderstanding regarding the supposed 
centrality of indefeasibility of title to such systems.  The Torrens land titles system was 
developed to address problems that existed with common law conveyancing and the deed 
registry system which existed in South Australia.  Given that South Australia was not a penal 
colony,
69
 there were many land transactions as land speculators bought land and then sold it to 
settlers. Each time, the “chain of titles” had to be searched and even then, there was no guarantee 
that a purchaser was obtaining all the property rights in that parcel of land.
70
  Torrens sought to 
address the inherent uncertainty in this search of title documents (which could be forged)
71
 in a 
society which recognized adverse possession
72
 and as a corollary, verbal claims to proprietary 
interests in land.  In such an environment, it is doubtful that Torrens was concerned with absolute 
indefeasibility for each seller and purchaser in every transaction.  Such a result was not possible.   
Professor Mapp recognizes the inherent contradiction associated with the concept of 
indefeasibility, writing: 
the primary objective of the Torrens system was to eliminate the necessity of 
verifying the seller’s derived ownership. Assume that A was the best owner of 
Blackacre at common law, that B was subsequently registered as the owner 
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through error, and that C (… Robert Torrens) purchased from B without fraud and 
became the registered owner. Robert Torrens and others of his generation, based 
on experience, were haunted by the danger of a prior superior owners [sic], and 
they wanted the state to give them protection from this risk originating in the past.  
Assuming an adequate compensation system, the question posed by this example 
is, who gets the mud and who gets the money?
73
 
 
Professor Mapp is cognizant that only one of these persons can “get the mud” while the other 
will have to be compensated with money.  Only one of their titles can be indefeasible.  This is 
the only recent source which a practicing lawyer might consult which provides such a frank 
overview of some of the limitations inherent in the doctrine of indefeasibility of title.  It is a 
much more discerning analysis than what is contained in the other sources.   
5. INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE – A SURVEY OF COURT JUDGMENTS 
When studying “indefeasibility of title,” the fictitious lawyer will search court decisions.  
Such a person will discover that the term has been used regularly in Alberta courts since the 
early 1950s,
74
 following the trial judge in Turta v Canadian Pacific Railway significant use of 
the expression.
75
  That case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada and Justice Estey’s 
judgment
76
 is the seminal Canadian decision on indefeasibility of title.  When discussing relevant 
cases, Justice Estey quotes judgments from New Zealand and Australia which previously had 
been quoted in Alberta and Saskatchewan judgments,
77
 thereby legitimizing the use of this term 
in Canadian jurisprudence. Even so, he does not refer to any of the three pillars or principles. 
Much has changed since then.  Now the terms introduced by Marcia Neave to Canada are 
used commonly in provincial judgments and part of the dominant legal lexicon. In British 
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Columbia,
78
 Alberta
79
 and Ontario
80
 the term “indefeasibility of title” has been used in at least 
fifty judgments in each jurisdiction.  In Ontario and New Brunswick, Neave is cited as the 
authority for these expressions.
81
  
Saskatchewan is a little different from these jurisdictions. Unlike Alberta, “indefeasibility 
of title” only started to be used regularly in the last thirty years, and has only become dominant 
in approximately the past ten years.  It has been mentioned in twenty-seven Saskatchewan 
judgments, twenty-five of which focus on land,
82
 and nine of which have been issued since 
2000.
83
  
In this province the expression “indefeasibility of title” gained popularity after the trial 
decision of Hermanson v Martin
84
 and its subsequent appeal.
85
 This was the first time that 
Saskatchewan courts addressed the issue of fraud in the land titles system. The expressions 
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“mirror principle,” “curtain principle” and “insurance principle” were not mentioned in the 
judgments but “indefeasibility of title” was. Once the term was used in this case, it began to be 
used more regularly.  
In the past five to six years, those few judgments focusing on indefeasibility have made 
more general and definitive statements about this term.  For example, in CIBC Mortgages Inc v 
Saskatchewan (Registrar of Titles),
86
 Justice Laing provides a very concise description of this 
term.  He writes: 
Under the Torrens’ system, indefeasibility of title is made an incident of 
registration. Once registered, an instrument is no longer the source of title of the 
transferee but is replaced by the certificate of title, which subject to the exceptions 
contained in any particular land titles statute, becomes conclusive.
87
 
 
Technically his analysis is correct because he recognizes that statutory exceptions to 
“indefeasibility of title” exist.  However, this recognition is very brief and is not accompanied by 
any examples.  Because it is a brief general statement, it is easy for an inexperienced lawyer 
reading it to overlook the number and type of exceptions that are inherent in the land titles 
system of registration. 
 In Jen-Sim Cattle Co Ltd v Agricultural Credit Corporation of Saskatchewan,
88
 Justice 
Ryan-Froslie begins the judgment by writing, “Indefeasibility of title has always been the 
hallmark of the Torrens system of land holding.”89  Later, she devotes one paragraph to 
explaining this concept.  Doing so, she writes: 
The principle of indefeasibility provides that when title to land is transferred, 
the new owner takes that title free and clear of all encumbrances except those 
registered against the title at the time of transfer.  Registration is everything. It is 
conclusive proof of ownership and it is conclusive proof of any interests, 
exceptions and/or reservations that may affect ownership.
90
 
 
This paragraph is more problematic than the definition of “indefeasibility of title” 
provided in CIBC Mortgages Inc v Saskatchewan (Registrar of Titles).  In Jen-Sim the 
court uses the phrase “conclusive proof of ownership” which is codified in section 13(1) 
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of The Land Titles Act, 2000,
91
 but does not mention the existence of any statutory 
exceptions or limitations to an owner’s conclusive title.  Rather, and more in keeping 
with the mythical construct, the judge states that “registration is everything” and that 
registration “is conclusive proof of any interests, exceptions and/or reservations that may 
affect ownership.”  Thus, the judgment presents indefeasibility as an absolute and all-
encompassing principle, one in keeping with the myth. 
Another example of a technically correct yet simplistic description of “indefeasibility of 
title” is found in Brick v Modus Resources Ltd.,92 a case decided in 2007.  In it Justice Popescul 
writes:   
The integrity of the land titles system in Saskatchewan has long depended on the 
fundamental principle of indefeasibility of title. A party intending to obtain an 
interest in land in Saskatchewan is entitled to rely on the certificate of title being 
correct and conclusively representing all interests in the land without having to 
look behind the title to determine if there are any unregistered interests…. This 
principle is absolute and is subject only to statutory exceptions or the effects of 
fraudulent activities.
93
 
 
Once again, only a brief mention is made of the statutory exceptions.  The exceptions are 
nuanced and complex, and more than a half-sentence general statement is required for readers to 
comprehend their complexities.  Without such elaboration, such general statements, especially 
when made by members of the judiciary, serve to perpetuate the myth.  
None of these cases discuss in detail the statutory provisions which impact the principle 
of indefeasibility or provide any statutory foundation for the usage of this term. The nuances of 
real property law in the context of a land titles jurisdiction remain unexplored, just as they do in 
the introductory textbooks and journal articles. Instead of the detailed level of analysis one 
would expect in what in reality is a very complicated area of law, the term “indefeasibility of 
title,” without much explanation, is becoming more widely used. With this, the myth of 
indefeasibility, as it is thought to exist in the dominant legal lexicon, is perpetuated.    
Given their widespread use, the fictitious lawyer likely will research cases which have 
employed the expressions “mirror principle,” “curtain principle” and “insurance principle” to try 
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to learn about indefeasibility of title.  Searches of these expressions on an online legal database 
result in a number of “hits” across Canadian provinces which operate land titles systems of 
registration.  For example, the “curtain principle” has been referred to in judgments from New 
Brunswick,
94
 Ontario,
95
 Alberta
96
 and British Columbia.
97
  The Supreme Court of Canada also 
has used the terms “mirror principle” and “insurance principle” in a judgment.98  Saskatchewan 
courts have never referred to the mirror principle, but two cases do reference the “curtain 
principle.” 99 From this, the lawyer should conclude that little reliance should be placed on these 
expressions in Saskatchewan. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has attempted to survey how “indefeasibility of title” and the three pillars or 
principles are used in traditional legal sources such as introductory textbooks, casebooks, journal 
articles, practice manuals, seminal texts and cases.  From this, it becomes apparent that there is a 
dichotomy between the dictionary definitions of indefeasible and how this word and its 
associated noun – indefeasibility – are used in the context of land titles systems of registration. 
Although these expressions are not defined in dictionaries, they have come to be treated as 
integral features of land titles systems of registration.   
Very few of the sources which have been surveyed examine these constructs in the 
context of legislation, and thereby fail to portray the nuances and complexity inherent in land 
titles systems of registration such as the one operating in Saskatchewan.  Only alluding to 
statutory exceptions is insufficient to create awareness of the inherent limitations contained in 
land titles systems. Without any specific references to the actual statutory exceptions or analysis 
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of how these exceptions adversely impact certainty of ownership, readers accept the visual 
images of the mirror and the curtain.  This obfuscates the principles actually espoused in 
legislation and facilitates the growth and acceptance of the mythical construct, one akin to the 
Emperor’s new clothes. As a result, lawyers may fail to understand or apply the substantive 
elements which are codified in this legislative scheme.   
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CHAPTER 3 
FACT:  
INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE IN  
SASKATCHEWAN’S LEGISLATION 
 
In construing a Torrens [land titles] Act it is wise to avoid approaching it with 
a preconception of its general effect, e.g. that the Act confers an indefeasible title, 
or a “parliamentary title”, or a title distinct from that derived under the general 
principles of common law. Read subject to a preconception the protecting 
provisions are likely to be construed too broadly and the exceptions to them too 
narrowly. The better plan is to take the Act section by section (not forgetting of 
course that it must be read as a whole) and to see how far each section, examined 
without preconceptions, but in the light of other sections, alters the general law. In 
this way the scheme and general purpose of the Act will be built up from the 
actual provisions of the Act. Too often, it is suggested, interpretation begins with 
a preconceived scheme into which particular provisions are fitted, whereas the 
scheme should take its shape from the provisions.
1
 
     Professor WN Harrison 
 
 Instead of approaching the progression of Saskatchewan’s land titles statutes with an 
assumption that each one contains provisions which correspond to “indefeasibility of title,” in 
this chapter the analysis follows the structure advocated by Professor Harrison in his seminal 
paper “Indefeasibility of Torrens Title.”  The two sequential statutory regimes – the first one 
which was based on the Torrens model and which existed from the time Saskatchewan became a 
province until approximately ten years ago,
2
 and the latest one which focuses on a computer-
based land titles registry – are examined. This analysis establishes that the “doctrine” of 
indefeasibility of title with its mirror, curtain, and insurance principles have never been codified 
in the statutory provisions, and that a direct correlation between these concepts and the statutory 
provisions may not exist. 
 In section one of this chapter, the first statutory regime is examined. This includes 
consideration of how Saskatchewan’s land titles system altered the general law of real property 
and conveyancing, and begins with scrutinizing the goals espoused in the original Act, The 
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Territories Real Property Act.
3
 Then the discussion focuses on The Land Titles Act, 1906.
4
 It 
begins broadly by examining how this Act’s procedural and administrative provisions – which 
remained largely unchanged until this period ended in 2002
5
 – worked synergistically to alter 
previous practices and laws and to achieve the statute’s goals.   
 Next the discussion turns to the substantive provisions which may be used to support the 
preconception of indefeasibility of title and the three principles.  Because we know the broader 
context of this legislative scheme, we are better able to ascertain if the preconception is 
appropriate.  The substantive provisions in The Land Titles Act, 1906 are considered for 
consistency: it is logical to examine statutory provisions from the same statute which has been 
analyzed already.  This way, an inference can be made regarding the existence of indefeasibility 
of title, free from the widely-held assumption.  
 The same inference can be made from The Land Titles Act
6
 codified in the 1978 Revised 
Statutes.  As very little changed since the 1906 Act was proclaimed, the 1978 provisions are only 
referred to when they depart significantly from the earlier statute.  The analysis of these 
provisions illustrates that “indefeasibility of title” was not central to the Act’s functions and 
goals during the later years of the first regime either.  
 The final section of the chapter examines “indefeasibility of title” and the three principles 
in the context of The Land Titles Act, 2000.
7
  This statute is treated as a separate regime because 
it significantly changed the operation of and some of the substantive provisions of the legislation 
which it repealed.  Here the statutory scheme is briefly described in order to identify the regime’s 
goals.  Then the specific provisions which support or detract from the alleged link to 
“indefeasibility of title” and the three principles are analyzed.  When these provisions are not 
viewed through the lens of the preconception, it is difficult to comprehend how “indefeasibility 
of title” has come to be treated as central8 to this land titles regime.   
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1. INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE - THE FIRST LAND TITLES REGIME 
Contrary to how it has been portrayed in traditional legal research sources,
9
 the land titles 
system was never designed to be a panacea.  Rather it represents an attempt to rationally and 
systematically address specific deficiencies inherent in common law conveyancing and 
substantive real property laws,
10
 namely the lack of certainty of ownership, and the length of 
time and amount of work required to give effect to a conveyance.  These deficiencies in 
conveyancing practices and laws shaped the development of the regime, not any overriding 
objective to develop a perfect and infallible system.  
1.1 The Goals of Saskatchewan’s Land Titles System 
From this perspective, it is easy to understand the system’s explicit goals.  When the 
federal government enacted the Torrens System legislation in the North-West Territories,
11
 its 
twofold intention was explicit in the Act’s preamble: to create certainty in the ownership of land 
titles, and to simplify conveyancing practices: 
“Whereas it is expedient to give certainty to the title to estates in land in the 
Territories and to facilitate proof thereof, and also to render dealings with land 
more simple and less expensive: Therefore Her Majesty … declares and enacts as 
follows ….”12 
 
Even though the preamble was removed when the 1886 consolidated statutes were published in 
1887,
13
 these goals remained
14
  and, until recently, continued to guide analysis of land titles 
issues.
15
   
                                                 
9
 Chapter 2 above. 
10
 Chapter 1 above at 6-28. 
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 In 1905, part of the lands which comprised the North-West Territories became the provinces of Saskatchewan and 
Alberta.  These provinces then enacted land titles legislation which was based on the federal statute.  See:  Greg 
Taylor, The Law of the Land: The Advent of the Torrens System in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2008) at 129. 
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 The Territories Real Property Act, supra note 3 at the Preamble, as reproduced in Roger Carter, “Some 
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Canadian Pacific Railway Company v Turta (1954) SCR 427; [1954] 3 DLR 1; [1954] SCJ no 31 (SCC) [Turta 
SCC citing to SCR] at 452. 
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 The Territories Real Property Act, RSC 1886, c 51. 
14
 These goals can be ascertained in some of the recent cases discussed in Chapter 4 below. 
15
 These goals also were supported by the operation of the cadastral survey system adopted in the Dominion Lands 
Act, SC 1872 c 23, s 3-15.  With these sections, land was described by referring to its location within a quarter-
section, a section, a township, a range, and a meridian which had been determined through measuring or surveying 
the land.  Instead of descriptions based on political or geographical features as seen from the example provided in 
Chapter 1 above at 11, land was described on a title as, for example, the north-east quarter of section three, township 
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The provisions codified in The Land Titles Act
16
 adopted by Saskatchewan in 1906 when 
the province was carved from the North-West Territories continued to support the two 
objectives.  Essentially this statute was a transcription of the federal legislation
17
 and therefore it 
contained a number of provisions designed to simplify land conveyancing and real property law.  
Some of these provisions were substantive, but others were procedural or administrative.  All 
were important to meeting the statute’s twin goals.   
1.2 The Goals in Action: a statutory perspective 
Our tendency today is to interpret substantive provisions in an effort to establish that 
indefeasibility of title is intrinsic to the legislation and the land titles system.
18
  However, the 
phrase “indefeasibility of title” had not been developed in 1906;19 nor had the phrases “mirror 
principle”, “curtain principle”, and “insurance principle” been added to the legal lexicon.20  
Initially analysis focused on attaching meaning to the statutory provisions through examination 
of specific provisions, and then considering how they interacted together.  It was a holistic 
approach, one which required understanding of how the system functioned as compared to the 
one which it replaced, as well as knowledge of the most important substantive provisions. Such 
an approach lends itself to a broad understanding of the system and its goals.  
The importance of achieving understanding of the system and its goals through this 
approach can be emphasized through the use of analogy, one which employs the imagery of 
baking a cake. The goals of certainty of ownership and simplicity of procedures are the finished 
cake, the substantive provisions are the ingredients such as flour, eggs, oil, sugar, baking soda 
and cocoa, and the administrative and procedural sections describe the methods necessary to turn 
the raw and distinct substantive provisions into the finished product. If the baker mixes the 
                                                                                                                                                             
twelve, range four, west of the prime meridian, comprised of one-hundred sixty acres more or less.  Such a 
description conveyed much more practical information than the type of descriptions used in England, and thereby 
facilitated certainty in the ownership of land titles.   
16
 The Land Titles Act, 1906, supra note 4. 
17
 The Territories Real Property Act of 1886 was replaced by The Land Titles Act, 1894, SC 1894, c 28.  It was used 
as the basis for the statutes enacted by the governments in Saskatchewan and Alberta in 1906, shortly after they 
became provinces. Taylor, supra note 11 at 129. 
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 See eg: CIBC Mortgages Inc v Saskatchewan (Registrar of Titles), 2005 SKQB 470 (available on CanLII) which 
is discussed more fully in Chapter 4 below at 106-118. 
19
 Chapter 1 above.  
20
 Marcia Neave, “Indefeasibility of Title in the Canadian Context” (1976) 26 U Toronto LJ 173 at 173-174, and 174 
n 6 (HeinOnline), indicates the phrase “indefeasibility of title” was not coined until 1957, when Theodore BF Ruoff, 
an Englishman, was examining the Torrens System in Australia.  
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ingredients without regard to the procedural directions, the final product will not resemble a 
cake.  When this happens important ingredients may be forgotten, and the cake may not resemble 
the product the baker was expecting to produce.  
It is the same with the Torrens System of land titles; a practitioner who ignores the 
procedural and administrative provisions imperils the legislation’s goals. In so doing, the 
framework within which the substantive provisions need to be interpreted becomes lost.  It was 
only by operating together that the two types of provisions revolutionized substantive real 
property law and conveyancing practices and created certainty of ownership.   
Understandably, the administrative provisions in the Act worked to fulfill its goals.  No 
government agency was created explicitly, but the Act stated that the land registration districts 
were to operate under the direction of the Attorney-General.
21
  Given Saskatchewan’s size, the 
province was divided into different land registration districts,
22
 and each district contained a 
“Land Titles Office”23 maintained at “the public expense”24 by the office of the Attorney-
General.
25
  The person in charge of the entire system was called an “inspector of land titles 
offices.”26  He answered directly to the Attorney- General and was empowered “to inspect the 
books and records of the several land titles offices” and such other prescribed duties.27      
The person responsible for the business conducted in each Land Titles Office was called 
a “registrar of titles”28 or a “registrar,”29 and, like the inspector,30 had to be a practicing lawyer 
with at least three years experience in any Canadian jurisdiction.
31
  They were expected to 
understand the law in this area, and to be able to administer the new system, thereby ensuring 
consistency which could make ownership more certain. 
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 The Land Titles Act, 1906, supra note 4 s 23. 
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 Ibid ss 18-19. 
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 Ibid s 20. 
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Each registrar was given a seal to use on certificates of title
32
 to prevent forgery. With the 
seal, anyone looking at a title could ascertain if it was valid. This aligned with the goal of 
certainty. 
All of the land titles officials – the inspector, registrar, deputy registers, and assistant 
deputy registers
33
 - were required to “furnish to His majesty security in a penal sum of not less 
than one thousand dollars for the true and faithful performance of … [this person’s statutory] 
duty”34 which could be “either a joint or several bond”35 at the Attorney-General’s discretion.  If 
they failed to act in accordance with their statutory mandate, potentially they would suffer fiscal 
consequences. Thus, the bond acted to ensure that they acted within the ambit of the legislation, 
thereby avoiding the incidences of fraud which had plagued conveyancing in common law.   
In keeping with this safeguard enacted to foster certainty of ownership, any person 
employed at a land titles office could not earn income from a business in conflict with land 
titles.
36
  This included acting as an agent for “any person investing money and taking securities 
on land,”37 accepting money for giving advice regarding the operation of the land titles system,38 
acting as a conveyancer,
39
 or carrying on any other business while working at the land titles 
office.
40
  As a corollary, land titles staff were protected from unhappy clients because staff were 
not liable for “any act bona fide done or omitted to be done in the exercise or supposed exercise 
of the powers”41 given pursuant to the legislation.     
Other administrative provisions supported the registration process.  Registration was the 
procedural hallmark of the system because an estate or interest in land would not be effective 
against third parties until the registrar entered it on the register.
42
 The Act contained forms for 
                                                 
32
 Ibid s 35. 
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the most commonly used instruments such as certificates of title, transfers and mortgages.
43
 To 
ensure accuracy and validity (two factors which contribute to the goal of certainty of ownership), 
the registrar at each Land Titles Office was responsible to review each submitted instrument 
before entering it on the proper title.  When one was submitted, it was to be stamped with the 
“date, hour and minute”44 it was received, as a means of determining priorities between 
competing instruments.
45
  Details regarding each instrument also had to be entered in a 
daybook
46
 and in the register.
47
  If an instrument was not “complete and in proper form or 
appear[ed] to be unfit for registration,”48 the registrar was expected to reject it and return it to the 
submitting party.
49
   
If the instrument was in the correct format, properly attested to in accordance with the 
Act’s contents,50 and all the information contained in the instrument appeared correct on its face, 
the registrar entered the transaction in the daybook
51
 and the register.
52
  If the instrument was a 
transfer, then the registrar would cancel the existing Certificate of Title
53
 and issue a new one for 
the same parcel of land,
54
 entering the information in a folio maintained by the office.
55
   
If the instrument was not a transfer, the registrar would enter information about the 
submitted interest on the folio and the Certificate of Title retained at the government office.
56
  To 
ensure accuracy and to be able to double-check entries, the registrar also retained the original 
instruments which had been submitted.
57
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Almost all interests pertaining to the land were found on the Certificate of Title, as 
instruments did not become operative until they were registered.
58
  There was no need to review 
the transfer on which the title was based.
 59
  With the exception of leases with terms of less than 
three years,
60
 statutory interests
61
 and trusts,
62
 the instrument could only affect the rights of a 
third party after it was registered.
63
  
The process of registration was key, but it was also necessary to understand some of the 
substantive changes to real property law.  Without this, it would be nearly impossible to 
understand the nuances inherent in Saskatchewan’s land titles system.   
This is demonstrated early in the statute, in the definitions which may correlate to the 
concept of indefeasibility. In The Land Titles Act, 1906, the use and placement of generic 
definitions served a procedural and substantive role which worked to fulfill the system’s twin 
goals (not indefeasibility). At the time lawyers were accustomed to having to review judicial 
authority to attach meaning to the words and phrases in deeds and other conveyancing 
documents. Because this legislation commenced with a section of definitions, anyone reading it 
would be exposed immediately to a number of generic terms which replaced the substantive and 
technical common law definitions.   
The section was not organized alphabetically; instead it commenced with the most 
important concept – land.  The Act defined land to include all the broad technical legal interests 
in real property such as “messuages, tenements, and hereditaments, corporeal and incorporeal of 
every nature and description and every estate or interest therein and whether such estate or 
interest is legal or equitable”64 – all terms which historically had been mentioned in or omitted 
from deeds.  Likewise, the definition included the elements of land that generate forms of 
economic value independent from the title to the land per se, such as “easements, mines, 
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minerals and quarries unless such items were “specifically excepted.”65  Watercourses were 
included too.   
Because of this definition, lawyers no longer had to examine the lengthy legal description 
of land in a deed to determine what types of interests were included or what type of estates were 
being created.  One word – land – was sufficient, thus making the estate or interest more certain, 
simplifying conveyancing procedures and minimizing the associated costs. 
Other definitions in this section also support the statute’s goals and potentially, 
indefeasibility of title.  For example, “instrument” was broadly defined to include all documents 
evidencing dealings with land, including: 
[a]ny grant, certificate of title, conveyance, assurance, deed, map, plan, will, 
probate or exemplification thereof, letters of administration or an exemplification 
thereof, mortgage or incumbrance or any other document in writing relating to or 
affecting the transfer of or other dealing with land or evidencing title thereto.
66
 
 
As a result, the statutory definitions replaced the convoluted common law definitions in 
Saskatchewan; different documents such as grants, certificates of title, transfers, and mortgages 
were defined together and treated the same.  This meant the scope of real property law was 
simplified and clarified.  Instead of needing to understand how the law applied to distinct types 
of documents or deeds,
67
 one only needed to understand one concept, the “instrument.” 
 The drafters also used generic definitions to clarify information regarding who had an 
interest in land, and what type of interest each person held.  Instead of using technical differences 
to ascribe different types of proprietary interests to different persons, “owner” was defined as 
meaning “any person or body corporate entitled to any freehold or other estate or interest in land, 
at law or in equity, in possession, in futurity or expectancy.”68  This greatly simplified the law. 
The generic “transfer” also fostered simplicity.  Instead of sixteen different types of deeds 
transferring various interests in land,
69
 and other means through which title to land passed 
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between individuals,
70
 “transfer” referred to “the passing of any estate or interest in land under 
the Act, whether for valuable consideration or not.”71  As a result, a conveyance could not be 
overturned because of technical arguments arising from the definitions attached to different types 
of deeds. 
Additionally, the statute defined “incumbrance”72 to refer to charges on land including 
“mortgage[s], mechanics’ liens and executions against land.”73 Once again, one word was used 
to encapsulate a number of formerly disparate interests, thereby simplifying conveyancing 
practices and reducing associated costs. Anyone reading the Act chronologically was exposed to 
these concepts, aiding understanding of the new concepts and procedures within the remainder of 
the statute.  All of these substantive changes made conveyancing simpler, and also made it 
appear straightforward. 
The Act also contemplated administrative errors made by land titles staff.
74
  This ensured 
there was a summary procedure in place before any person suffered loss or damage requiring 
compensation from the government office. To respond to any such administrative errors the Act 
included an “assurance fund;” the registrar was obliged to collect a sum based on the value of 
land or transaction before completing the tasks of registration.
75
  If any person suffered loss or 
damage through “any omission, mistake or misfeasance”76 of the inspector, registrar, or any 
other person employed at a Land Titles Office and if this person could not eject the person in 
possession or receive compensation from the person at fault, a claim could be made against the 
assurance fund.
77
 In these circumstances, government would compensate the aggrieved person 
who then would not be left without any recourse.  It made the system more attractive, and 
differed from the common law. As such, it was an administrative feature possessing substantive 
elements, ones which acted to fulfill the Act’s goals. 
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From these examples, the importance of the procedural and administrative characteristics 
espoused in the legislation becomes clearer than occurs when the discussion focuses on 
indefeasibility of title.  All of these elements were necessary to achieve the system’s goals, and 
only considering some of them reduces the conceptualization of the scheme’s scope and ambit.  
To return to the cake analogy, both the ingredients and the procedures listed in the recipe need to 
be followed for the baker to achieve the goal of producing a cake.  Reducing the discussion to 
“indefeasibility of title” is akin to using a cake mix or to failing to include a key ingredient: the 
result just is not the same as when the baker goes to the trouble of understanding and following 
the complete recipe, and achieves the anticipated result. 
1.3   Indefeasibility of Title in Saskatchewan’s first Land Titles Statute 
As has been alluded to, when considering The Land Titles Act, 1906 from the 
preconception of indefeasibility of title, the level of analysis is more ritualistic: only the most 
apposite substantive provisions are treated as important. One considers sections that verify and 
buttress the notion of indefeasibility and its principles, while the rest largely are treated as 
extraneous.   
This can be seen with the insurance principle
78
 which may be inferred from the number 
of sections in the 1906 Act, all of which refer to the assurance fund.
79
  From a substantive 
perspective, the most important of these is section 151.  According to it, if any person suffered 
loss or damage through “any omission, mistake or misfeasance”80 of the inspector, registrar, or 
any other person employed at a Land Titles Office:   
in the execution of their respective duties under the provisions of this Act and any 
person deprived of any land by the registration of any other person as owner 
thereof or by any error, omission or misdescription in any certificate of title or in 
any memorandnm [sic] upon the same … and who by the provisious [sic] of this 
Act is barred from bringing an action of ejectment or other action for the recovery 
of the land may in any case in which remedy by action for recovery of damages 
hereinbefore provided is barred bring an action against the registrar as nominal 
defendant for the recovery of damages. 
2.  If the plaintiff recovers final judgement [sic] against … [the registrar of land 
titles] the judge before whom such action is tried shall certify to the act of such 
judgment and the amount of the damages and costs recovered and the provincial 
treasurer shall pay the amount thereof out of the assurance fund aforesaid to the 
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person entitled on production of an exemplification or certified copy of the 
judgment rendered.
 81
 
 
If a person suffered financial loss because of an error made by land titles staff and if the 
defendant was impecunious or had absconded from the province or could not be found,
82
 and if 
no action for ejectment was possible, the person harmed could bring an action against the 
registrar of land titles and collect damages from the provincial government.  With this, 
government was creating certainty of ownership and fostering public confidence in the system.   
From section 151 it is apparent that the assurance fund was never intended to be treated 
as insurance.
83
  An insurance company pays the policy holder for losses suffered which are 
payable under the terms of the insurance contract, and then attempts to recover the amount it 
paid to the policy holder from the individual who caused the loss, usually by means of a 
subrogated claim.  In the first land titles regime, the person who suffered a loss and who could 
not bring an action for ejectment had to attempt to recover damages from the person who caused 
the loss before seeking compensation from land titles.   
Furthermore, not everyone could bring such a claim against the land titles system: only 
persons who suffered losses because of “errors, mistakes or misfeasance” by the land titles 
office.  In all other instances, compensation could not be claimed from the government.  
Referring to the assurance fund codified in the first statutory regime in Saskatchewan as the 
“insurance fund” does not reflect the contents of the legislation.  These provisions served a 
different purpose, in keeping with Torrens’ belief that “the Assurance Fund had been created for 
the specific purpose of facilitating the free flow of conversions to the new form of title.” 84 
Having an assurance fund which fostered the conversion of land to the land titles system of 
registration did not reflect “indefeasibility of title:” it achieved the goals of simplifying 
conveyancing practices and creating certainty of ownership.   
 It is similar with the “mirror principle.”  The “principle” is closest to section 75(1), which 
read:   
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The owner of land for which a certificate of title has been granted shall hold the 
same subject (in addition to the incidents implied by virtue of this Act) to such 
incumbrances, liens, estates or interests as are notified on the folio of the register 
which constitutes the certificate of title, absolutely free from all other 
incumbrances, liens, estates or interests whatsoever except in case of fraud 
wherein he has participated or colluded and except the estate or interest of an 
owner claiming the same land under a prior certificate of title.
85
  
 
Reading this section, it appears as if the phrase “absolutely free from all other incumbrances” 
may be sufficiently broad to encompass the analogy of a mirror.  One looks at the title and it 
reflects all interests that affect the land except for statutory exceptions,
86
 or cases in which the 
owner has participated in fraud, or when there is a prior Certificate of Title.
87
  The wording in 
this provision is almost identical to the portrayal of indefeasibility of title in traditional legal 
research sources,
88
 so it seems as if it supports the mirror principle. 
Considering the numerous “incidents implied by virtue of” the Act, or statutory 
exceptions, this correlation is problematic.  For example, trusts could not be mentioned on a 
Certificate of Title, and trustees named in instruments were “deemed to be the absolute and 
beneficial owners of the land for the purposes of this Act.”89  Because of this prohibition, a 
beneficiary of a trust needed to use the device of the caveat
90
 if this person wanted to notify third 
parties of the trust and of the beneficial interest in the land.  If a beneficiary failed to do so, the 
Certificate of Title would remain silent and third parties would not have notice of the 
beneficiary’s equitable interest in the land.  
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Among other things, each Certificate of Title was subject to the following types of 
interests and estates which did not need to be registered on the title to be effective: 
(a) any subsisting reservations or exceptions contained in the original grant of 
the land from the crown; 
(b) all unpaid taxes; 
(c) any public highway or right of way or other public easement howsoever 
created upon, over or in respect of the land; 
(d) any subsisting lease or agreement for a lease for a period not exceeding 
three years where there is actual … [occupation] of the land under the same; 
(e) any decrees, orders or executions against or affecting the interest of the 
owner in the land which have been registered and maintained in force 
against the owner; 
(f) any right of expropriation which may by statute or ordinance be vested in 
any person, body corporate or His Majesty; 
(g) any right of way or other easement granted or acquired under the provisions 
of The North-West Irrigation Act.
91
   
 
Because of these, it would have been prudent for a potential purchaser to review the 
original Grant on file at the land titles office to see if there were any exceptions to the estate 
granted to the owner (such as mines and minerals), to contact the local municipality to determine 
if any property taxes were owing, to conduct a search of the vendor at the local courthouse to 
discover if any judgments or writs of execution encumbered the vendor’s property, to review the 
legislation giving government or its agencies the power to expropriate land, and to attend at the 
property to determine if a tenant was using it, if there was a trail or railway running across it, or 
if any water bodies were located on it.  Only then would a purchaser comprehend the true extent 
of the property being acquired.   
These statutory exceptions illustrate that some interests have never needed to be 
registered on a title to adversely affect the owner’s estate. Because of them, the mirror is not the 
most accurate analogy.  Instead of producing indefeasibility of title, this section acts to fulfill the 
goals of certainty and facility of transfer.  A potential purchaser knew where to look to discover 
any unregistered interests.  This was much more efficient than the common law.  It is this 
context, not the preconception of indefeasibility with its mirror principle, which is necessary to 
understanding its importance.   
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 There may be a better correlation with the curtain principle, as sections 73, 74, 77, 80 and 
81 support its existence. They read: 
73.  After a certificate of title has been granted for any land no instrument until 
registered under this Act shall be effectual to pass any estate or interest in any 
land except a leasehold interest not exceeding three years or render such land 
liable as security for the payment of money.
92
 
74.  Upon the registration of any instrument in manner hereinbefore prescribed 
the estate or interest specified therein shall pass or as the case may be the land 
shall become liable as security in manner and subject to the covenants, conditions 
and contingencies set forth and specified in such instrument or by this Act 
declared to be implied in instruments of a like nature.
93
 
77.  After the certificate of title for any land has been granted no instrument shall 
be effectual to pass any interest therein or to render the land liable as security for 
the payment of money as against any bona fide transferee of the land under this 
Act unless such instrument is executed in accordance with the provisions of this 
Act and is duly registered thereunder.
94
 
80.  Every instrument shall become operative according to the tenor and intent 
thereof so soon as registered and shall thereupon create, transfer, surrender, 
charge or discharge as the case may be the land or estate or interest therein 
mentioned in such instrument.
95
 
81.  Instruments registered in respect of or affecting the same land shall be 
entitled to priority the one over the other according to the time of registration and 
not according to the date of execution.
96
 
 
These provisions confirm that instruments only becomes operative once they are 
registered at the land titles office and if they are “executed within the provisions of this Act.”97  
It does not matter when they are signed; the date of registration is key.  This is confirmed in 
section 73 which states that except for a lease with a term of three years or less, no instrument is 
“effectual to pass any estate or interest in any land” or capable of “render[ing] such land liable as 
security for the payment of money” until the instrument is registered in accordance with the 
provisions contained in the Act.
98
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Section 81 also reflects the notion that underlies the curtain principle, because it clarifies 
the issue of competing interests: whichever one was registered first was entitled to priority over 
all subsequently registered interests, regardless of when each was executed.
99
  One does not look 
at the instruments on which the estate or interest is based. It is as if a curtain has fallen behind 
the title; registration is required to ascertain validity and to determine competing priorities. 
Even if the curtain works as an analogy, it fails to buttress “indefeasibility of title.”  
Rather, it is a device which promotes certainty of ownership and simplifies the process of 
conveyancing. The Land Titles Act, 1906 was not a panacea focused on indefeasibility of title, it 
was focused on improving and rationalizing the common law.   
1.4  Indefeasibility of Title in The Land Titles Act, 1978 
Between 1906 and 2001, the land titles regime and statute changed very little, and The 
Land Titles Act, 1978
100
 continued to be a mixture of administrative, procedural and substantive 
provisions which served to fulfill its twin goals.  The early definitions which simplified real 
property law remained substantially unchanged.  For examples, mines and minerals and 
watercourses remained in the definition of “land.”101 A “Registrar of Titles” continued to manage 
each land titles office,
102
 and the legislation specified the minimum qualifications required to 
hold this position.
103
  
Most importantly, the process of registration remained central in the attainment of 
certainty of ownership and facility of conveyancing. This was codified in section 67(2) which 
provided that  
[e]very instrument shall become operative according to the tenor and intent thereof 
when registered and shall thereupon create, transfer, surrender, charge or 
discharge, as the case may be, the land, estate or interest therein mentioned.
104
 
 
Unfortunately the legislation did not always make this readily apparent.  
One factor which contributed to this confusion was the location of related provisions: not 
all of them were grouped together within the statute. As an example, the provisions considered 
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relevant to “indefeasibility of title” were scattered through-out the Act.  Most often sections 68, 
213 and 237 were considered to be the substantive provisions supporting “indefeasibility of 
title,” 105 and they serve to illustrate this point.    
Section 68 provided: 
The owner of land for which a certificate of the title has been granted shall hold 
the same subject, in addition to the incidents implied by virtue of this Act, to such 
encumbrances, liens, estates or interests as are endorsed on the certificate of title, 
absolutely free from all other encumbrances, liens, estates or interests whatever, 
except in case of fraud wherein he has participated or colluded and except the 
estate or interest of an owner claiming the same land under a prior certificate of 
title, as mentioned in section 213.
106
 
 
Section 213(1) read: 
Every certificate of title and duplicate certificate of title granted under this Act 
shall, except: 
(a) in case of fraud wherein the owner has participated or colluded; and 
(b) as against any person claiming under a prior certificate of title granted 
under this Act in respect to the same land; and 
(c) so far as regards any portion of the land by wrong description of 
boundaries or parcels included in the certificate of title; 
be conclusive evidence, so long as the same remains in force and uncancelled, in 
all courts, as against Her Majesty and all persons whomsoever, that the person 
named therein is entitled to the land included in the same for the estate or interest 
therein specified, subject to the exceptions and reservations implied under this 
Act.
107
 
 
The relevant portion of section 237 is subsection (2). It stated: 
A person contracting or dealing with or taking or proposing to take a transfer, 
mortgage, encumbrance, lease or other interest from an owner is not, except in the 
case of fraud by that person: 
(a) bound or concerned, for the purpose of obtaining priority over a trust or 
other interest that is not registered by instrument or is not caveated, to inquire 
into or ascertain the circumstances in or the consideration for which the owner 
or any previous owner of the interest acquired the interest or to see to the 
application of the purchase money or any part of the purchase money; or 
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(b) affected by any notice, direct, implied or constructive, of any trust or other 
interest in the land that is not registered or caveated, any rule of law or equity to 
the contrary notwithstanding.
108
 
 
These sections demonstrate that they were not determinative; one also had to consider other 
related sections, such as those specifying the “exceptions and reservations implied under this 
Act.”109  
In addition to the statutory exceptions contained in the 1906 Act, these included: 
(a) “the rights of Her Majesty under The Mineral Taxation Act, 1983;”110 
(b) “the rights of municipalities under The Tax Enforcement Act;”111 
(c) “any subsisting tenancy agreement within the meaning of The Residential Tenancies 
Act;”112 
(d) “any right of way or other easement granted or acquired under the Irrigation Act 
(Canada), or The Water Corporation Act;”113 
(e) any right acquired by adverse possession prior to the land being granted or the first 
title being issued;
114
 
(f) “liens in favour of Her Majesty for advances of seed grain, fodder or other goods by 
way of relief;”115 
(g) “the reservation of any minerals that become vested in Her Majesty pursuant to any 
Mineral Taxation Act, and the rights of Her Majesty with respect to such 
minerals;”116 
(h) “any zoning regulation made pursuant to the Aeronautics Act (Canada) … on the 
deposit of the regulation with a plan and description of the lands affected by the 
regulation as required by that Act;”117 and 
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(i) public utility easements “situated outside the corporate limits of an urban 
municipality within the meaning of The Urban Municipality Act, 1984, to construct 
and maintain a pipe line on or under that land pursuant to a program established for 
the purpose of supplying natural or manufactured gas to one or more persons.”118 
From this list it can be inferred that the protection afforded by the Certificate of Title had shrunk 
because the number of exceptions had increased. This does not support indefeasibility, but 
instead demonstrates confusion regarding the scope of the legislation.  
These statutory exceptions also exhibit the type of complexity which had become 
inherent in the land titles legislation: in order to comprehend the scope and nature of these 
exceptions, in many cases different statutes needed to be consulted. This removes the title from 
the preconception of “indefeasibility” and from the notion that the title functions as does a 
mirror.   
In further support of this observation that the level of protection had decreased, some of 
the protections contained in The Land Titles Act, 1906 had disappeared from the 1978 legislation.  
As an example, by 1978 a title was no longer conclusive evidence “so far as regards any portion 
of the land by wrong description of boundaries or parcels included in the certificate of title.”119  
Likewise, claims based on adverse possession
120
 or prescription
121
 were not recognized unless 
the proprietary right existed before the land was granted.
122
 Also, a title was not treated as 
determinative of mineral ownership unless the chain of title had been reviewed and a mineral 
certificate had been issued.
123
 Until this occurs compensation is not available if the “owner” 
suffers a loss, making minerals distinct from the surface of the land. 
From these changes, it becomes even more apparent that “indefeasibility of title” was not 
axiomatic to the legislation in the first land titles regime in Saskatchewan.  The expressions 
“indefeasibility of title,” mirror, curtain, and insurance principle never appear.  The main 
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substantive provisions suggest adherence to the two goals espoused in the 1886 legislation, not to 
“indefeasibility of title.”  The administrative and procedural provisions, as well as the generic 
definitions which facilitated a shift in practice to the land titles system, support the same 
assertion.  From considering this regime from the perspective of the statute instead of the 
preconception, it can be inferred that indefeasibility of title was not of central importance: it is 
more likely that it is a myth. 
 
2. INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE IN THE SECOND STATUTORY REGIME 
2.1 The Goals in Action 
During the period in which the land titles system remained largely unaltered, Canadian 
society changed a great deal. This resulted in a dichotomy between land titles systems of 
registration, and the societies which they served.  All the provincial and territorial governments 
except Quebec recognized this issue, and in the late 1980s they struck a joint committee to 
examine issues in Canadian land registries and to suggest solutions.  In so doing, the Joint 
Committee summarized the issue facing them as follows:  
The existing title registration statutes are based on 19
th
 century Australian or 
English statutes. Some of their central concepts have served us well. However, 
they leave problems unsolved. They are opaque, and sometimes downright 
misleading. They have had to be tortured by courts into new forms to meet current 
conditions. They hide the light of title registration under bushels of substantive 
law and administrative detail. They require rationalization and modernization in 
the light of nearly a century and a half of experience of title registration.
124
 
 
As part of this report, the Joint Committee drafted a model statute which included registration of 
titles to provide conclusive evidence that the person named was the owner.  The report 
recommended that interests be treated differently, that they should merely be recorded on the 
title, without any obligation to verify that each was valid and enforceable.
125
 This way, the land 
titles systems operating in the Canadian common law jurisdictions could be made more rational, 
and transactions could be processed more efficiently. 
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Modernization was required in Saskatchewan.  For one thing, because the Act had always 
obligated the government to retain the original instruments which had been submitted as part of 
conveyancing transactions, and the cancelled Certificates of Title,
126
 the land titles offices were 
facing a storage issue.  When the government began considering modernizing the system, “over 
four miles of shelving” 127 was necessary to store all of the historic instruments. Many of the 
older documents were deteriorating,
128
 and “loss of paper records was becoming a problem.”129  
These practical issues needed to be addressed because if the system remained the same, logistical 
problems would grow with time, as more instruments were processed and then retained.   
As well, Certificates of Title were organized and filed according to the legal description 
of the land; if one did not know the land’s legal description, there was no way to search the title.  
If a creditor wanted to learn if a debtor owned land but did not know the legal description, the 
creditor would either have to contact the local municipality or conduct an examination of 
discovery of the debtor.  Neither was very efficient.  Because of this filing system, a secondary 
issue existed too: there was a risk that if a title was accidentally filed in the wrong folder, there 
was no way to find it except to search all other title folders.  This was inefficient, and reduced 
certainty of ownership. 
Encumbrances against individuals, such as Writs of Execution and Powers of Attorney 
which had been registered at a land titles office, were another issue which caused the 
Saskatchewan government to modernize the land titles system.
130
  Instead of being endorsed on 
Certificates of Title, these were recorded in the “General Record.”131 This separate registration 
book – organized by the person’s name and not by the land’s legal description  – needed to be 
searched for the owner’s name each time an individual was planning to acquire an interest or 
estate in the land.  If a potential purchaser failed to do so, the title acquired would be subject to 
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such interests.  In contrast to the system’s goals, the “General Record” complicated matters and 
had the potential to reduce certainty.   
Moreover, each land transaction could only be submitted, reviewed, and processed in its 
geographically assigned regional office.  Work could not be redistributed between the ten 
different offices, as “[e]ach office maintained discrete records and customers were required to 
identify and contact the correct office in order to view records for a particular office.”132 The 
process was inefficient. 
In smaller centres, a transaction could be completed within a few days of submission.  
However, in busy offices such as Regina and Saskatoon, especially during the summer when 
many people were buying and selling homes, it could take weeks to process and register a 
transfer and mortgage.
133
  Purchasers were paying interest on late closing: not because their 
paperwork had not been completed in a timely fashion, but because of procedural bottlenecks in 
the land titles system.  This problem acted to thwart the system’s original goals. 
Given the plethora of issues involved in continuing to operate such a system, in 1995 the 
provincial government decided to re-engineer the entire land titles system in Saskatchewan. In 
keeping with its new goals, this project’s initial objectives were: 
 To review the operations, legislative base, processes and service of Land Titles 
and plan processing; 
 To develop plans for the future introduction of automated services; 
 To develop an automated system for Land Titles; 
 To convert the existing information in Land Titles into an electronic database; 
 To create the ability to display parcels of land graphically; and 
 To link title information to the provincial SaskGIS Cadastral (Saskatchewan 
Geographic Information System) Database.
134
 
 
Interestingly, certainty of title and indefeasibility of title were not listed in the project’s initial 
goals.  
This changed when the Saskatchewan Cabinet approved a number of general principles 
for the LAND (“Land Titles Automated Network Development”)135 Project.  The Cabinet 
approved document included an implicit commitment to certainty of title; the principles were: 
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 To recognize that the existing Torrens system is the appropriate system of land 
registration for Saskatchewan; 
 To provide quality products and services, in a timely manner, and for good value 
for money; 
 To accommodate maximization of integration and co-ordination of related land 
information services; 
 To utilize the latest, most cost-effective technology at minimum cost; 
 To continue Land Titles as a public program, to meet the need for continuity, 
quality, consistency and neutrality, as well as to achieve other public policy goals, 
such as debt collection and maintenance enforcement; and 
 To maximize employment security for existing staff.136 
 
Although certainty of title can be implied, it appears as if government was more concerned with 
improving the facility of conveyancing.  These principles and the issues facing the land titles 
system identified by government representatives, provide some assistance in assessing what a 
common law province such as Saskatchewan valued in the system. No longer certainty of title 
and facility of transfer: these had been replaced with rationality and modernity.   
The LAND project continued, and decisions were made which reflected the changed 
policy objectives.  These included drafting new legislation and developing a computer system for 
the automation of land processes, one in which all land information in the province could be 
accessed by, among other things, either the legal description of the land or the owner’s name.  By 
2001, it was concluded that the LAND System was ready to become operational.  On June 25, 
2001 The Land Titles Act, 2000 was proclaimed in force, and the new system began to be 
implemented.  By the fall of 2002
137
 the new regime, with its increased focus on facility of 
conveyancing, had completely replaced the former system. 
In keeping with the general principles approved by Cabinet in 1996, the new statute has 
attempted to address the issues associated with the former legislative scheme while maintaining 
the application of indefeasibility of title.
138
 In the process, some of the definitions and key 
features which may imply indefeasibility changed.  Instead of codifying common law concepts 
of different interests and estates in land in one word, now “’land’ means … the surface; … mines 
and minerals; and … unless the context requires otherwise, the condominium units and common 
                                                 
136
 Ibid at 3. 
137
 Ibid at 6. 
138
 Nicholson, supra note 127 at 1. 
  91 
property included in a condominium plan.”139 The legislation reads much easier, but it contains 
less substantive information.   
Another significant change involves the Certificate of Title, which used to be considered 
the old system’s “centerpiece.”140 Its status as such supported the preconception of 
indefeasibility.  The new Act clarifies that this is no longer accurate, as the Certificate of Title 
has been replaced with the “title” which includes “a surface title, a mineral title or a 
condominium title, but does not include an uncertified mineral title.”141  Nothing in the definition 
indicates that all particular information about the title is found on the title, as occurred in the 
former Act.
142
  This reinforces that the title is less important than was the Certificate of Title in 
the former regime. 
Further support for this assertion is found in Part III of The Land Titles Act, 2000. It is 
entitled “Fundamental Principles” and includes all of the legislation’s main tenets, beginning 
with the newly created “ownership register.”143  According to section 11(1): 
Subject to subsection (3), the Registrar shall establish and maintain an ownership 
register for: 
(a) each surface parcel that has been the subject of a Crown grant submitted to 
the land titles registry; 
(b) each mineral commodity that has been the subject of a Crown grant 
submitted to the land titles registry; and 
(c) each condominium unit that is the subject of an application for issuance of 
title pursuant to The Condominium Property Act, 1993.
144
 
 
This ownership register for all patented land in Saskatchewan – not a Certificate of Title 
pertaining to an individual piece of land – is now the central feature of the land titles system.  
The reduced status attached to the titles for specific pieces of land alludes to the change in focus: 
certainty of ownership may not be as important as it once was. 
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This seems to be reinforced in the treatment of interests.  Now interests are not referred to 
in Part III, which only refers to registered owners.  Interests appear later, in Part VIII, and section 
54(3) states that registration does not validate an interest which is void.
145
  For example, if a 
mortgage is improperly executed or if the land is not properly described on the document, 
registration no longer cures the defect.  This is a change from The Land Titles Act, 1978 which, 
in accordance with the goal of certainty, provided that interests were treated as valid once 
registered. All of this supports the notion that facility of transfer is now the system’s most 
important goal, and that the Act was changed substantively to reflect this new reality. 
2.2    Indefeasibility of Title in The Land Titles Act, 2000 
If indefeasibility of title is a hallmark of the land titles system, it is reasonable to expect 
that it would be codified in the legislation, especially since the statute was enacted after use of 
these terms became popular.
146
  This does not occur: none of these terms are mentioned.  The 
statute comes closest to doing so in two places, both located in Part III – Fundamental Principles.  
Section 13(1) entitled “Effect of title” reads: 
Where the Registrar issues a title pursuant to this Act: 
(a) subject to section 14, the registered owner holds the title free from all 
interests, exceptions and reservations; and 
(b) subject to section 15: 
(i)     the title is conclusive proof that the registered owner is entitled to the 
ownership share in the surface parcel, mineral commodity or 
condominium unit for which the title has issued;  
(ii)    the title may not be altered or revoked or removed from the 
registered owner; and 
(iii)   no action of ejectment from land or other action to recover or obtain 
land lies or shall be instituted against the registered owner.
147
 
The second place is the heading to section 23 which reads “Reliability of title.”  
However, this section does not imply indefeasibility of title in the sense in which it is used it the 
dominant legal lexicon. Instead it reads: 
(1)  A person taking or proposing to take from a registered owner a transfer or an 
interest in land or dealing with a title: 
     (a)  is not bound: 
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(i)     to inquire into or ascertain the circumstances in or the consideration 
for which the registered owner or any previous registered owner acquired 
title; or 
(ii)     to see to the application of the purchase money or any part of the 
purchase money; and 
(b)  notwithstanding any law to the contrary but subject to sections 18 and 35, 
is not affected by any direct, implied or constructive notice of: 
 (i)     any trust; 
 (ii)    any other unregistered interest; or 
 (iii)   any unregistered transfer. 
(2)  Knowledge on the part of the person that any trust or other unregistered 
interest or any unregistered transfer is in existence must not of itself be imputed as 
fraud.
148
 
 
At first glance it appears as if these statements endorse the concept of indefeasibility of 
title.  According to section 13(1), subject to some statutory provisions, an interest, exception or 
reservation must be registered on the title for it to encumber the owner’s estate in the land.  
Exceptions exist.  Titles continue to be subject to, among other things, reservations and 
exceptions contained in the original Crown grant,
149
 statutory easements,
150
 municipal tax 
arrears
151
 residential tenancies,
152
 prior titles,
153
 and roadway plans.
154
 None of these need to be 
registered on the face of a title.   
As well, subsection 14(a) states that “[e]very title is subject to any interest that is 
registered against the title pursuant to this Act or any other Act or law.”155 This includes the beds 
and shores of water bodies located within the parcel of land.
156
  A title for minerals is not even 
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conclusive proof of ownership until it is certified.
157
 Consequently, a person may think he owns 
the small lake on the title, or minerals, when someone else does.  This means the old problem has 
not been fixed, and indefeasibility of title continues to be elusive in the new legislation.  
Further support is found in the fact that “legal description” is not even defined in The 
Land Titles Act, 2000.  This phrase is defined in The Land Surveys Act, 2000.
158
  Consequently a 
title does not define and cannot be used as: 
proof of ... the boundaries of a parcel; ... the extent or area determined by the 
boundaries of a parcel; ... the boundaries of a condominium unit or the common 
property included in a condominium plan; or ... the extent or area determined by 
the boundaries of a condominium unit or the common property included in a 
condominium plan.”159   
A person is the owner of a title, but the existence of the title does not guarantee that the 
boundaries or size of the parcel outlined in that title are accurate.  In keeping with this limitation, 
a landowner who suffers loss because the boundaries of a parcel are incorrect or because a water 
body decreases the size of the parcel is not entitled to claim or to be paid compensation for the 
loss.  A title is only conclusive proof of ownership of a parcel of land which may or may be 
described accurately. Because of this limitation, how can one say the title is indefeasible? 
Likewise, the expressions “mirror principle,” “curtain principle” and “insurance 
principle” are not codified in The Land Titles Act, 2000.  The nearest reference is found in Part 
XII which is titled “Assurance and Compensation,” and a close examination of this Part also 
demonstrates that indefeasibility of title is not central to this new regime.  The primary section in 
Part XII is 84, and, if one only reads subsection 84(2), it appears as if it is very comprehensive, 
almost akin to an insurance scheme: 
84(2)   Subject to the exclusions mentioned in sections 85 and 86, any person who 
sustains loss, damage or deprivation in any of the following circumstances is 
entitled to make a claim for compensation pursuant to this Part: 
(a) where a registration made by the Registrar was not authorized by this Act; 
(b) where the Registrar has omitted to make a registration as required by this 
Act; 
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(c) where the Registrar has made an error or omission in the performance of a 
duty or function pursuant to this Act that is not mentioned in clause (a) or (b); 
(d) where a former registered owner has been deprived of title through the 
registration of an invalid transfer and that former registered owner is 
prohibited by section 15 from bringing an action of ejectment or other action 
to obtain or recover land; 
(d.1) where: 
     (i)   the circumstances mentioned in clause 15(1)(b.1) exist; and 
     (ii)  title has been restored to the former registered owner pursuant to 
section 101.1 or 107; 
(d.2)  where: 
      (i)    the circumstances mentioned in clause 15(1)(b.1) exist; and 
      (ii)  title has not been restored to the former registered owner; 
(e) where a registered owner has been divested of title by the operation of 
clause 15(1)(c) and section 16; 
(f) where a former registered owner recovers land in an action brought 
pursuant to subsection 15(3) and the title recovered includes an interest that 
was not registered against the prior title of that former registered owner; 
(g)  where: 
(i)   a mortgage obtained on the basis of a fraudulent instrument has been 
registered; 
(ii)  the Registrar pursuant to section 101.1 or the court pursuant to section 
107 has directed that the registration of the mortgage mentioned in 
subclause (i) be discharged against title; 
(iii) the mortgagee has demonstrated the prescribed due diligence; and 
(iv)  the mortgagee satisfies the Registrar that the mortgagee has no right: 
(A) to claim title insurance as defined in The Saskatchewan Insurance 
Act; or 
(B) to otherwise recover the mortgagee’s loss.160 
 
In all of these circumstances, a person can claim compensation from Information Services 
Corporation.  
However, there are even more exceptions than there are enumerated grounds for claiming 
compensation.  In section 85 there are eighteen exceptions listed pertaining mainly to surface, 
condominium, certified minerals, and interests.
161
  One of these pertains to claims for 
compensation “related to a boundary problem or an allegation that title is for a parcel or 
condominium unit with boundaries or an extent or area other than what was assumed or 
                                                 
160
 The Land Titles Act, 2000, supra note 2 s 84(2). 
161
 Ibid s 85.   
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understood by the registered owner.”162  This clarifies that a registered owner cannot claim 
compensation from the Registrar if there is an issue with the boundaries of the parcel of land 
which the owner thought she owned.  This exception is a significant departure from the notion of 
indefeasibility, and from the idea that the Act contains an insurance principle.   
Some other subsections contained in section 85 which restrict claims for compensation 
include situations when the “loss, damage or deprivation”163 is: 
(a) suffered by a person who knowingly participates or colludes in a fraud; 
(b) occasioned by a registered owner’s breach of any trust whether express, 
implied or constructive; 
(c) by reason of the improper use of the seal of a body corporate; 
(d) by reason of the lack of capacity or lack of authority in a body corporate to 
deal with the title or interest involved or to execute or take the benefit of 
the registration; 
(e) by reason of a registration authorized on behalf of a body corporate by a 
person who lacks capacity to apply for registration on behalf of the body 
corporate; 
(f) occasioned by the failure of the Registrar to register an interest based on a 
writ or a maintenance order against a title of any registered owner or 
against an interest of any interest holder under a name that is different in 
any way from the name by which he or she is described in the writ or 
maintenance order; 
(g) occasioned by the registration by the Registrar of an interest based on a 
writ or a maintenance order against a title owned or interest held by a 
person who is not the person named in the writ or maintenance order; 
(h) occasioned by the failure of the Registrar to ensure compliance with any 
requirement set out in Part XVII or in any other Act or law with respect to 
the registration of an interest; 
(i) occasioned by the failure of the Registrar to ensure compliance with any 
requirement set out in any other Act with respect to a transfer or the 
discharge, amendment, assignment or postponement of an interest; 
(j) occasioned by the registration of a transfer or the registration of an interest 
by a person who has not been properly appointed by a power of attorney 
or who does not have authority under a power of attorney; 
(k) occasioned by a correction or registration by the Registrar in accordance 
with sections 97, 99 and 101.
164
 
                                                 
162
 Ibid s 85(l). 
163
 Ibid s 85. 
164
 Ibid s 85. 
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From this list, it becomes obvious that compensation is only available in very limited 
circumstances, and usually is not available when the Registrar makes an error.  It also clarifies 
that Information Services Corporation does not review corporate documents and powers of 
attorney to the degree necessary to verify that they have been properly executed.  All of this is 
very different from the notion of “indefeasibility of title” and the insurance principle.  Instead it 
seems as if compensation is only accessible in very limited circumstances when a loss is suffered 
in the context of a surface, certified mineral, or condominium title. 
The Act also enumerates six additional exceptions to compensation specifically related to 
uncertified mineral titles.
165
  In effect, until a mineral title is certified, it is not conclusive 
evidence that the person named as owner actually has the best title to the minerals.  
When the statutory provisions are considered by themselves, without any preconception 
of what one will discover, the insurance principle and indefeasibility of title are more fiction than 
fact.   
CONCLUSION 
Within Saskatchewan, Professor Harrison appears to be correct.  If one analyzes the 
statute, the preconceived notion of indefeasibility of title is not supported by its most important 
statutory provisions.  In this regard, it is the same now as it was in the past.  The Saskatchewan 
legislation has never mentioned indefeasibility of title or the three principles.  When one closely 
examines the provisions in the context of the system’s goals, the provisions have never suggested 
the presence of them either.  “Conclusiveness of ownership” offers very limited protection, but, 
because it is codified in the legislation, it should be respected.   
Imposing an overly broad conception of “indefeasibility of title” on a legislative scheme 
such as this simply increases confusion, and leads to a misunderstanding of how the Act is to be 
interpreted.  It would be much more beneficial to follow Professor Harrison’s advice, and look to 
the limits of the statutory provisions every time one needs to examine a land titles issue.  
Indefeasibility of title is not supported directly by the statutory provisions: treating it as if the 
statute does so is akin to clothing oneself in the Emperor’s new jacket. The user believes he is 
dressed, but others may not be able to distinguish what is being worn.
                                                 
165
 Ibid s 86. 
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CHAPTER 4 
A CAUTIONARY TALE:  
INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE IN RECENT CASES 
 
 
     Keeping in mind the purpose and intent of the [Land Titles] Act … I fail to see 
how it is possible for a court to import into these protective clauses words which 
are not there, and to attach to them another condition or exception which the 
legislature did not see fit to mention.
1
 
 
 - Justice Egbert of the Alberta Supreme Court Trial Division in Turta v 
Canadian Pacific Railway Company 
 
This chapter serves the same function of many fairy tales:
2
 it provides a cautionary tale of 
the pitfalls and perils which may occur when one strays from accepted mores of behaviour, or, in 
this case, analysis.  In 1952 Justice Egbert warned lawyers of the potential perils which could 
arise if lawyers strayed from the contents of land titles legislation, and instead imported other 
words and phrases into the analysis.  Yet, as evidenced by the reliance on “indefeasibility of 
title” in traditional research sources,3 and as illustrated by four Saskatchewan cases, this is 
exactly what has been happening. 
Saskatchewan lawyers, and consequently its courts, do not always analyze the applicable 
legislative provisions.  Based on the arguments presented by lawyers, courts rarely devote a great 
deal of analysis to the statutory provisions and to the operations of the land titles scheme.  
Instead, lawyers. As a result, the courts demonstrate a preference for common law principles.   
Sometimes the lawyers and courts followed the concept of “indefeasibility of title” as it is 
used in dominant legal discourse.  Other times they have sidestepped  its application, using the 
doctrine of abandonment and contract law principles to avoid the rigidity associated with the 
complex statutorily-based land titles scheme.  Thus, often the myth of indefeasibility and other 
common law principles have been  the rationale for decisions as opposed to the statute and the 
legislative scheme.   
                                                 
1
 Turta v Canadian Pacific Railway Company (1952), 5 WWR (NS) 529; [1952] AJ no 21 (QL) at para 147 (AB 
SCTD) [Turta Trial citing to QL]. 
2
 See eg:  Hans Christian Andersen, “The Emperor’s New Clothes” in Maria Tatar (ed), The Annotated Hans 
Christian Andersen, (New York: WW Norton & Company, Inc, 2008) at 3; and “Rumpelstilskin” in Vivian French, 
The Kingfisher Mini Treasury of Fairy Tales (Boston: Kingfisher, 2000) at 70. 
3
 Chapter 2 above. 
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This preference, and its affect on land titles discourse, will be  illustrated through analysis 
of four fairly recent Saskatchewan cases: the chapter begins by examining two cases in which the 
courts explored the issue of fraud in ownership disputes over land because this issue is apposite 
to the notion of indefeasibility of title  The first case, Hermanson v Saskatchewan (Registrar, 
Regina Land Registration District), was decided respectively by the Court of Queens Bench in 
1982
4
 and the Court of Appeal in 1986,
5
 at a time when “indefeasibility of title” was just gaining 
a certain cachet in Saskatchewan. The second, CIBC Mortgages Inc v Saskatchewan (Registrar 
of Titles),
6
 was decided by the Court of Queen’s Bench in 2005.   
The discussion then turns to two cases where the analysis is more troubling.  Instead of 
applying principles codified in land titles statutes or even relying upon “indefeasibility of title”, 
Arndt v First Galesburg National Bank and Trust Co
7
 and Henderson v Knogler
8
 provide 
evidence that some courts have base decisions on legal principles which usually are treated as 
anathema in real property disputes, or after a transfer of title to real property has been registered.  
One discovers that, contrary to the almost blind reliance on “indefeasibility of title” espoused in 
traditional legal research sources; it is not always treated as a legal fact or universally applied in 
land titles disputes. 
1. HERMANSON V SASKATCHEWAN (REGINA REGISTRAR OF TITLES) 
Hermanson v Saskatchewan (Regina Registrar of Titles) is the first case before the 
Saskatchewan courts to determine competing ownership claims in the context of fraud and 
identity theft.  The statement of claim was issued in 1978 but a decision of the Court of Queen’s 
Bench was not issued until September 9, 1982.
9
 The Registrar of the Regina Land Registration 
District consequently filed a Notice of Appeal on October 26, 1982.  Valerie Hermanson, the 
                                                 
4
 Hermanson v Martin (1982), 18 Sask R 430; (1982), 140 DLR (3d) 512, [1982] SJ no 740 at paras 2-3 (SK QB) 
[Hermanson Trial citing to QL].  
5
 Hermanson v Saskatchewan (Registrar, Regina Land Registration District) (1986), 33 DLR (4
th
) 12; [1986] SJ no 
728 (SK CA) [Hermanson Appeal citing to QL]. 
6
 CIBC Mortgages Inc v Saskatchewan (Registrar of Titles), 2005 SKQB 470 (available on CanLII) [CIBC 
Mortgages Inc]. 
7
 Arndt v First Galesburg National Bank and Trust Co, 2001 SKQB 234 (available on CanLII) [Arndt v First 
Galesburg]. 
8
 Henderson v Knogler, 2010 SKCA 119 (available on CanLII) [Henderson Appeal]; 2009 SKQB 96 (available on 
CanLII) [Henderson Trial]; 2011 SKQB 399 (available on CanLII) [Henderson Chambers]. 
9
 Hermanson Trial, supra note 4. 
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plaintiff in the court action, filed a Notice of Intention to Vary on October 26, 1982.  The appeals 
were heard on August 23, 1983, but Chief Justice Bayda and Justice Brownridge, the two panel 
members who remained seised with the case,
10
 took more than three years to issue two 
concurring judgments.  These delays and the concurring judgments by the Court of Appeal 
justices indicate that both levels of court analyzed the issues carefully and were cognizant of the 
important policy elements accompanying the issues of identity theft and fraud. 
The case arose following difficulties in a marriage.  Valerie and Edward Schmidt were 
married in 1962 and had two children.  In 1971 they purchased a house in Regina, held title to it 
as joint tenants, and lived there as a family.  In the spring of 1972 a petition for divorce was 
issued and a divorce decree absolute was granted that fall, without the family property issues 
being determined.  The parties continued to hold title to the former family home as joint tenants, 
while Valerie and the two children moved to Calgary.
11
  In the meantime, she remarried and 
changed her last name to Hermanson. 
Edward Schmidt continued to live in the family home until late May, 1975, when he sold 
it to Ralph Martin.  There is some suggestion that it was a private sale because the judgment 
states that in April they reached an agreement whereby Martin would pay $13,500.00
12
 for the 
property.  In exchange for the registration of a first charge against the title, Co-operative Trust 
Company of Canada agreed to loan Martin $12,271.00.  Schmidt agreed to loan him the amount 
required to cover the balance of the purchase price and, given that the total of the two loans 
exceeded the purchase price, presumably the amount necessary to cover legal and registration 
costs, with the second mortgage being registered in the amount of $2,200.00.
13
  From this it 
appears as if Martin did not need to use any of his own funds to complete the transaction.  
Schmidt’s lawyer prepared the mortgages and registered them and the transfer for Martin,14 and 
                                                 
10
 The records at the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan, disclose that the appeal was heard by a three justice panel – 
Chief Justice Bayda, Justice Wood and Justice Brownridge – on August 23, 1983 and the Court reserved its decision 
until November 13, 1986.  According to information recorded at the website for the Saskatchewan Courts, 
<http://www.sasklawcourts.ca/defeault.asp?pg=ca_justices_27>, Justice Wood retired in 1984 when he turned 75 
years of age, meaning he was unavailable to participate in the judgment of this case. 
11
 Hermanson Trial, supra note 4 at paras 2-3.  
12
 Ibid at para 41. 
13
 Ibid at para 4. 
14
 Hermanson Appeal, supra note 5 at para 12. 
  101 
title to the property was registered in his name on May 29, 1975.  On the same date the two 
mortgages were also registered.
15
   
When Schmidt attended at the lawyer’s office to execute the transfer and related 
documents, he was informed that his wife needed to sign the documents too.  Schmidt left the 
office and within thirty minutes returned with a woman he introduced as Valerie.  They executed 
the documents in front of the lawyer and then she left.
16
   
Valerie Hermanson was unaware the house had been sold or that two mortgages had 
registered against its title for more than two years.
17
  From this one can infer that she never 
informed the land titles office of her address in Calgary. Her ex-husband never told her what he 
had done. 
Martin moved onto the property, and made the payments on the Co-operative Trust 
mortgage.  However, he never made any payments to Edward Schmidt on the second mortgage
18
 
before Schmidt died in March 1977. At his death Schmidt’s only significant asset was the 
mortgage registered against the former family home.
19
   
Hermanson learned of her former husband’s death in October, 1977.  She believed she 
was the surviving joint tenant of the Regina home and hired a Regina lawyer to assist her with its 
transmission.  In January 1978, when she learned the title to the property had been transferred,
20
  
Hermanson commenced a court action to have the land transferred into her name, free and clear 
of the mortgages.  In the alternative, she made a claim against the Registrar of Titles of the 
Regina Land Registration District for the value of the land
21
 to be paid from the assurance fund.  
She also filed a complaint regarding the forgery with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Fraud 
Squad, but they were unable to locate the woman who had impersonated her.
22
   
In the trial judgment, the Court examined the interplay between three statutory provisions 
and the treatment of similar provisions by the courts in other jurisdictions.  Justice McIntyre 
                                                 
15
 Hermanson Trial, supra note 4 at para 6. 
16
 Ibid at para 5. 
17
 Ibid at para 6. 
18
 Ibid at para 6. 
19
 Ibid at para 7. 
20
 Ibid at para 7. 
21
 Ibid at para 9. 
22
 Ibid at para 8. 
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began the analysis with section 68 of The Land Titles Act 
23
 which “enshrine[s] indefeasibility of 
title as a fundamental principle of the Torrens System of Land Registration.”24  It read: 
The owner of land for which a certificate of the title has been granted shall hold 
the same subject, in addition to the incidents implied by virtue of this Act, to such 
encumbrances, liens, estates or interests as are endorsed on the certificate of title, 
absolutely free from all other encumbrances, liens, estates or interests whatever, 
except in case of fraud wherein he has participated or colluded and except the 
estate or interest of an owner claiming the same land under a prior certificate of 
title, as mentioned in section 213.
25
 
 
Quoting this section, the Court acknowledged the importance of registration in land titles 
schemes.   
The Court also referred to the other key statutory provisions, namely sections 196
26
 and 
213(1).
27
  Section 213(1) specified when a title was conclusive proof of ownership against 
persons not named as owner on the Certificate of Title.
28
  Section 196(1) enumerated those 
situations whereby an owner could recover the land.  It read: 
No action of ejectment or other action for the recovery of land for which a 
certificate of title has been granted shall lie against the owner under this Act, 
except in the case of: 
(a) a mortgagee, as against a mortgagor in default; 
(b) a lessor, as against a lessee in default; 
(c) a person deprived of land by fraud, as against the person who through the 
fraud has been registered as owner, or as against a person deriving title 
otherwise than as a transferee bona fide for value from or through such 
owner through fraud; 
(d) a person deprived of or claiming any land included in any grant or 
certificate of title of other land by misdescription of such other land or of 
its boundaries, as against the owner of such land; 
(e) an owner claiming under a prior instrument of title, where two or more 
grants are registered, or two or more certificates of title issued, in respect 
of the same land; 
                                                 
23
 The Land Titles Act, RSS 1978, c L-5, s 68(1) [The Land Titles Act, 1978]. 
24
 Hermanson Trial, supra note 4 at para 17. 
25
 The Land Titles Act, 1978, supra note 23 s 68. 
26
 Hermanson Trial, supra note 4 at para 18. 
27
 Ibid at para 19. 
28
 Chapter 3 above at 85-86. 
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(f) rights arising under any of the clauses of section 69.29   
In quoting these sections, the Court recognized the fundamental principles underlying the 
statutory scheme.  
The Court then considered the Privy Council decisions which had examined fraud and 
identify theft in land titles disputes from Australia and New Zealand.  It considered Gibbs v 
Messer
30
 and the more recent decision of Frazer v Walker.
31
 The Court used the wording 
employed by the Privy Council in Frazer to conclude that “’it is in fact the registration and not 
its antecedents which vests and divests title’”32 and that the statute conferred immediate 
indefeasibility on a bona fide purchaser for value.
33
   
Justice McIntyre then applied the statutory provisions and the quote from Frazer to the 
facts before him.  Although indicia was present which could be considered to be characteristic of 
real estate fraud including the fact that Martin: never used any of his money as a down-payment, 
financed the purchase price and legal expenses, never made a payment on the mortgage owing to 
Schmidt, and used the same lawyer as Schmidt
34
 – the Court concluded that Martin was a bona 
fide purchaser for value.  Because he had not participated in the fraud perpetrated on Hermanson, 
he held the title to the property free of all unregistered interests with the exception of those 
mentioned in section 68. Thus Martin was unburdened by Hermanson’s former jointly held 
estate, and the title became indefeasible the moment it was registered in Martin’s name.  It was 
conclusive proof against all claimants, including Hermanson. 
Although Hermanson was not entitled to eject Martin from the property, the Court 
concluded that, given that she had held title to the property jointly with her ex-husband, she was 
entitled to half the value of the property at the date of the sale, with interest thereon. If Schmidt’s 
estate could not satisfy the debt, it was to be paid from the assurance fund. 
  The Registrar of the Regina Land Registration District was dissatisfied with the result 
and appealed.  Valerie Hermanson filed a Notice to Vary.  Both parties asserted that Hermanson 
                                                 
29
 The Land Titles Act, 1978, supra note 23, s 196(1). 
30
 Gibbs v Messer, [1891] AC 248 (PC).  
31
 Frazer v Walker, [1967] All ER 649 (PC). 
32
 Frazer v Walker, ibid at 651, cited in Hermanson Trial, supra note 9 at para 32. 
33
 Frazer v Walker, ibid at 654, cited in Hermanson Trial ibid at para 33. 
34
 Pursuant to the decision of The Law Society of Upper Canada v Cunningham 2010 ONLSHP 0097 (available on 
CanLII) at para 43, all of these factors are indicia of mortgage fraud.   
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should recover her property, and made alternative secondary and conflicting arguments.  Both 
appeals were dismissed, but the concurring judgments illustrate the different approaches which 
courts may employ when considering a land titles issue: Justice Brownridge relied primarily on 
the common law, while Chief Justice Bayda took an approach more aligned with Justice Egbert’s 
admonition.  Each deserves mention. 
Justice Brownridge reproduced sections 68, 196 and 213 after the recitation of facts at the 
start of his judgment,
35
 but devoted most of the analysis to common law authorities such as 
Gibbs v Messer
36
 and the supporting Saskatchewan and Alberta cases which had been considered 
by the trial judge.
37
 In his judgment, the statutory provisions were interwoven with the trial 
judge’s analysis of the cases from other jurisdictions, in particular Assets Company, Limited v 
Mere Roihi,
38
 and Frazer v Walker.
39
  As seen from his following statement, traditional sources 
of law – case authorities and equity – were at the forefront: 
    Finally, there are no doubt cases where the registered owner, having been 
deprived of his title by forgery or fraud, should have his title restored. But this is 
not such a case. The issue in this case is about indefeasibility of title and the 
present registered owner has been the registered owner since May 29, 1975. It is 
neither just nor equitable that he should now be deprived of his title because of 
the fraud of others if that can be avoided. As Lord Wilberforce pointed out in 
Frazer v Walker, there is nothing to prevent the court from granting equitable 
relief as the circumstances require even if it cannot or feels it ought not to take 
away the title of the present registered owner and restore it to a former owner.
40
 
 
Although he concurred with the judgment authored by Justice Brownridge, Chief Justice 
Bayda placed much greater emphasis on the statutory provisions, an approach better suited to a 
statutory regime such as the land titles system of registration.  Bayda CJS started the analysis by 
examining the relevant statutory provisions, without any examination of case authorities from 
other jurisdictions.  From the statutory analysis he concluded: 
the term fraud as used in s. 196 must be limited to the new owner’s fraud, that is, 
to fraud in which he participated or colluded …. As noted, to define ‘fraud’ in s. 
                                                 
35
 Hermanson Appeal, supra note 5 at 7-8. 
36
 Gibbs v Messer, supra note 30, referred to Hermanson Appeal, ibid at 8-9. 
37
 Hermanson Appeal, ibid at 9-10. 
38
 Assets Company, Limited v Mere Roihi (1905), AC 176 (PC). 
39
 Frazer v Walker, supra note 31.  
40
 Ibid at 12. 
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196 to coincide with ‘fraud’ in ss. 68 and 213 automatically results in the 
application of ‘immediate indefeasibility’ theory.”41   
 
Chief Justice Bayda then addressed the interpretation of “fraud.”  Because this term is not 
defined in The Land Titles Act, he turned to the common law, specifically to jurisdictions 
possessing similar land titles statutes to Saskatchewan.  Whenever he examined the interpretation 
of fraud in such cases, the judgment referred to the statutory provisions that had been applied, 
and compared them to Saskatchewan’s.  Like the Court below, he primarily referenced cases 
from Australia and New Zealand, as those jurisdictions’ statutory provisions were almost 
identical to those in Saskatchewan.   
From this, Bayda CJS held that section 196(c) had to be restricted to situations in which 
the new owner had actually participated in the fraud, and, contrary to the common law, that 
equitable fraud or constructive knowledge of the fraud was not sufficient to overturn ownership 
of the title.
42
  He therefore concluded that Martin had not participated in fraud as it is described 
in land titles statutes.  This judgment was rooted in the statute; one assumes Justice Egbert would 
have been pleased. 
In Hermanson, both levels of court demonstrated a commitment to the principles 
underlying Saskatchewan’s land titles system, namely, that registration confers ownership rights 
which can only be defeated in limited and enumerated circumstances. From beginning with the 
statute, and then using it as the context for analyzing case law from jurisdictions possessing 
similar legislative provisions, both levels of court demonstrated a degree of comprehension and 
acceptance of the land titles statute and regime that often is missing from more recent judgments.  
All the judges concluded that registration was the scheme’s most important feature, and that a 
new owner must participate in the fraud for his title to be set aside.  Indefeasibility of title was 
only mentioned as a corollary to the statutory provisions. 
Both appeal judgments utilized Torrens System terminology instead of phrases developed 
in the common law.  Chief Justice Bayda began his judgment by quoting Justice Brownridge’s 
statement that Martin was an “’owner of land for which a certificate of title … [had] been 
granted.’”43  A “Certificate of Title” is a creation of the Torrens System.  Neither refers to deeds; 
                                                 
41
 Hermanson Appeal, supra note 5 at para 5. 
42
 Ibid at para 5. 
43
 Ibid at para 2. 
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instead Justice Brownridge wrote about the fraudulent execution of a transfer,
44
 which is another 
Torrens System creation.
45
  The “instrument numbers” given to the mortgages by land titles staff 
were also mentioned.
46
  From their choice of language, it can be inferred that the judges 
possessed significant knowledge and understanding of the land titles scheme, with its inherent 
notion of conclusiveness of ownership.  These examples illustrate knowledge of the principles 
and operation of a Torrens System of land registration and decisions based on the contents of the 
legislation, which should be the standard of analysis in any land titles case. 
2. CIBC MORTGAGES INC. V SASKATCHEWAN (REGISTRAR OF TITLES) 
In 2005 the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench once again examined the issue of 
fraud arising from identity theft in the context of real property ownership.  By this time 
employing the expressions “immediate indefeasibility” and “deferred indefeasibility” to describe 
the effect of the protections afforded in land titles legislation had become firmly entrenched as 
dogma in legal discourse.  However, two different streams of analysis were possible:  one based 
on this immediate / deferred indefeasibility debate in the common law to distinguish the 
authority of Hermanson; or one which relied upon the new legislation and statutory 
interpretation principles to do so. 
As noted by Elmer A Driedger in the preface to his seminal text, The Composition of 
Legislation,  
Statutes are laws. They are supposed to settle the rights and liabilities of the 
people, and they are enforced by the courts. They must be, so far s we can make 
them, precise. They are serious documents. They are not, like the morning 
newspaper, to be read today and forgotten tomorrow.  Like all other serious works 
of literature, they must be read and studied with care and concentration. Every 
word in a statute is intended to have a definite purpose and no unnecessary words 
are intentionally used.  All the provisions in it are intended to constitute a unified 
whole.  It represents many long hours of hard work.  Only fifteen minutes may be 
required to read the words in it, but that is not enough.  Anyone who wishes to 
understand a statute must be willing to spend a little time with it, reading it 
through, slowly and carefully, from beginning to end, and then re-reading it 
several times.
47
   
                                                 
44
 Ibid at para 5. 
45
 This can be contrasted to the headnote, which uses the word “deed” instead of transfer.  Ibid at para 1. 
46
 Ibid at paras 5-6. 
47
 Elmer A Driedger, The Composition of Legislation, 2
nd
 ed, (Ottawa: The Department of Justice, 1976) at xxiii. 
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In 2001 Saskatchewan repealed The Land Titles Act and replaced it with The Land Titles Act, 
2000, a new statutory regime in which the goal of facility of transfer is preferred to the goal of 
certainty of title.
48
 As the new statute also possesses a different focus than its predecessor and a 
different type of organization, arguments could have been developed that Hermanson did not 
apply in the context of the new statute.
49
   
Unfortunately it appears as if the lawyers arguing the case failed to make the statutory 
interpretation argument.  Instead, they relied upon “indefeasibility of title” and were therefore 
compelled to make the common law central to the discussion, instead of statutory analysis which 
would have enabled the Court to author a more coherent judgment based on the legislation 
instead of a common law “principle.”  Thus, the Court employed a circuitous analysis – 
including a cursory review of leading cases, articles, and the term “indefeasibility of title” as it 
has developed in British Columbia and Ontario in the context of fraud and mortgages – without 
any in depth comparison of these sources with the provisions contained in The Land Titles Act, 
2000.
50
  
In CIBC Mortgages Inc. v Saskatchewan (Registrar of Titles),
51
 a fraudster had caused 
the title to 611 Leslie Avenue, Saskatoon to be registered in the name of Trent Doerksen, a real 
individual who lived in Prince Albert.
52
  For a number of years an elderly couple owned and 
lived in that house.  After the husband died, his widow transferred title to their two children, one 
                                                 
48
 Chapter 3 above at 68 n 2.   
49
 Although this argument is beyond the scope of this thesis, a few comments based upon Driedger, supra note 48 
need to be made to support this assertion.  If one contrasts the style of organization between the statutes, one sees 
that The Land Titles Act was organized in such a manner as to emphasize registration, including bringing land into 
the ambit of the legislative scheme, with no distinction between transfers and interests.  In The Land Titles Act, 
2000, the statute is organized to emphasize the importance of ownership, with owners being accorded much more 
attention than land.  Interests have been separated from the statutory protections provided to owners of parcels of 
land.  Instead of being based on the value of the interest, now a flat-fee is charged when an interest is registered. 
This is because interests are no longer reviewed prior to registration.  These are significant changes, and could have 
been used to assert that decisions made in the context of the former legislative regime were no longer applicable, 
and could be distinguished.   
50
 The Land Titles Act, 2000, SS 2000, c L-5.1. 
51
 CIBC Mortgages Inc, supra note 6. 
52
 Ibid at para 4. 
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of whom lived in Edmonton and one of whom lived in Calgary.
53
  In less than a year, the widow 
also died,
54
 and the house remained vacant for a period of months.
55
  
At some point the fraudster obtained a Saskatchewan Health Card and a birth certificate 
in Trent Doerksen’s name.56 The fraudster then applied for and obtained mortgage approval in 
Calgary,
57
  ensuring there was very little possibility that the mortgage broker would learn of the 
intended fraud. Mortgage instructions were sent to a Saskatoon lawyer and when the fraudster 
met with him, he produced Doerksen’s birth certificate and health card.58  The lawyer undertook 
and completed the work, and the fraudster instructed him to forward “the net mortgage in the 
amount of $149,287.26 … by a law firm trust cheque made out to Trent Doerksen to a branch of 
the Royal Bank of Canada in Saskatoon.”59  Once the fraudster had the mortgage proceeds, he 
disappeared. 
Less than one month later, one of the property’s real owners learned of the fraudulent 
transfer and mortgage when an insurance policy that listed Trent Doerksen as the home owner 
was mailed to the Leslie Avenue house and subsequently forwarded to him.
60
  At the time the 
real owners were negotiating the sale of the property so it was imperative that they be able to 
finalize the transaction.  Within two months of learning of the fraud, CIBC Mortgages Inc and 
the Registrar of Titles executed a consent order which transferred the title to the land back to the 
original owners and discharged the mortgage, enabling the real owners to convey clear title to the 
purchaser.
61
  
However, the parties could not resolve all the issues.  The borrower had absconded with 
the mortgage proceeds and the lender received no payments.  CIBC Mortgages Inc
62
 believed it 
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was entitled to receive compensation for its loss from the Registrar of Titles.  The Registrar 
would not agree so the matter proceeded to court. 
The parties were able to agree to the wording of the issue, and it was reproduced in the 
consent order which enabled the property to be transferred into the names of the real owners.  
The issue in the consent order does not mention “indefeasibility of title;” rather, it refers to the 
statute, asking the Court to answer:   
‘Is CIBC Mortgages Inc. entitled to be compensated by Information Services 
Corporation of Saskatchewan pursuant to part XII of The Land Titles Act, 2000, in 
relation to the mortgage registered as Interest Register #109531773, Interest 
#127294094 against Title #128591332 whether as a result of the discharge of the 
mortgage pursuant to this order or otherwise?’63 
 
Part XII of the Act focuses on compensation: when it is available and the processes necessary to 
claim it.  From the wording of the issue it can be inferred that the parties expected the Court to 
focus the analysis on the legislative provisions. 
 The substantive provision at the focus of the dispute was subsection 54(3).  It prescribes 
the relationship between the registration and validity of interests, and states:   
Any interest registered … is only effective according to the terms of the 
instrument or law on which the interest in based and is not deemed to be valid 
through registration.
64
 
 
As seen from subsection 54(3), a registered interest only has priority against subsequent interests 
if the instrument on which it is based is valid. This is contrary to the interpretation attached to the 
provisions in the former land titles statute,
65
 whereby registration cured and validated a void 
instrument.  Subsection 54(3) leaves void but registered interests vulnerable to challenge from 
subsequent registered interest holders or other parties with interests or estates in the same parcel 
of land.  Given how the parties framed the issue as one based on statute, one would have 
expected CIBC Mortgages Inc’s claim to fail, without any analysis of “indefeasibility of title.” 
 However, instead of analyzing the issue identified by the parties in the consent order, the 
Court held that its task was to determine: 
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whether a person who takes a mortgage interest in land, not from the registered 
owner, but from someone who forges the registered owner’s name, is entitled to 
remain on title after the forgery is discovered.
66
 
   
With this reframing, the emphasis on Part XII of the Act and subsection 54(3) was diminished.  
This enabled the Court to consider other sources, leaving the judgment circuitous and the 
analysis less helpful than it might otherwise have been.   
 To establish this point, the judgment’s organization deserves examination. Judicial 
decisions usually follow a similar format.  The facts are presented first and then the issue is 
described.  If the issue involves consideration of some statutory provisions, usually they are 
presented next. Sometimes this involves explanation of the principles of statutory interpretation.  
After this, the court presents cases which have considered the statutory provisions.  Most often, 
only the most significant cases are presented, including those significant cases which can be 
distinguished.  Then the facts are analyzed in the context of the legal authorities.  Once this is 
completed, the Court states its conclusion.  This is the approach which the judgment of Chief 
Justice Bayda demonstrated in Hermanson v Saskatchewan. 
 This format was not followed exactly in CIBC Mortgages Inc, and because of this, the 
judgment appears confusing and is difficult to follow.  The Court began as expected, with a 
recitation of the facts.  This was followed by the parties’ framing of the issue and a broad 
summary by the Court of the position of each of the parties. The Court then reframed the issue so 
it did not refer to the statute. After this, the judgment became more confusing, perhaps because 
the Court followed the arguments made by counsel who failed to highlight the nuances and 
complexities which arise when “indefeasibility of title” – as this term is presented in the 
dominant legal lexicon – becomes the focus of analysis instead of the applicable statutory 
provisions. This failure to grasp the nuances inherent in such analysis is illustrated by presenting 
and examining the Court’s analysis as it progresses. 
 After reframing the issue, the Court commences with a brief description of some cases 
which it describes as the leading authorities. One would expect the discussion to begin with 
Gibbs v Messer,
67
 Frazer v Walker,
68
 and Hermanson v Saskatchewan
69
 as they all arose in land 
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titles jurisdictions based on the original Australian model.  The first two are the leading 
international land titles cases in which fraud and competing ownership claims were considered, 
and were decided respectively by the House of Lords and the Privy Council. Given their 
importance, a brief review of each is required.  
 In Gibbs v Messer,
70
 the House of Lords concluded, and thereby overruled the decisions 
of the trial and appeal courts, that a mortgagee who had loaned money to a fraudster posing as a 
landowner was not entitled to compensation from the land titles office.  As well, the House of 
Lords ordered that the mortgagee’s interest was to be discharged from the real landowner’s 
title.
71
  Consequently, registration did not protect the subsequently registered mortgagee who was 
left without any satisfactory remedy.   
 In Frazer v Walker,
72
 a land owner had lost his property to foreclosure because his spouse 
forged his name to a mortgage, and then failed to make payments.  The landowner sought to 
have the title vested in his name, and the mortgage discharged from the title on the basis that he, 
as one of the owners, had not executed it.  The Privy Council concluded he was not entitled to 
compensation from the land titles office.  It also found that the forged mortgage was valid 
because it was registered on the title.
73
  This is the decision on which the Court of Appeal in 
Hermanson v Saskatchewan
74
 relied. 
  Instead of leading with these cases, the Court commences its presentation of legal 
principles and rules with a quotation contained in a British Columbia trial judgment, Vancouver 
City Savings Credit Union v. Hu.
75
  The Court does not describe the fact situation facing the 
British Columbia Supreme Court; this decision is simply used as the vehicle from which to 
reproduce Lord Watson’s famous statement in Gibbs v Messer:76 
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     The main object of the Act, and the legislative scheme for the attainment of 
that object, appear to be equally plain. The object is to save persons dealing with 
registered proprietors from the trouble and expense of going behind the register, 
in order to investigate the history of their author’s title, and to satisfy themselves 
of its validity. That end is accomplished by providing that every one who 
purchases, in bona fide and for value, from a registered proprietor, and enters his 
deed or transfer of mortgage on the register, shall thereby acquire an indefeasible 
right, notwithstanding the infirmity of his author’s title.77 
  
Nor does the Court provide any information regarding the statutory provisions in issue in Gibbs v 
Messer or for that matter, in Vancouver City Savings Credit Union v Hu. After Lord Watson’s 
quote, the Court highlights the fact that the quote refers to “persons dealing with the registered 
proprietors,”78 and then moves on.  Noticeably the Court fails to refer to Frazer v Walker,79 the 
decision that changed the law from that expressed by Lord Watson.   
 Instead of presenting these authorities, the Court devotes one sentence to the English 
authority of Cooper v Vesey,
80
 writing: “Gibbs v. Messer, supra, also affirmed what was stated 
in Cooper v. Vesey, supra, that a forged mortgage is a nullity.”81 This is equally troubling for a 
number of reasons.  
 First, the conclusion expressed in Cooper v Vesey contradicts the approach taken in 
Saskatchewan since the early 1920s.  In the second paragraph of the 1962 Manual of Law and 
Procedures, Saskatchewan Land Titles Offices, Peter S Stewart, QC, then Master of Titles, 
writes:  
     Under the Torrens system, registration goes further and it is registration which 
gives operation to instruments. Section 66, sub-section … (2) of the 
Saskatchewan Land Titles Act, 1960, reads as follows: ’every instrument shall 
become operative according to the tenor and intent thereof when registered and 
shall thereupon create, transfer, surrender, charge or discharge, as the case may 
be, the land, estate or interest therein mentioned.’ In Elford v. Elford (1921) 1 
W.W.R. 341 Mr. Justice Taylor said at page 346 that certain transfers were never 
validly executed and should never have been accepted by the Registrar of Land 
Titles, but that as the Registrar accepted the documents and registered them they 
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became operative according to the tenor and intent thereof when registered and 
thereupon transferred the lands therein mentioned not by virtue of the instrument 
but as directed by the statute.
82
    
 
This quote indicates the dominant practice in Saskatchewan before The Land Titles Act, 2000 
was proclaimed in force: that is, registration validated void instruments, regardless of whether 
they pertained to transfers or interests that encumbered titles.   
 For example, in Elford v Elford
83
 a grantee of a power of attorney transferred titles to 
himself from his estranged spouse, even though the Power of Attorney did not expressly 
empower him to do so.  This was fraud.  However, the land titles office accidentally registered 
the transfers and the court concluded that, because the transfers had been registered, even though 
he had no authority to execute the documents in favour of himself, titles were to remain in the 
fraudster’s name.84  The provisions in the land titles legislation regarding registration were 
followed, not the common law principles regarding fraud.
85
  This decision was reversed by the 
Supreme Court of Canada when it applied common law provisions instead of the statute,
86
 but, as 
seen from Stewart’s quote, land titles staff in Saskatchewan continued to apply the position taken 
by the trial judge.  This position is contrary to the conclusion reached in Cooper v Vesey.
87
 
 Cooper v Vesey is a decision of the English Court of Appeal.  At the time, the Australian 
based land titles systems were much more rigid regarding the legal impact of registration than 
were the land titles systems derived from the English model.  In such jurisdictions, registration 
was not as definitive.  In the Australian model, the state essentially provided a “statutory 
warranty of title”88 once it issued a Certificate of Title.  This meant that a person’s ownership of 
the title to a parcel of land could only be challenged in certain prescribed circumstances such as 
error by land titles staff, or fraud.  With the English model, it was possible for a person not 
named as owner on a title to assert ownership of a parcel of land by means of quieting of titles 
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legislation and a resulting judicial decree of ownership.
89
 This meant the title issued by the state 
could be overruled if someone else could prove he had a better ownership claim than the person 
listed on the title.   
 Another significant difference involved the relationship between registration and 
interests.  In the Australian model, an interest gained priority over other interests once it was 
registered in the land titles system.  In the English model, interests were registered, but their 
status and priorities between competing interests were governed by the contents of the 
instruments.
90
 Perhaps these distinctions explain why the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in 
Hermanson
91
 did not refer to Cooper v Vesey.   
 In spite of these distinctions in the effect attached to registration in the two types of land 
titles systems, in CIBC Mortgages Inc the Saskatchewan Court followed the authority based 
upon the English model.  No explanation was provided regarding the different models, and why 
Cooper v Vesey applied in Saskatchewan.  Referring to it was unnecessary and confusing for 
anyone who has read Gibbs v Messer, Frazer v Walker, and Hermanson.   
 The Court’s analysis in CIBC Mortgages Inc then shifts from court decisions to an article 
produced for the Law Society of Upper Canada regarding the distinctions between immediate 
and deferred indefeasibility of title.
92
 Once again, there is very little explanation as to how it 
applies in Saskatchewan.   
 Then the Court attempts to ground the immediate versus deferred indefeasibility of title 
debate in statutory provisions.  In so doing, the Court quotes provisions contained in Ontario’s 
and British Columbia’s legislation which support the theory of deferred indefeasibility of title:93 
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in these jurisdictions, registration does not act to cure registration of an instrument which is 
founded upon a void instrument.  The Court also acknowledges that “[t]here is no similar 
provision in the Saskatchewan Act.”94   
 Only then does the Court consider the theory of immediate indefeasibility adopted in 
Hermanson
95
 and Frazer v Walker.
96
 It does not repeat any statutory provisions considered in 
these judgments.  It does not compare Frazer v Walker to Gibbs v Messer.  The Court 
distinguishes Hermanson, writing that the “rectification powers of the registrar contained in the 
Act which were not applicable in this case.”97  In two paragraphs the court summarizes these 
cases and then moves on to consider In the Matter of Lorrie Risman, an Ontario decision issued 
by Nancy Sills, the Deputy Director of Title for that province.
98
   
 The Court seems persuaded by the Deputy Director’s observation that in Canada, “the 
only case to apply the doctrine of immediate indefeasibility was Hermanson.
99
 Ms Sills then 
qualifies her comment by admitting that “’[d]ue to the difference in statutory provisions, it is not 
appropriate to apply Frazer v. Walker or Hermanson in Ontario.’”100  However, a reader is left 
with the impression that deferred indefeasibility is a superior approach to adopt in such a dispute. 
 This implication is supported by the next paragraph wherein the Court observes: 
   A cursory review of the case law in the other western Canadian provinces does 
not disclose one case where a forged transfer or interest, forged meaning it did not 
emanate from the person who was the registered owner on title, upheld the forged 
interest.
101
 
 
 Only then does the Court examine provisions in The Land Titles Act, 2000.
102
  Among 
others, it reproduces sections 13(1), 23, 50, 54 and 84.  It determines that “indefeasibility of title” 
is an incident of sections 13(1) and 23 without providing any significant support for this 
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assertion.
103
 It then analyzes the facts in the context of the legal rules it has presented, focusing 
its discussion on indefeasibility of title. In so doing, the Court never addresses the fact that 
section 54(3) which specifically pertains to interests may impliedly except the general statement 
made in section 23 regarding the scope of protection afforded in the legislation.
104
 
 Through it failure to consider some of the nuances inherent in the statutory provisions, 
the Court’s analysis is incomplete and provides fodder for Justice Egbert’s admonition; in 2005 
the Court overlooks some of the problems associated with treating the myth of indefeasibility of 
title as fact. There is very little comparison of the cases with the facts or with the previous or 
current statutory provisions. For example, the Court does not highlight the fact that the 
conclusiveness of an owner’s title outlined in section 13 does not apply to interests105 such as the 
mortgage in question.   
 Instead the Court writes that indefeasibility of title is “made an incident of registration”106 
in a Torrens System.  “Incident” is defined as: “an event or occurrence …, [as] a minor or 
detached event attracting general attention or noteworthy in some way …, [and in law, as] a 
privilege, burden, etc., attaching to an obligation or right.”107  The Court’s use of the word 
“incident” minimizes the importance attached to registration in Torrens’ legislative schemes such 
as the one operating in Saskatchewan.  Rather than a “detached event,” the statute provides that it 
is registration that makes a person’s title conclusive against all other individuals except those 
possessing: interests which are the subject of statutory exceptions; equitable interests; and 
registered interests recognized as capable of supporting registration within the legislative 
scheme.   
 Registration is the central feature of the legislation.  Until an instrument such as a transfer 
is registered, the purchaser has no legal basis for claiming an interest in the land against third 
parties.  The relationship is defined by contract prior to the registration of the instrument.  
However, once the transfer is registered, it is the title which governs and binds individuals.   
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 The Court does not seem to possess a nuanced understanding of this legal fact.  This is 
demonstrated when it notes that “[o]nce registered, an instrument is no longer the source of title 
of the transferee but is replaced by the Certificate of Title, which subject to the exceptions 
contained in any particular land titles statute, becomes conclusive.”108  In a Torrens System, the 
instrument is never conclusive proof of ownership or the source of an individual’s title: 
registration is.
109
  If land is patented, legal ownership is not recognized until a title is issued by 
the land titles office.  A title is only prepared following registration of a transfer or grant of 
letters patent. This is more than an “incident” of registration. 
The Court relies upon sources from Ontario and British Columbia.  From this, one infers 
that the statutory provisions are similar and that land titles systems are homogeneous, when they 
are not.  James Edward Hogg determined that the English and Australian-based systems are very 
different, and that British Columbia is unique.  Hogg found that out of the thirty-one jurisdictions 
operating land titles systems before 1920, essentially there were twenty-two different types of 
systems.
110
  Different jurisdictions have adopted very distinct statutory provisions, and care must 
be taken to compare the statutes when applying cases from different jurisdictions.111  When a 
Court fails to do so, the reader is left with a misconception regarding the law, one which 
embraces the myth of indefeasibility of title. The distinctiveness of each jurisdiction’s statutory 
provisions may be lost in the adoption of precedents from a land titles system developed in a 
different jurisdiction. 
 Because it is not completely cognizant of these subtleties inherent in the concept of 
indefeasibility, the Court demonstrates a preference for the myth.  It concludes that section 54(3) 
limits the concept of indefeasibility of title inferred from the legislative provisions, and holds 
that the statutory provision is not appropriate as a basis for determining the legal issue before it. 
It does not offer an explanation as to why indefeasibility of title trumps the express provision – 
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particularly when the legislature chose not to codify the term in the legislation.
112
  In a very 
complex area of law masquerading as a rational system, one myth has replaced another.
113
 
 In the end, the Court rightly dismisses CIBC Mortgages Inc’s application to receive 
compensation from the Registrar of Titles.
114
 Unfortunately, the decision is not based upon 
section 54(3), but upon the common law: 
On the facts in this matter, Trent Doerksen was the registered owner on title. 
CIBC took a mortgage interest, not from Trent Doerksen, the registered owner, 
but from a fraudster who impersonated Trent Doerksen. It did not take its interest 
from the registered owner, and therefore does not gain the benefit of the ‘curtain’ 
principle of the Torrens’ system articulated in s. 23 of the Act. The result is the 
forged mortgage which it received from the fraudster is a nullity at common law 
and is unenforceable against the title. It is properly removable from title pursuant 
to s. 68 of the Act.
115
 
 
This is the essence of subsection 54(3), yet the Court decided not to apply it.  The  instrument – 
the mortgage – was void because it was not executed by the real Trent Doerksen. Pursuant to the 
statute, registration did not validate it. 
The Court’s conclusion is correct, but its reasoning is not.  Section 54(3) addressed the 
issue before the Court.  Instead of applying it, the Court based its conclusion on the underlying 
preconception of indefeasibility of title with its associated mirror, curtain and insurance 
principles, as they have been applied in jurisdictions which have always followed the deferred 
indefeasibility model.  This makes the judgment disjointed and unnecessarily complex.  It also 
demonstrates what can happen when a lawyers and a Court accept a myth as fact, and begin 
analysis from a preconception that it exists, instead of the applicable statutory provisions.  
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3. ARNDT V FIRST GALESBURG NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY   
Arndt v First Galesburg National Bank and Trust Company
116
 is the latest Saskatchewan 
case which interpreted provisions from The Land Titles Act, 1978.
117
 The Court of Queen’s 
Bench had to determine who had the better ownership claim when the registered owner had been 
dead for more than sixty years.  The facts brought the case squarely within the ambit of 
“indefeasibility of title” and the relevant statutory provisions.  In these circumstances one would 
expect that the registered owner, and persons claiming through him such as the defendants, 
would succeed in such an ownership claim.  Yet in this case the court held otherwise and made a 
declaratory order that the Arndts held title to the land on the basis of abandonment.   
The facts help to explain this unexpected result.  On December 15, 1925, Arthur D 
Stearns of Galesburg, Illinois was registered as the owner of a half-section of uncultivated land 
located in south-eastern Saskatchewan.
118
  During his lifetime Stearns leased the land to Adolph 
Arndt, a local farmer.
119
  In 1930 Stearns and Arndt reached an agreement regarding the sale and 
purchase of the half section.
120
  They agreed that Arndt would pay $1,600 for the half section, 
paying for the land over time and executed an agreement for sale. In conjunction with doing so, 
Arndt paid $50 towards the purchase price.
121
 
In 1931, Stearns assigned Arndt’s payments to First Galesburg National Bank and Trust 
Company (“First Galesburg”).122  First Galesburg then sent a letter to Arndt informing him of the 
assignment,
123
 and registered a caveat against the title to the land to protect its interest.
124
  
However, First Galesburg did not submit a copy of the agreement of sale or the assignment with 
its caveat, and, as noted by the trial judge, “No agreement for sale has been found nor 
produced.”125  It was also noted that “[t]here are no bank records of any transaction and no 
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records with respect to whether any moneys were owed or ever paid under the agreement for 
sale. All bank records have been destroyed.”126  This meant that there was “no evidence that any 
payment was ever made to the Stearns or to First Galesburg pursuant to the alleged agreement 
for sale.”127 
Arndt and his heirs used Stearns’ land from 1930 to 1998.128  Starting in 1930 the Arndts 
began paying property taxes levied against the land by the rural municipality.  They did not 
always do so promptly, but eventually taxes always were paid.
129
  Until 1999 the rural 
municipality listed a member of the Arndt family as the land’s assessed owner.130  Yet at all 
times, Arthur D Stearns was listed as the registered owner on the Certificate of Title granted by 
Land Titles.   
Stearns died in 1935.
131
  He left all his property to his widow
132
 but he did not mention 
the Saskatchewan land in his will.
133
 Mrs Stearns died intestate in 1938 and all her assets were 
transferred to their four surviving children.
134
  Like her husband, her estate documents failed to 
mention the Saskatchewan land.
135
 
The “purchaser,” Arndt, died in 1939 and “letters of administration with respect to his 
estate were not applied for until 1952.”136  In his Schedule of Assets filed with the Court, his 
widow only referred to land to which her deceased husband was the registered owner and failed 
to indicate that Arndt had any ownership interest in Stearns’ land.137 Neither the Stearns nor the 
Arndts made any claim to the land in their respective estate documents.   
At trial in 2001 the Court noted that Arndt’s beneficiaries:  
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contacted solicitors with respect to having a transfer of [Arndt’s] lands registered 
in the name of ... [his widow].  There is no evidence that any steps were taken at 
that time to complete the matter nor was there any caveat filed against the title 
even though the Arndts allegedly had been in possession and farming the land 
since at least 1930.
138
 
 
From this it could be argued that when they sought letters of administration in 1952, the Arndts 
knew they did not own the land which they had been using for more than twenty years, and did 
not believe that Stearns had abandoned it. 
Arndt’s widow died in 1982.  Once again, the Stearns land was not referred to in the list 
of assets filed with the court. 
139
 In fact, the Arndts took no action to assert that they owned 
Stearns’ land until after another family – the Hockleys – stepped forward and located heirs with 
whom in 1998 they negotiated and executed a lease and a right of first refusal.
140
   
Once this happened, the Arndts sought a vesting order pursuant to section 87 of The Land 
Titles Act.  Section 87 read: 
A judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench may, upon such notice as he deems fit or, 
where in his opinion the circumstances warrant, without notice: 
(a) make a vesting order and may direct the registrar to cancel the certificate of 
title to the lands affected and to issue a new certificate of title in the name 
of the person in whom by the order the lands are vested.
141
 
The couple who had gone to the trouble and expense of locating Stearns’ heirs – the Hockleys – 
defended on the basis of indefeasibility of title, and on the lack of documentary evidence of any 
agreement for sale or any payment.
142
   
Most likely the lawyers expected that the Hockleys would be successful in this action. 
First, abandonment is rarely used in conjunction with real property, and only then in conjunction 
with claims to incorporeal hereditaments.
143
 Second, a Certificate of Title was granted to Arthur 
D Stearns in 1925.  Arndt never registered his alleged interest against the title to the property. 
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There was corollary evidence of the existence of an agreement for sale executed by Stearns and 
Arndt, but the agreement itself and evidence of any payments were not produced as evidence. In 
accordance with section 67, as against third parties such as the Hockleys the agreement was 
unenforceable.     
The Arndts’ legal arguments contradict the supremacy accorded to the dominant 
understanding of “indefeasibility of title” that the Certificate of Title is conclusive evidence of 
the information contained therein, subject to specific exceptions enumerated in statute.  Statutory 
provisions support this: specifically, sections 67, 68, 71 and 213 support the Hockleys’ position.  
If a Certificate of Title really is indefeasible, then one would have expected the defendants to be 
successful. 
This is also supported by the fact that Saskatchewan does not recognize ownership claims 
based on adverse possession.  Ever since 1913,
 144
 the statute has precluded a “squatter” from 
claiming to own land for which a title has already issued and which the “squatter” has possessed 
for a number of years.  Section 71(2) of the former Act read: 
After land has been brought under this Act no right, title or interest adverse to or 
in derogation of the title or of the right to possession of the registered owner shall 
be acquired, or be held to have been acquired since the nineteenth day of 
December, 1913, by the possession of another, and the right of the registered 
owner to make an entry or to bring an action or suit to recover the land of which 
he is such registered owner shall not be held to be or to have been impaired or 
affected by any such possession since the said date.
145
 
 
When someone else is in adverse possession of another’s land, the rightful owner can bring an 
action to recover the land, because the rightful owner is the person named on the Certificate of 
Title.  This person has a better claim to the real property than does any squatter.  One would have 
expected the Court in Arndt to apply this section, and to refuse to grant the vesting order 
requested by the Arndts. 
 Nonetheless, the Court found that Mr Stearns had abandoned the land.    
 The Court began its analysis by considering Turner v Waterman,
146
 an earlier 
Saskatchewan case which considered the same issue, and then rejected the abandonment 
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argument.
147
  The Court quoted the paragraphs from Turner where it was determined that 
adverse possession and prescription are “’inconsistent with indefeasibility of title.’”148  In Arndt, 
the Court also included a quotation from Turner which reads: 
‘In Hackworth v Baker, [1936] 1 WWR 321 (Sask.), Turgeon, J.A. (as he then 
was) interpreted the effect of the various sections [regarding the effect of 
registration of title] …, at p. 332: 
     “Some of the cardinal principles of the Torrens registration system are 
embodied in these sections, and in one respect or another they are 
designed to do away with some of the rules of the old law of real property, 
and consequently with some of the difficulties and controversies to which 
the old rules gave rise. These sections establish: (1) That estates and 
interests pass upon the registration and not upon the execution of the 
instrument; exception being made only in the case of certain leasehold 
interests; (2)That priority dates from the time of registration and not from 
the time of execution; (3) That the registered owner, except in the case of 
his own fraud, holds his land free from all estates or interests not noted on 
the registrar, saving certain leasehold interests already mentioned, and 
subject to the reservations and incidents provided by the statute; (4) That 
possession by another shall not derogate from the registered owner’s right; 
(5) That a person taking a transfer from the registered owner shall not, 
except in the case of his own fraud, be affected by any notice given him of 
another’s equity or unregistered interest in the land; that further on this 
point, knowledge of such equity or unregistered interest shall not be 
considered a fraud; and it is expressly set out that this protection is to be 
given to the purchaser ‘any rule of law or equity to the contrary 
notwithstanding.”’149 
 
This quote sets out the cardinal features of the land titles system in Saskatchewan, most 
notably the importance attached to registration.  The land titles systems developed to promote 
certainty of ownership.
150
  This could only be achieved by reducing the importance attached to 
deeds executed by the parties to transactions and which remained in the possession of the 
landowner, making them easily susceptible to forgery and fraud.
151
 Once the land titles system 
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was better established and recognized, there was no longer a need to recognize adverse 
possession.
152
  Instead, registration was the most important feature of the legislative scheme. 
However, the Court does not elaborate on these cardinal features.  Instead, it again quotes 
from Turner v Waterman:  
‘No student of our land titles system would seriously contend, I think, that a 
trespasser could not gain any title, possessory or legal, by effluxion of time as 
against the registered owner of the land …’153 
…. 
 ‘However, in the event that evidence is available from which the court might 
reasonably infer that the land had, in fact, been paid for, or abandoned, I am 
prepared to consider the application … as one for a vesting order under … The 
Land Titles Act, 1960.’154  
 
Applying the doctrine of abandonment in a land titles jurisdiction ignores the importance 
attached to registration.  At common law, abandonment is usually only available in disputes 
involving personal property or incorporeal hereditaments in real property such as easements or 
licences.
155
  Even then, abandonment will only be established if two preconditions are present: 
the owner must give up possession and must demonstrate the intention that the owner no longer 
wants to retain or recover the property in question.  Abandonment is not akin to a gift in that the 
owner does not choose who will receive and take control of the property; instead, the owner 
abandons control and has no intention to exclude others from it, thereby leaving it to be claimed 
by the first person who discovers it and takes it into his or her own possession.   
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That said, there exists “a firmly established common law rule [that] provides that a 
corporeal interest in land cannot be abandoned.”156 It is a rule predicated upon “the seldom-
articulated but ancient policy disfavoring voids or gaps in the chain of title to land.”157   
In Arndt, the Court neglected to consider that perhaps abandonment was not available, 
and even if it was, the facts do not support the requirements in the legal test.  Specifically, there 
is no evidence that Stearns intended to leave the land for the first finder to claim possession.  
Had Stearns done so, he would have walked away from it without entering any contractual 
relationship.  He would not have known who occupied it.  Instead he left it in the possession of 
someone who was to make installment payments. Stearns even assigned these payments to a 
financial institution.  Drawing an inference of abandonment enabled the Court to recognize the 
Arndts’ adverse possession of the land, thereby avoiding the statutory prohibition codified in 
section 71.   
 This judgment indicates that the Court was cognizant of the authorities which did not 
support the Arndts’ claims. For example, the Court quoted section 71 and commented on the 
prohibition against adverse possession.
158
  As well, the Court referred to Jones v McLean,
159
 a 
decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal which provides that abandonment does not apply to 
land in a land titles jurisdiction.  In it the Court wrote at page 252: 
’I know of no principle of English law under which real estate can pass from one 
to another by “abandonment”. One man cannot abandon his property to another. 
The term is to [sic] [not] applicable to the transfer of property. A man may sell or 
give away his property to another but he clearly cannot “abandon” it to 
another.’160 
 
The Court in Arndt even acknowledged that “[t]he concept of abandonment has been discussed 
in different contexts but rarely in the context of real property.”161 The authorities did not support 
this approach.   
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To distinguish these authorities, the Court placed great weight on a justification 
suggested but not adopted in Turner v Waterman:
162
 
[t]he title to land should not be left in a state of limbo if it can be avoided. If 
abandonment is established then the purchaser would not be holding the land 
adverse to or in derogation of the registered owner, nor would the question of 
indefeasibility of title arise.”  If the land had been partially paid for but abandoned 
it could be said that those interested had accepted what had been paid in full 
satisfaction, and hence the terms of the Agreement for Sale had been met. If, on 
the other hand, nothing can be proven to have been paid on the Agreement for 
Sale and there has been abandonment, this, I think, could well be construed as a 
grant of the legal title to the purchaser. These observations should not be taken as 
attempting to establish any fixed rule; each case must depend on its particular 
circumstances. 
Although abandonment, sufficient to bring into play the Limitations Acts, did not 
at common law carry with it the right to legal title, I am of the opinion that in the 
event of abandonment being proven to the satisfaction of the Court, Section 86 is 
wide enough to empower the Court to make a vesting order [as to the proper 
owner of the land].
163
 
 
These comments can be contrasted with the more reasoned approach taken in 1966 by the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Montreal Trust Company v Murphy.
164
  This case involved 
determination of ownership interests in land arising out of an agreement of sale of land entered 
into in 1918, where the purchaser made the initial payment and remained in possession until his 
death.  Thereafter the defendant, his executrix, assumed management of the land.
165
   
The Court of Appeal began its analysis by quoting the statutory provision against 
ownership claims based on adverse possession,
166
 and section 213 which provided that, except in 
certain enumerated situations such as fraud or error, a: 
“certificate of title … granted under this Act shall …. be conclusive evidence, so 
long as the same remains in force and uncancelled, in all courts, as against Her 
Majesty and all persons whomsoever, that the person named therein is entitled to 
the land included in the same for the estate or interest therein specified, subject to 
the exceptions and reservations implied under this Act.”167 
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It went on to apply Smith v National Trust Co, a decision in which the Supreme Court of Canada 
had interpreted a statutory prohibition against adverse possession in Manitoba’s legislation to 
determine whether a person can acquire “a title by possession.”168  For Justice Duff, given the 
statutory prohibition, such an argument was “’untenable.’”169   
This argument also proved to be untenable to the Court of Appeal in Murphy.  Writing 
for the Court, Justice Hall concluded: 
     A purchaser can only obtain title through the terms of his agreement for sale. 
This he cannot do if he himself is in default, unless performance by him has been 
waived by the vendor. This was, I think, the position quite properly taken by 
Davis, J., in Turner v. Waterman. His reference there to abandonment of the land 
by the vendors necessarily includes waiver of performance under the agreement 
for sale. 
     The title of the registered owner must under our Land Titles Act remain intact 
and indefeasible. It, therefore, cannot be extinguished by effluxion of time.
170
 
 
In so doing, Justice Hall qualified the position articulated in Turner v Waterman.  Yet in Arndt, 
the Court ignored this qualification and the definitive statements made by appellate courts on this 
issue.   
Instead of applying these authorities and the legislative provision which states that once 
issued a title is conclusive proof of ownership except in certain prescribed situations, the Court 
treated section 87 as definitive: 
the principles of the Torrens System confirm the significance of the principle of 
“indefeasibility of title”. As a general rule, possession by the Arndts for a period 
of 70 years or more does not impair the registered owner’s claim to the land. The 
exception is s. 87 of The Land Titles Act.
171
 
 
This approach allowed the Court to ignore the prohibition against adverse possession, and to 
apply abandonment to a dispute centering on the ownership of land.  
Also troubling is the fact that the Court does not seem to accept that its power to make a 
declaratory order should be constrained by the Act’s substantive provisions, or even by the 
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“principle” of indefeasibility of title. To apply such common law principles contradicts the 
underlying importance attached to registration in the statute, and indefeasibility of title. Given its 
dominance in legal discourse, one would expect the Court to apply “indefeasibility of title” to the 
facts, if it fails to base its decision upon the applicable statutory provisions. In Arndt, neither 
approach is adopted. This development is further evidence that “indefeasibility of title” is not as 
universally accepted or understood as it is portrayed in traditional legal research sources. 
4. HENDERSON V KNOGLER 
The recent case of Henderson v Knogler
172
 went to trial,
173
 and then to appeal,
174
 finally 
returning to the trial judge
175
 to determine a procedural matter arising in the context of The 
Planning and Development Act, 2007.
176
 The issue fell within the ambit of The Land Titles Act, 
2000
177
 and indefeasibility of title.  However, the Courts virtually ignored the principles of real 
property law and relied upon contract law principles instead.   
Ardel Henderson and his wife intended to subdivide and sell a portion of the lakefront lot 
they owned at Candle Lake, Saskatchewan.  Their lot was abutted on the north by another titled 
lot, and the lands to the south were designated as a provincial forest and were  vested in Her 
Majesty the Queen in right of the province.  The Crown’s land had never been patented and as a 
result, title had never been raised.  This meant there were a number of procedural steps that had 
to be accomplished before the Hendersons could proceed.  
The Hendersons started the necessary process in the late 1990s, and the copy of the 
survey plan (Figure A)
178
 illustrates the boundaries of their lot.  It included all of Parcel C, and 
well as all the land located between the dashed line and the lake front located in Parcel K. The 
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submitted survey plan was approved by Order in Council,
179
 but the subdivision had not been 
finalized and a new title had not been created for the portion of land the couple wished to retain, 
before Henderson advertised it for sale. 
When they learned the lakefront property was for sale, the Knoglers arranged with 
Henderson to meet with him at the lot.  Henderson showed them the survey pins indicating the 
portion of the lot that was not for sale. After an offer and counteroffer, ultimately they reached 
an agreement for the purchase and sale of the lot.  This occurred before the subdivision had been 
completed, so these documents referenced Parcel C, the entire lot owned by Henderson.  
Figure A 
Survey Plan of the Hendersons’ Subdivision  
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However, one of the conditions involved the creation of an easement regarding the use of 
the marina located on the property which Henderson was selling; he and his wife needed to retain 
access to it.  A copy of the survey plan was attached as a schedule to this easement which was 
executed by the parties.  Thus, there was evidence that the parties intended that the Hendersons 
would retain the portion identified as Lot K on the survey plan. In spite of this, title to 
Henderson’s entire lot registered in the names of the Knoglers. 
When Henderson’s lawyer learned of the error, he wrote to the Knoglers’ lawyer asking 
if they would consent to signing all documentation necessary to correct the problem.  The 
Knoglers refused.  They took the position that they obtained title to the land identified in the 
purchase documents and in the transfer authorization, and that Henderson would have to assume 
responsibility for his error.   
Arguably, the Knoglers’ position was based on the traditional understanding of the 
doctrine of indefeasibility of title.
180
  Henderson had signed the transfer authorization even 
though it did not refer to the correct parcel.  Title to the entire property had registered in the 
Knoglers’ names.  Once this title was issued, a curtain dropped behind it, making all other 
instruments superfluous.  The new title was a mirror of their proprietary interest, and could not 
be challenged by the disgruntled former owner.  Constructive notice is not recognized in land 
titles statutes.
181
  Given that Henderson had not registered a miscellaneous interest against the 
title to the property regarding the proposed subdivision before the transaction was concluded, 
notice had not been provided in accordance with the statute or judicial authority.
182
  
Because of this, Henderson could not allege that the Knoglers had committed fraud in 
taking title to the entire parcel. The Knoglers were bona fide purchasers for value who did not 
have recognizable legal notice of Henderson’s interest, because the statutory provisions 
regarding notice in the land titles legislation override the common law principle of constructive 
notice.
183
  Had Henderson wanted to retain an interest in the property, he should have 
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encumbered the title with a miscellaneous interest before he sold it.  He failed to do so and as a 
result the property belonged to the Knoglers. 
This defense was not considered because Henderson did not commence an action against 
the Knoglers pursuant to The Land Titles Act, 2000.  Even though title had already registered in 
the Knoglers’ names, the action was based upon a claim of mutual mistake.  Both the vendor and 
the purchaser knew that the legal description contained in the contract documents and the 
transfer authorization did not match the parcel of land which was the subject matter of the 
contract.   
Before this case, Saskatchewan Courts had not applied the contractual doctrine of 
“mutual mistake” in disputes of this nature.  It is questionable whether it is appropriate to apply 
mutual mistake to the terms of a contract after title has been issued in the names of the purchaser.  
One of the cardinal features of a land titles system is that the registered title, and not the deed or 
instrument on which it is based, is the foundation of the person’s ownership. There was no error 
per se on the title. Henderson executed the transfer authorization for Parcel C, and the Knoglers 
registered it.  Title issued in their names, and the documents on which it was based were no 
longer determinative between the parties.  As to ownership, the contents of the title governed. 
In a regime such as Saskatchewan’s, mutual mistake coupled with rectification only is 
appropriate before title has registered.
184
  For example, such a claim may be made in conjunction 
with the remedy of specific performance.
185
  Thus, if Henderson had realized the mistake before 
title had registered in the Knoglers’ names, and the Knoglers refused to return the transfer 
authorization, assertions of mutual mistake and rectification, coupled with the remedy of specific 
performance, would have been effective.  As well, such an approach would have avoided conflict 
with the substantive provisions in The Land Titles Act, 2000 and with the principle of 
indefeasibility of title.   
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Instead of considering the applicability of The Land Titles Act, 2000, the trial judge never 
referred to “indefeasibility of title” or any statutory provisions.186  The Court of Appeal 
mentioned sections 13(1) and 23(1), referring to them as “the principles of indefeasibility,”187 but 
concluded that “those provisions do not apply to the circumstances of this case.”188 I respectfully 
disagree because this dispute focuses on the ownership of a parcel of land.  Title had issued, and 
therefore the legislation should have been determinative. 
The parties and the Court could have applied mutual mistake and upheld the statutory 
provisions expressing the fundamental principles of the land titles system of registration.  Two 
reasons support this position.  First, the first portion of subsection 13(4) provides: 
No title defines or is proof of: 
(a) the boundaries of a parcel; [or] 
(b) the extent or area determined by the boundaries of a parcel.189 
With the provision, the Court was not bound to conclude that the Knoglers’ title was conclusive 
proof that they held title to all of Parcel C.  The parties’ mutual mistake demonstrated otherwise.  
The Court could have acknowledged the fundamental principles of the statutory scheme and the 
“principle” of indefeasibility of title, and then used subsection 13(4) as a statutory exception to 
that scheme. This approach would have enabled the Court to avoid applying the principles 
codified in section 13(1) of The Land Titles Act, 2000. 
 In addition, it was open to the Court to apply equity to the facts because equitable estates 
and interests cannot be registered in the land titles scheme except by means of the notice 
provided by causing a caveat or miscellaneous interest to be endorsed on a title.
190
  Given that 
the parties never intended the Knoglers to take title to all of Parcel C, Henderson may have 
argued that the Knoglers were holding the portion of Parcel C identified as Parcel K on the 
Survey Plan, as trustees.  The Land Titles Act, 2000 precludes any one from being registered “on 
title as trustee”191 but equitable estates are recognized in the land titles system.192  They just 
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cannot be registered in the same manner available for legal interests.  Making a declaration that 
the Knoglers held title to a portion of Parcel C as trustees for Henderson would have allowed the 
courts to uphold the fundamental principles of the legislation and the “principle” of 
indefeasibility of title. This approach also would prevent the Knoglers from benefitting from the 
mutual mistake.  Instead of this, the analysis regarding the land titles provisions and the principle 
of indefeasibility of title is missing.  
CONCLUSION 
These cases illustrate that indefeasibility of title, as it is used in the dominant legal 
lexicon, is not always followed or universally understood. Nor is Justice Egbert’s cautionary 
admonition from the trial judgment in Turta v Canadian Pacific Railway. In Hermanson v 
Saskatchewan,
193
 Chief Justice Bayda adopted a very traditional approach favoured by Justice 
Egbert, one which focused on the statutory provisions and only considered cases from 
jurisdictions possessing similar statutory regimes when he needed to interpret a word (fraud) 
which was not defined in the legislation. This is the approach which one expects if 
“indefeasibility of title” exists, and if lawyers are cognizant of the fact that land titles systems are 
based upon a statute, and not simply upon the common law.  
The final three cases are examples which demonstrate that indefeasibility of title is not 
always applied consistently; rather, it deserves to be treated as a myth, and not as a legal fact. In 
CIBC Mortgages Inc,
194
 the Court could have based its decision on section 54(3) of The Land 
Titles Act, 2000
195
 but it appears as if this argument was not made.  Consequently the Court 
employs the notion of “indefeasibility of title” as it has developed in Ontario and British 
Columbia.  Since the statutes in these two jurisdictions have always provided that an interest’s 
priority against third parties is based on the instrument, in contrast to Saskatchewan’s former 
legislation which bases priority upon registration, the reliance on these authorities is troubling.   
In Arndt,
196
 the Court adopts the doctrine of abandonment which normally does not apply 
to ownership interests in land, in preference to the statutory provisions and “indefeasibility of 
title.”  In so doing, the Court bases its decision on an assertion that the statute empowers it to 
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vest ownership in a claimant, without any requirement to comply with the statute’s substantive 
provisions. The Court ignores the fact that all land, once patented, is subject to the provisions 
contained in the land titles legislation.  In this instance, a common law doctrine is preferred to 
the statutory regime. 
In Henderson v Knogler,
197
 the Court of Appeal concludes that indefeasibility of title 
does not apply to the dispute.  Surprising, it could still rely on The Land Titles Act, 2000 to make 
a vesting order regarding the ownership of the portion of the parcel which was not contemplated 
by either party in the sale.  The Court does so upon the basis of the contract doctrine of mutual 
mistake, without considering the effect registration has upon a title. Given that land titles systems 
are statutory regimes designed to replace the complexity associated with common law 
conveyancing laws and practices,
198
 a reader would expect the Court to apply and analyze the 
relevant statutory provisions.  This does not happen, illustrating that “indefeasibility of title” is 
not universally applied or understood.   
Is there an inverse relationship between our general acceptance of this principle and the 
degree of analysis present in court judgments? Arguably, the more we rely upon “indefeasibility 
of title” as an operating principle in real estate transactions, the less understanding of land titles 
systems and fundamental principles is demonstrated in litigation.  From these recent cases, it can 
be concluded that indefeasibility of title is a myth, and therefore, in any dispute focusing on land 
ownership in Saskatchewan, caution is necessary.  
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THE EMPEROR’S NEW CLOTHES: 
THE MYTH OF INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE IN SASKATCHEWAN 
 
- CONCLUSION 
 
 When one thinks of fairy tales, often there is an expectation that the protagonist will face 
a number of trials but will ultimately triumph, with the last phrase in the story being “and they 
lived happily ever after.”  If this thesis was such, then one might perceive the author as the 
wicked witch, and would expect that ultimately the reliance upon the doctrine of indefeasibility 
of title and its three principles would continue in the dominant legal lexicon, and that all would 
be well for the members of the public who own homes in this land titles jurisdiction. After all, 
the doctrine of “indefeasibility of title” is like a suit of clothes that protects them. 
 Alternatively, one might equate “living happily ever after” with turning away from using 
these terms, and relying upon the contents of The Land Titles Act, 2000,
1
 instead.  In this thesis it 
has been established that often the essence of the land titles system of registration is reduced to 
the notion of “indefeasibility of title,” even though this expression fails to encapsulate the 
complexities and contradictions contained within the framework legislation in Saskatchewan.
2
  
In order to assess the best outcome, it must be remembered that the theoretical legislative 
framework began with practical policy objectives which continue to shape the land titles system. 
Government has always had explicit reasons for enacting this structure.  These policy reasons 
should shape the discourse regarding land titles systems and practices, and not simply reflect an 
expression promulgated by someone with only a theoretical knowledge of the Torrens System.
3
   
 The land titles system operating in Saskatchewan is modeled on the Torrens System 
which was adopted in South Australia.
4
  It is known that Torrens sought to protect purchasers 
and mortgagees in almost all instances and used the expression “indefeasibility of title.”5  It is 
also known that the assurance fund was adopted to encourage landowners to cease use of the 
deed registry system and to cause their lands to be enrolled in the land titles system.
6
  Torrens 
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knew the system needed a “carrot” to encourage people familiar with another system to convert 
to his system of land titles.  He had very ambitious policy goals which the legislature soon 
realized were not very practical:  
     Torrens’s main aim was to make the purchase of an interest in land simple, 
safer, and cheaper, by barring retrospective investigation of title; and for this 
purpose it would have been sufficient to make the register conclusive in favour of 
the bona fide applicant who first brought land under the Act and the bona fide 
purchaser who subsequently dealt on the faith of the register. However, in his 
original Act, Torrens went further and laid down a broader principle of 
indefeasibility. Since “dependent titles” were the source of evil, he not 
unnaturally adopted “independent titles” as the remedy; and, as he said, 
“indefeasibility of title created by registration follows of necessity as a corollary 
to the principle of independent title.” But this would give protection in some cases 
where it was not necessary for his purpose, or might even cause injustice. This is 
recognised in the original exceptions of fraud and error; and the additions to these 
exceptions made by later Acts indicate a view that there were other cases where 
the certificate should not prevail. It was not necessary to make the protection of a 
registered proprietor so absolute that a neighbour should be deprived of an 
easement merely because it had been omitted from the certificate; and, more 
important, it was not necessary that a proprietor should in all cases be entitled to 
take advantage of an error as to parcels at the expense of the true owner of land 
wrongly included in a certificate. A long list of exceptions made somewhat unreal 
the declaration that registration vested a new title in the person registered. More 
particularly, the recognition of the exception of wrong description meant that 
there was no guarantee of parcels, and made it difficult to treat the certificate as a 
new grant of the land described in it. Of course, it might still have been 
maintained that the certificate operated as a grant, but as a grant which in the 
specially excepted cases would be wholly or partially invalid. But this would have 
been an artificial conception, and it must have seemed better to abandon the 
original principle, and instead to treat the certificate of title as being what its very 
name imported, rather than as a grant or source of title. The certificate could then 
be made conclusive in cases where this was necessary to achieve the purpose of 
the legislation, and open to challenge and correction in other cases where it was 
not necessary to protect the registered proprietor at the expense of others with a 
better claim. The one case where absolute protection was necessary was the case 
of the bona fide purchaser for value dealing on the faith of the register, and 
accordingly the changes which further qualified the general principle of 
indefeasibility were accompanied by an elaboration of the provisions that made 
the certificate conclusive in favour of the bona fide purchaser for value.
7
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Consequently, it is apparent that South Australia’s original land titles system was 
designed to protect purchasers and by implication, the mortgagees who used the land as 
collateral in exchange for loans, from the endemic weaknesses in the common law and in deed 
registry systems.
8
  This protection involved substantive changes to the law – certainty of 
ownership through a title as opposed to from the deeds which preceded the transfer in ownership 
– and practical and administrative matters. The process was designed to improve transfers, 
making them more efficient, ie, to simplify the transfer process and to thereby reduce the 
associated costs.  This way, the underlying objective of protecting the purchaser and the 
mortgagee could be achieved. 
Canada had similar policy objectives which shaped the land titles system in the North-
West Territories. With the adoption of The Dominion Lands Act
9
 in 1872, Canada evidenced a 
commitment to having settlers on agricultural lands located within this region and Manitoba.
10
  
For this to occur, a type of state machinery which could efficiently process the grants of land was 
needed.  The Torrens System of land titles registration served this function.  
With this goal in mind, the Territories Real Property Act
11
 was assented to on June 2, 
1886, and the new scheme was proclaimed in force effective January 1, 1887.
12
  Its preamble 
explicitly stated the government’s objectives in adopting this legislation, reading, 
Whereas it is expedient to give certainty to the title to estates in land in the 
Territories and to facilitate proof thereof, and also to render dealings with land 
more simple and less expensive: Therefore Her Majesty … declares and enacts as 
follows ….13 
 
The government wanted to achieve two goals. First, it wanted “to give certainty to the title to 
estates in land,” meaning it wanted persons to be assured that the person named on the title in 
most instances was its owner.  In keeping with this goal, registration accompanied by the 
issuance of a Certificate of Title was fundamentally important. This level of certainty would 
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encourage individuals to purchase land, and would cause lenders to be more likely to use land as 
collateral in exchange for making loans to settlers.   
The government also wanted to simplify conveyancing practices and thereby make the 
transaction of acquiring and divesting oneself of real property more affordable.  If practices were 
simplified so that a chain of lengthy and convoluted documents would no longer need to be 
reviewed in great detail, the transactions could be concluded in less time and at less cost.   
Whereas conveyancing in the common law was based on the “deed,” with its lack of 
standardized language,
14
 the Torrens System promulgated the use of forms in conveyancing 
transactions, for everything from a Certificate of Title to a transfer and a mortgage.
15
  Such 
standardized and concise forms were easy to understand, and this reduced conveyancing costs 
and the time required to complete the transaction. 
These were the government’s initial policy goals.  The preamble was dropped when the 
statutes were consolidated in 1887,
16
 but, even after Saskatchewan and Alberta became provinces 
and enacted their own land titles legislation based on the federal statute,
17
 these goals continued 
to be recognized. Even in the 1960s, at least one scholar continued to use the wording from the 
preamble.
 18
 In the late 1970s another described the goals differently, in terms of their effect: 
There are two deliberate fundamental elements in a Torrens system; one is 
administrative, and the other is legal.  They are intimately related and together 
they constitute the strategy of the system. The administrative element is a 
comprehensive set of records maintained by the state disclosing all possible 
interests in any lands covered by the system. The legal element is the limitation of 
legal interests to those conferred by the state.
19
 
 
The administrative mechanism of registration by the state produces a legal result – certainty of 
title ownership – while simplifying administrative processes, thereby reducing expenses and 
increasing the speed in which conveyancing transactions can be processed. One goal is 
administrative, and one is substantive. 
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In determining how to characterize the fundamental features of Saskatchewan’s land titles 
system and whether indefeasibility of title is one such feature, it must be recognized that there 
always has existed a potential for tension between these two goals. If certainty of ownership of 
title – the substantive legal result – is the paramount objective, transactions may not be able to be 
processed quickly or cost effectively.  For example, if the system’s goal is to effect certainty of 
ownership of title in all instances, land titles staff must peruse every instrument in great detail 
prior to registration.  Then government will be assured that the important details in the 
instrument – including the names of the parties and the legal description of the land – are 
identified correctly, and that the document has been properly executed.  Doing so takes time.
20
   
If the paramount goal is simplifying conveyancing processes and reducing associated 
costs, certainty of ownership cannot be so absolute.
21
  Transactions can be processed very 
quickly, or ownership of title can be very certain; both goals cannot be achieved in equal 
measure. This inherent tension has been described by government personnel as follows: 
     A land titles conveyancing system should have two purposes. One is to 
provide security of ownership, that is, it should protect an owner against being 
deprived of ownership except by his or her own act or by the specific operation of 
a legal process such as expropriation or debt collection. The other purpose is to 
provide facility of transfer, that it, it should enable anyone, particularly a 
purchaser, to acquire ownership easily, quickly, cheaply and safely. 
Unfortunately, a measure designed to achieve one of these purposes is likely to 
militate against achieving the other.
22
 
 
In the former statutory regime,
23
 certainty of title was preferred.  Land titles staff took as 
much time as necessary to review instruments prior to registration, as their mandate was to reject 
instruments which were invalid.
24
  For example, if land titles staff discovered that a mortgage 
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failed to describe the land properly, it would not be registered. Depending on the cover letter, 
land titles staff would either reject the faulty instrument or, if the lawyer had asked to be 
contacted prior to rejection, the lawyer would be given the opportunity to correct the instrument 
to make it capable of sustaining registration.
25
  This process ensured that certainty of ownership 
could be attained in a matter of weeks, which was a great improvement over the common law.   
In the most recent Saskatchewan legislation, facility of transfer is now the chosen goal.
26
 
The instruments upon which interests are based are no longer reviewed when they are submitted 
for registration.  If the instrument is invalid, registration does not cure the defect.
27
 This is one 
reason why transactions usually are processed in less than three days.
28
 It is important to 
acknowledge the primary policy goal, because it is this which shapes the form, content and 
interpretation of the legislation, and which acts as the benchmark to measure the appropriateness 
of “indefeasibility of title.” 
 There is another inherent tension in the policy goals of the land titles system.  The system 
was adopted to protect settlers – persons acquiring land – and lenders who wanted to certainty of 
ownership before they would use land as collateral.  The system was not designed to protect 
everyone equally.  For example, a dispute always involves at least two parties with competing 
interests.  In land disputes, there is one piece of land in issue and usually it cannot be divided 
equitably between the parties.  Only one party can succeed in a claim of ownership of the title.  
With land, there is little room for compromise or divided success.  This creates tension and 
nuance. 
This underlying focus on the purchaser and by implication, the lender, is often hidden in 
the current discourse surrounding “indefeasibility of title.”  Often it is treated as if it applies 
equally to vendors and purchasers. Mrs Hermanson discovered the problems with this type of 
reasoning.  She was the legal owner who had been defrauded of her property.  However, a bona 
fide purchaser for value was held to have the better ownership claim.
29
  Similarly, the Hockleys 
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entered into a written lease containing a right of first refusal with one of the descendants of the 
owner named on the Certificate of Title.  Their claim was defeated by the family who had 
maintained possession of the land for more than sixty years, initially through an agreement with 
the owner.
30
 Both cases illustrate how a purchaser is favoured over a vendor or previous owner in 
this legislation. 
However, this policy is not universally understood or applied; reliance on “indefeasibility 
of title” can adversely impact the public. Consider the Knoglers, the couple who purchased a 
lakefront lot at Candle Lake, Saskatchewan from Mr Henderson.
31
  Both the vendor and the 
purchasers knew that only a portion of the lot was to be sold, but the transfer for the entire parcel 
registered in the Knoglers’ names.  Instead of recognizing that an issued title is not conclusive 
proof of the boundaries of the parcel,
32
 the Knoglers continue to act as if indefeasibility of title is 
all encompassing.
33
   
They incurred expenses: (a) for an application to lapse a miscellaneous interest which Mr 
Henderson caused to be registered against the title to the land;
34
 for trial;
35
 for an appeal;
36
 and for 
a return to the trial judge because they were refusing to complete a procedural step required to 
effect the Court of Appeal’s judgment.37 Had the Knoglers possessed a more nuanced 
understanding of “indefeasibility of title” shortly after they purchased the land from Mr 
Henderson, they may not have acted as if “technically the land”38 was theirs, and adopted a less 
costly and time-consuming course of action.  As it is, they illustrate how purchasers can incur 
expenses from relying upon “indefeasibility of title” as expressed in the dominant legal lexicon 
and as buttressed through reliance on land titles forms, with the accompanying failure to 
completely encapsulate the nuances inherent in the land titles scheme. 
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Indefeasibility of title is a myth masquerading as a legal fact, one which can harm the 
unwary. Twenty-five percent of all claims made against lawyers arise in real estate.
39
  It is unclear 
if any can be attributed to lawyers’ failure to understand the nuances of indefeasibility of title,40 
but when one considers the degree of complexity in this area, and how it increases through a less-
than complete understanding of the realities of indefeasibility of title, this interpretation may be a 
factor in the proliferation of claims.
41
 Lawyers and judges do not always possess a nuanced 
understanding of this term,
42
 and reliance upon the three principles serves to obfuscate the 
legislation’s substantive provisions and its goals. 
Take the mirror principle. Lawyers are taught that in a land titles system predicated upon 
the Torrens model, the title is like a mirror which reflects all pertinent information.
43
  Yet this 
image does not really capture the essence of the title. Some Canadian scholars critique this image 
on the basis that a mirror produces a reverse image of the object.  They reject its use, and instead 
advocate that a photograph is more applicable.
44
  While correct vis-à-vis the image created by 
this analogy, they neglect the fact that a title is not conclusive proof of items such as the 
boundaries of the parcel of land, or of the ownership of the beds of water bodies located within 
the parcel.  Because of such deficiencies in information, one should not say that the title is like 
an ordinary mirror or photograph which reflects all of its essential elements.  It does not. 
The owner and the land are described on the title, but the image is hazy and may be 
distorted. If one wants an accurate or certain image, one cannot rely on what one sees but must 
ask questions. For example, in the former regime it would have been prudent to review the plan 
referred to in the legal description if one was purchasing land with a metes and bounds 
description. More generically, each title contains a statement to the effect that the estate is 
subject to statutory exceptions, which serves as a clue that one cannot rely solely on the 
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information in the document. On a title, there is some basic information from which to draw 
inferences, and which can guide a careful viewer who seeks to determine if more information is 
required to obtain a clear and certain image.    
Referring to the curtain principle may also confuse: it is portrayed as if it is drawn, but in 
Saskatchewan, the curtain remains half-open.  A title is conclusive proof of ownership of a 
surface parcel; in this circumstance the curtain is drawn.  Yet until a mineral title is certified, the 
window of ownership remains wide open, and all instruments back to the grant must be reviewed 
to reach a conclusion as to who has the best ownership claim. The documents behind the title – 
or curtain – are vitally important. This means the ownership information on such a title is 
uncertain. 
It is similar if a water body is contained within the boundaries of a parcel of land.  
Because water bodies are vested in the Crown without any obligation for them to be titled, they 
remain statutory exceptions to ownership.  The Provincial Lands Act
45
 and The Saskatchewan 
Watershed Authority Act, 2005
46
 and the grant need to be consulted before one can make a 
conclusive determination as to the ownership of the beds and shores.
47
  When such a water-body 
is present, even if the title indicates that the parcel contains 160 acres, the owner cannot rely on 
the curtain to claim the water-body is included.  Once again, the curtain remains open.  This is 
the effect of the statutory exceptions.   
In Chapters 1 and 3, it has been established that the “insurance principle” does not 
capture the intent of the compensation provisions in the legislation.
48
 Because compensation 
from the Registrar of Titles is only available in limited circumstances,
49
 referring to this as a 
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principle is misleading.  One Australian commentator succinctly summarized the problems 
inherent in referring to this as a principle: 
It is said that the assurance fund warrants or guarantees the title against 
losses which may flow from the operation of the system of title by registration. In 
such cases we have a paradox: the principle of “indefeasibility” is replaced by that 
of “guarantee” – the one gives security against deprivation, while the other 
assumes the possibility of such deprivation and grants financial assistance if it 
occurs. The existence of this principle is a further limitation upon the case 
advanced for the claim of “indefeasibility”. In addition, difficulty of access to the 
assurance fund in most jurisdictions belies the claim that it is a “principle” of title 
by registration that loss should be met from such a fund. Large accumulations of 
moneys in the many funds (in Australia, England and Wales, for example) support 
this contention. Many titles have been held to be bad upon the basis of the 
indefeasibility of someone else’s title, but few claims have ever succeeded against 
the assurance fund to make good the losses. Then, there are jurisdictions where no 
fund exists, yet there is registration of title: Germany, Austria and Israel. This 
supposed “principle” is exploded.50  
 
Given that these constructs have come to dominate the legal discourse regarding land 
titles issues, it is not surprising to find statements such as this in court decisions:   
The integrity of the land titles system in Saskatchewan has long depended on the 
fundamental principle of indefeasibility of title. A party intending to obtain an 
interest in land in Saskatchewan is entitled to rely on the certificate of title being 
correct and conclusively representing all interests in the land without having to 
look behind the title to determine if there are any unregistered interests. This 
principle has often been referred to as the ‘curtain’ principle of the Torrens 
system. This principle is absolute and is subject only to statutory exceptions or the 
effects fraudulent activities.
51
 
 
With this type of approach, very little attention is given to the statutory exceptions or to 
the contents of the legislation.  Land titles systems are treated as homogenous, when in 
reality the systems are distinct.
52
 “Indefeasibility of title” makes real property law seem 
settled and simplistic, which may help to explain why land titles issues have so 
infrequently been the subject of journal articles in recent years.
53
  The misunderstanding 
which results may further exacerbate the collective reliance upon these terms. A way 
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needs to be found to change this situation and to create more awareness of the 
complexities inherent in Saskatchewan’s land titles system.  
The land titles scheme is predicated upon a statute and the intentions of the legislature, 
not common law and the interpretation of judges.  In this milieu, the language contained in the 
statute should be preferred over a legal construct. “Indefeasibility of title” and the three 
principles contradict the explicit policy goals espoused in the legislation and therefore should not 
be used as the basis for interpreting the substantive statutory provisions.  This term was not 
included in South Australia’s first land titles statute.54 Closer to home, Saskatchewan has been 
much the same: in the succession of statutes in Saskatchewan’s first land titles regime, and in 
Saskatchewan’s new Act which was adopted in 2001, “indefeasibility of title” and the three 
principles have never been explicitly mentioned.
 55
   
Even when the province adopted new legislation to support a modern, computer-based 
land titles system in which purchasers continue to benefit from the statutory protections, 
Saskatchewan chose not to include these terms which dominant real property law discourse.
56
 
“Indefeasibility of title” and the three principles do not favour purchasers or mortgagees; without 
a nuanced understanding of the actual scheme, it appears as if existing land owners receive the 
same benefits as to purchasers.  The statutory scheme suggests otherwise.  By excluding these 
terms, it may be concluded that government implicitly acknowledged that these descriptions are 
not accurate reflections of its policy agenda.  
 If lawyers use the language of the statute instead of reducing debate to discussions of 
indefeasibility, the limitations and nuances inherent in the system become more apparent.  
“Indefeasibility of title” and the three principles make it seem as if the land titles legislation 
provides broader protection than is available. If lawyers cease relying upon these expressions and 
instead use the language of the statute, they will possess better comprehension of the ambit of the 
legislation and the protections it provides to their clients in specific and enumerated 
circumstances. 
 Examples have been provided as to the results which occur when the terms are preferred 
to the contents of the legislation.  This fact is illustrated in the discussions regarding Arndt v 
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First Galesburg National Bank and Trust Co, CIBC Mortgages Inc v Saskatchewan (Registrar of 
Titles), and Knogler v Henderson.
57
 In each of these cases, the conclusion reached by the Court 
was either not supported by the contents of The Land Titles Act, or the court focused on the 
common law conception of “indefeasibility of title” as espoused in the dominant legal lexicon 
and largely ignored the applicable statutory provision which addressed the issue before it. 
 It seems as if there has always been tension between the use of aids and legal principles 
which are not codified in the legislation, and the contents of land titles legislation.  Certainly the 
courts appear to have grappled with this issue.  Thus, in Fels v Knowles
58
 the New Zealand Court 
of Appeal was compelled to write,  
The object of the Act was to contain within its four corners a complete system 
which any intelligent man could understand, and which could be carried into 
effect in practice without the intervention of persons skilled in the law.
59
   
 
This same tension is evident when the Supreme Court of Canada in Union Bank of 
Canada v Phillips
60
 debated the concept of notice and whether the Saskatchewan land titles 
provision or the common law interpretation should apply.  Chief Justice Davies quoted the 
applicable provision and then concluded that the statutory provision should be preferred to an 
equitable principle, writing that:  
the object and purpose of this section … was to lay down a different rule which 
should govern in cases coming within its ambit, and unless we are prepared to 
ignore the section altogether or fritter away its language and meaning, we must 
hold that … these equitable rules established by the authorities, however just and 
equitable they may seem to be under ordinary circumstances, are not applicable to 
cases coming within [the applicable] section … of “The Land Titles Act.”61 
 
This statement was not an aberration, as in the same case Justice Idington reached the 
same conclusion that the wording of the statutory provision must be applied. Only he expressed 
it in stronger words: 
I cannot, however, see how such [equitable] doctrines can be maintained in 
such cases as in view of the express language of the legislature … 
                                                 
57
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58
 Fels v Knowles (1896), 26 NZ Rep 604 at 620, quoted with approval by Chief Justice Davies in Union Bank of 
Canada v Phillips and Boulter Waugh Limited (1919) 58 SCR 385 (Boulter Waugh citing to QL). 
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It seems impossible that the proper effect can be given to that section unless 
we try to appreciate what the legislature was about. 
Clearly it was not satisfied with the results of the law as settled by judicial 
expressions and decisions, and had determined upon the adoption of a system of 
registration as a basis of ownership of land a means of settling the order of 
priority of claims into or out of any such ownership when once registered under 
the Act in question. 
In doing so it cast upon those acquiring any such ownership or claim to any 
interest therein burdens, perhaps previously unknown, in the way of diligence in 
order to protect the rights so acquired by observing the provisions of the Act in 
that regard under penalty of losing ownership or priority of claim save in the case 
of fraud on the part of those obtaining the priority, which the Act seems clearly to 
contemplate as possible even with notice or knowledge unless springing from that 
conveyed by means of registration of a caveat…. 
But the steps necessary to secure such benefits must be those contemplated by 
the Act and not something else. 
The principle involved is not new. A privilege of any kind created by statute 
must be enforced in the way that statute provides. 
It cannot be made available in any other way.
62
 
 
The Supreme Court recognized that the statutory regime was preeminent, and that it must be 
followed even contrary to long-established equitable principles.   
It is ironic that in the case credited with the popularization of “indefeasibility of title,” 
Canadian Pacific Railway v Turta,
63
 the judge who used this expression the most
64
 simply tried 
to use it as an adjunct to assist in his task of statutory interpretation.  Justice Egbert did not start 
from the preconception
65
 that the statute contained the principle of indefeasibility of title, or that 
its provisions needed to be interpreted in accordance with this concept.
66
  Instead he asserted: 
     Keeping in mind the purpose and intent of the Act …, I fail to see how it is 
possible for a court to import into these protective clauses words which are not 
there, and to attach to them another condition or exception which the legislature 
did not see fit to mention.
67
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Such an approach would better serve the public, because lawyers would be forced to read the 
statute instead of relying upon “principles” and forms, and would thereby gain greater 
comprehension of what actually is a very complex system.  “Indefeasibility of title” and the three 
principles are not adequate for describing it, and should therefore be used sparingly, if at all.   
“Indefeasibility of title” as it has come to be understood in the dominant legal discourse 
is a myth which obfuscates the Saskatchewan government’s policy objectives for operating a 
land titles system.  As evidenced by the survey of cases in Chapter 2 and the more in-depth 
analysis of a few recent cases in Chapter 4, these concepts are misunderstood by many lawyers 
and by the public, and this has the potential to inflict harm on homeowners.  The Legislature has 
chosen not to adopt “indefeasibility of title” in the statutory provisions, and used the expression 
“conclusive proof of ownership” instead.  This policy decision should be respected.  Doing so 
would result in greater clarity and would promote understanding of the nuances inherent in 
Saskatchewan’s land titles scheme.  The time has come for the emperor to take off his new suit 
and start wearing his old clothes.  They may be frayed, but at least they are visible to all.  If this 
occurs, this “story” may deserve the classic, fairy tale, ending. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
